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Abstract 
 
Over the last 10 to 15 years, Australian coal mining companies have implemented 
sophisticated management systems designed to substantially improve workplace heath 
and safety (WHS). This has led to a distinctive WHS ‘architecture’ across the industry, 
and has coincided with steadily declining fatality and injury rates. In conjunction with 
these developments, government regulators have progressively modified the external 
regulatory framework. In particular, new forms of regulation have shifted away from 
prescription towards ‘management-based’ initiatives. The expectation is that 
companies will go ‘beyond compliance’ to achieve WHS improvements greater than 
that required by law.  
 
The combination of internal company WHS architecture and external management-
based regulation has coincided with substantial improvements in WHS outcomes 
across the Australian coal mining industry. Since the mid 1990s, fatalities have fallen 
substantially, along with other recorded injuries. However, in the last few years it 
appears that these earlier gains have not been sustained. Further, WHS outcomes 
vary widely between individual mine sites of the same company.  
 
Against this backdrop, the thesis addresses two overriding research questions. First, 
what factors have hindered the continued and consistent improvement in WHS 
outcomes across mine sites? Second, and from a normative perspective, what policies 
and strategies may be employed to overcome such factors?  
 
In answering these questions, the thesis addresses several inter-related themes, 
namely: the implementation of corporate-wide WHS management systems; the role of 
culture, especially mistrust, in influencing the operation of such internal WHS 
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management systems; the role of mistrust in undermining the operation of external 
regulation, including management-based regulation; the tendency of WHS codes of 
practice to be used as a form of creeping prescription; and the competencies, 
capacities and enforcement strategies of WHS regulatory agencies.  
 
The thesis draws on interview-based fieldwork, desktop research and literature reviews 
competed between 2007 and 2012. Face-to-face interviews were conducted at three 
Australian coal-mining companies, as well as with regulatory officials across Australia 
and officials from national and state mining industry associations and trade unions. In 
addition, phone-based interviews were conducted with WHS management from over 
20 metalliferous and coal mining companies. The thesis also draws on a range of 
safety statistics, both from the public domain and internal company records. Finally, 
interviews and statistical data were supplemented by reviews of both the domestic and 
international literature.  
 
The thesis’ findings suggest that WHS management systems may be, to a 
considerable extent, subservient to the culture into which they are received. And high 
levels of organisational mistrust, in particular, are more prevalent in those mine sites 
that appear to have resisted most strongly the imposition of corporate wide WHS 
management systems and standards. Beyond internal culture, the tools, behaviour and 
attitudes of mining inspectorates also influence WHS behaviour and outcomes. As 
such, the thesis considers how mining inspectorates should interact with mining 
companies in seeking to enforce WHS compliance, what inspectoral competencies, 
characteristics and behaviours should they possess, and what enforcement guidelines 
should they operate under. In this respect, the findings of the thesis may resonate 
beyond the Australian coal mining industry. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Changing WHS landscape 
 
Over the last 10 to 15 years there have been substantial changes across the workplace 
health and safety (WHS) landscape within which the Australian coal mining industry 
operates. This is reflected both in the internal management approaches adopted by 
large mining companies and the external regulation imposed by government 
authorities.  
 
Some of the changes in the WHS practices of coal mining companies may be 
attributable to a self-interested recognition that poor WHS outcomes make for poor 
business outcomes. In the short term, WHS incidents and injuries disrupt the 
production process, leading to a loss of time and costs. They can also result in 
increased absences, higher workers’ compensation costs and corporate fines (in the 
event of successful prosecutions). In the longer term, continued WHS incidents may 
diminish their ‘social licence to operate’, with the potential to undermine, for example, 
broad community support and, ultimately, government approval of mine site 
developments and/or expansions. In turn, this may also result in the imposition of more 
stringent and onerous regulations. Further, in a form of enlightened self-interest, coal-
mining companies are comprised of managers that are not immune to the emotional 
cost of a serious injury or fatality occurring on their ‘watch’, something they would 
undoubtedly wish to avoid.  
 
In this context, international coal mining companies operating within Australia have 
developed and implemented sophisticated WHS management systems designed to 
substantially reduce workplace death, injury and disease. Achieving such 
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transformational change has required a considerable injection of time and resources, 
and, crucially, substantial cultural and organisational change. Central to such systems 
are a combination of targets, strategies, tools and risk management initiatives that 
have evolved into a common and distinctive WHS ‘architecture’ across the industry. 
Over time, this internal regulatory architecture has coincided with steadily declining 
fatality and injury rates, as measured by official safety statistics, and more ambitious 
WHS improvement targets.  
 
In conjunction with these internal developments, external government regulators have 
progressively modified the regulatory framework to complement and accelerate the 
industry’s shift towards systemic WHS management. In particular, new forms of 
regulation have shifted away from prescription towards ‘management-based’ initiatives 
emphasising the importance of an integrated systematic approach to WHS, as 
opposed to a reactive ‘piecemeal’ approach based on individual remedies. Although far 
from a complete transition, management-based regulation (sometimes called systems-
based or process-based regulation) requires mining companies to establish a 
documented WHS management system incorporating targets, standards, hazard 
identification, training, audit and review and major hazard management plans (with 
obvious overlaps to the approach concurrently being developed by mining companies 
described above).  
 
In theory, under management-based regulation, inspectors assess the operation of the 
WHS system itself, as opposed to conducting site-based inspections that may result in 
prescribed improvements, often of a technical nature. The underlying rationale of this 
approach is that it is the mining companies themselves that are in the best position to 
determine technical solutions ‘on the ground’. The expectation is that not only does 
such flexibility reduce compliance costs, but, further, by adopting a WHS management 
systems, companies will go ‘beyond compliance’ – that is, implement WHS 
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improvements greater than that required by law through a process of continuous 
improvement. This is in stark contrast to the minimum compliance mentality often 
fostered by prescriptive regulation.  
 
In practice, however, mines inspectors have not completely abandoned their use of 
prescriptive approaches, and nor has the corresponding mining WHS legislation and 
regulation entirely rejected prescriptive standards. The result is a somewhat hybridised 
compromise between management-based and prescriptive approaches (in conjunction 
with broad-based general duties), with different standards arguably having the potential 
to pull in different directions (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). Nevertheless, the most 
substantial regulatory developments in recent years within the mining WHS policy 
framework have been in the direction of management-based regulation. 
 
1.2 Improved WHS outcomes, progress stalled 
 
The combination of internal company WHS architecture and external management-
based regulation has coincided with substantial improvements in WHS outcomes 
across the Australian coal mining industry. Since the mid 1990s, fatalities have fallen 
substantially, along with other recorded injuries. These improvements compare 
favourably to other countries, with an international review finding that mining fatality 
rates in Australia are among the lowest in the world (Ural 2008; Poplin et al 2008). This 
suggests the plausibility of a causal relationship between WHS management-based 
approaches and improved WHS outcomes, and, indeed, there is some evidence for 
just such a conclusion (see Gunningham & Sinclair 2012, 12-14).  
 
Despite these positive developments, there is little room for complacency, with the 
industry still some considerable distance away from its aspiration of ‘zero harm’. 
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Further, in the last few years it appears that the earlier gains in WHS outcomes that 
followed the introduction of corporate WHS architectures base on management 
systems and management-based regulation have not been sustained. Instead, 
improvements in serious injury and fatality statistics have plateaued. Further, WHS 
outcomes vary widely between individual mine sites of the same company, even where 
they operate under ostensibly uniform WHS management systems. Collectively, this 
suggests that there may be limitations in current approaches to WHS management 
systems and/or regulation.  
 
1.3 Thesis scope and research questions 
 
The thesis takes as its starting point, then, the slowing, indeed plateauing, of recent 
improvements in WHS outcomes across Australian coal mining companies, as well as 
the variation of WHS performance within those same companies. In broad terms, these 
phenomena raise two overriding research questions: 
• First, what factors have hindered the continued and consistent improvement in 
WHS outcomes across mine sites?  
• Second, and from a normative perspective, what policies and strategies may be 
employed to overcome such factors?  
 
In answering these questions, the thesis addresses several interrelated themes, 
namely: the implementation of corporate-wide WHS management systems; the role of 
culture, especially mistrust, in influencing the operation of such internal WHS 
management systems; the role of mistrust in undermining the operation of external 
regulation, including management-based regulation; the tendency of WHS codes of 
practice to be used as a form of creeping prescription; and the competencies, 
capacities and enforcement strategies of WHS regulatory agencies (in particular, 
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mining inspectorates). Each of these themes is expanded on below, including the 
identification of more detailed research questions. 
 
1.3.1 WHS management system architecture 
 
Over the last 15 years or so, safety statistics have recorded a steady improvement in 
the WHS performance of the Australian mine industry, including that of coal mining. 
This improvement has coincided with the progressive introduction of corporate wide 
WHS management systems. Today, such systems are the centrepiece of WHS policies 
and programs across coal mining companies. In essence, this entails the development 
and implementation of WHS targets, processes, reporting, reviews and audits under a 
single, comprehensive and integrated WHS management system. Whether required to 
do so by external regulators, or by choice, it is a widely held belief among companies 
that this approach will inevitably lead to better WHS outcomes (Parker & Nielson 
2006). Regulators, too, often subscribe to this way of thinking (Black 2011). As such, 
there is now a substantial and pervasive ecosystem of system designers, 
implementation consultants, data management software experts and third part auditors 
built-up on the back of, and in turn, perpetuating the use of, such WHS management 
systems in the mining sector.  
 
Given this prominence, and the widespread faith placed in them, it is timely to consider 
the role and contribution of WHS management systems. In particular, the thesis 
addresses the following research questions: 
• What are the defining features of WHS management systems in the Australian coal 
mining industry? 
• How similar are the WHS management systems across Australian coal mining 
companies? 
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• To the extent that WHS management systems have ‘converged’ across such 
companies, what are the underlying drivers of this phenomenon? 
• Has too much emphasis been placed on the role of WHS management systems to 
deliver continued WHS improvements? 
• What are to the potential limitations of WHS management systems, particularly 
given the apparent slowing of WHS improvements across the industry? 
 
As a subsequent chapter of this thesis elaborates, there is strong circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that WHS management systems have made a very substantial 
contribution to WHS improvements in the Australian coal mining industry. Further, not 
only has the industry converged on a remarkably common approach to corporate-wide 
WHS management systems, but also these systems, arguably, closely resemble what 
Parker (2002, Chapter 8) describes as the “institutionalising of internal corporate 
commitment”. Nevertheless, the slowing of WHS improvement across the industry 
gives pause for thought. One possible explanation is that many of the ‘easy’ WHS 
gains already have been made, and as per the law of diminishing returns, any further 
gains will require a much higher investment in energy and resources than that which 
has occurred to date.  
 
A second possible explanation is that WHS management systems have emphasised 
items and actions that can be readily measured through internal and external audits. 
Not only does this risk, to some extent, a ‘tick the box’ mentality, as the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2005) and Hopkins (2005) have noted, it 
potentially ignores more intangible, but crucially important factors, such as safety 
culture. It is this latter point that the thesis explores in considerable depth.  
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1.3.2 Culture, mistrust and corporate WHS management systems 
 
There has been much study on the interaction of ‘soft’ issues, namely culture, on ‘hard’ 
issues, namely technology and equipment and, more recently, WHS management 
systems. A common theme to emerge is that traditional approaches will underperform 
unless cultural issues are successfully addressed. Reason (2000), for example, has 
been prominent in arguing that WHS management systems are much more effective in 
the presence of a ‘robust’ safety culture, and that this takes on profound significance 
precisely at the point at which WHS incident rates reach a plateau. Similarly, Parker et 
al (2006) argue that “in order to go beyond this ‘low but (seemingly) unassailable 
plateau’ and to continue improvement in safety performance, it is necessary to address 
the hearts and minds of management and workers”. Finally, Hudson (2007) points to a 
‘generative’ safety culture as being crucial to involving an entire organisation in the 
effective implementation of WHS management systems, including having a chronic 
unease about safety.  
 
In sum, safety culture, along with closely related concepts such as ‘safety climate’, 
have been subject to sustained academic attention, However, this attention – 
understandably, given the breadth of this field of study – has given insufficient attention 
to important strands of culture that may have a disproportionate influence in shaping 
safety outcomes. This thesis hones in on what is arguably the single most important 
sub-component of safety culture (albeit rarely recognised as such in the literature), 
namely that of trust, or more particularly, mistrust. The role of mistrust is something 
that has gained increasing attention from official inquiries in recent years. For example, 
the New South Wales Mine Safety Review identified a “debilitating mistrust between 
the members of the tripartite process” (Wran & McClelland 2005, 7) a major hurdle to 
better WHS outcomes across the industry. Similarly, the New South Wales Minerals 
Council (an industry body) nominated mistrust as the single most important impediment 
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to a building a better safety climate in mining companies (New South Wales Minerals 
Council 2005).  
 
Where these and other reports fall short, however, is in not identifying the underlying 
causes of mistrust, the mechanisms by which it undermines WHS performance and, 
crucially, the potential avenues for reducing its prevalence. The academic literature is 
little better in this regard. For example, only “a limited number of researchers have 
examined the concept within the realms of safety research” (Cox et al 2004, 827; see 
also Risk Analysis: Special Issue on Trust, 2006). Nor has mistrust been the subject of 
any detailed empirical research in the mining industry. Consequently, our 
understanding of mistrust in the context of safety culture and, ultimately, WHS 
performance is less than ideal. As Zeffane & Connell (2003, 4) put it, the origins and 
evolution of mistrust in the workplace remains “complex and elusive”.  
 
In light of the above, a central focus of the thesis is to examine the impact of mistrust 
within Australian coal mining companies on WHS management systems and WHS 
performance. In particular, the thesis addresses the following research questions: 
• What are the origins of safety culture, including mistrust, within Australian coal 
mining companies? 
• What are the defining features of mistrust within Australian coal mining companies? 
• Where, and between whom, does mistrust manifest itself within Australian coal 
mining companies? 
• Does the presence of mistrust in mining companies negatively impact on the 
implementation of WHS management systems? 
• And if so, how does the presence of mistrust in mining companies negatively 
impact on the implementation of WHS management systems? 
  
17 
As subsequent chapters of this thesis elaborate, the issue of mistrust resonates 
strongly in the context of worker-manager and mine site manager-corporate relations 
(as well as being highly pertinent to relationships between the external WHS 
inspectorate and mine site managers and workers – discussed further below). The 
thesis, in particular, identifies the presence of mistrust as a real and present danger to 
better WHS outcomes, in general, and the operation of WHS management systems, in 
particular. Further, the often-poisonous industrial relations between workers and 
management in the coal mining industry in Australia have exacerbated mistrust at 
many mine sites. As such, the presence of mistrust may limit the gains that can 
realistically be achieved under WHS management systems adopted by Australian coal 
mining companies. 
 
Conversely, there has been some academic work on trust and the positive 
contributions it can make to WHS practices and performance, including, improved 
communication, better cooperation, generating ‘buy-in’ of management decisions, 
fostering a greater propensity to share safety knowledge and, ultimately, delivering 
improved WHS outcomes (Barling & Hutchinson 2000). While this literature addresses 
the broader question of how companies can foster organisational cultures that can 
complement and improve the operation of WHS management systems, there is less 
discussion of how to build trust in particular, including in the context of coal mining. As 
such, another detailed research question is: 
• What actions and strategies, both at corporate and mine site level, can best be 
taken to restore and build trust across Australian coal mining companies? 
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1.3.3 Mistrust and variations in mine site WHS performance 
 
In contrast to organisational safety culture in general, differences in culture between 
mine sites of a single company, and their potential contribution to WHS outcomes, 
have received far less attention in the literature. Instead, much of the literature 
assumes that, just as WHS management systems are consistent across companies, so 
too are their underlying workplace safety cultures. Given the geographical separation, 
the history of semi-autonomous management, and the different physical circumstances 
of individual mines sites that exist within many mining companies, however, there are 
risks in assuming they possess homogenous workplace cultures, and by extension, 
safety cultures, across their mine sites. The limited academic research on this issue 
that is available is somewhat equivocal (Vaghefi et al 2000; Wilcoxson & Millet 2000), 
and there is a paucity of studies on differences in safety culture, in particular, levels of 
mistrust, between individual sites in the Australian coal mining industry.  
 
Given the strong emphasis that Australian coal mining companies have placed on the 
implementation of corporate-wide WHS management systems, the potential 
contribution of mine site culture, particularly mistrust, on the efficacy of those systems 
and, consequently, WHS outcomes, is worthy of investigation. In this regard, a crucial 
first step is to determine if there is variation in the mine safety performance of mine 
sites within those companies. Having established the existence and extent of any 
variation, it is then possible to examine the potential contribution of site-specific cultural 
factors, particularly mistrust. This gives rise to the following thesis research 
questions: 
• Is there variation in WHS outcomes between mine sites within Australian coal 
mining companies? 
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• Is there variation in safety culture, particularly the level of mistrust, between 
individual mine sites within Australian coal mining companies. 
• Is there a relationship between variation in mine site safety culture, particularly 
mistrust, and variation in mine site WHS outcomes? 
• If so, what is the extent and nature of this relationship? 
 
As detailed in the subsequent chapters, the research revealed not only the presence of 
strikingly different mine-site sub-cultures within individual coal mining companies, but, 
further, that such cultural factors can have an adverse impact on WHS practices and 
performance. In particular, it was found that there is a cluster of characteristics 
associated within heightened levels of mistrust at mine sites within a single mining 
company that demonstrate poorer WHS outcomes – as measured by a range of 
internal and external safety statistics. In this respect, various manifestations of mistrust 
undermined the implementation of corporate WHS management initiatives at the mine 
site level.  
 
Mistrust is most obvious between workers and mine site management, particularly in 
an industry such as Australian coal mining that has historically suffered persistently 
acrimonious relationships between trade unions and management. Beyond this, 
however, mistrust can also have a corrosive impact on the relationships between mine 
site management and a geographically remote corporate management. Such mistrust 
can undermine attempts by corporate management to impose/implement consistent 
WHS policies and programs. Where mine site management, especially, middle 
managers, mistrust corporate motivations in pursing WHS policies and programs, their 
effective implementation may be severely compromised. In short, the thesis addresses 
the origins, development and consequences of mistrust across the above three areas, 
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and pinpoints where it can negatively impact on WHS practices and performance. An 
additional thesis research question, however, is: 
• How can mining companies foster trust within mines sites and between their 
organisational layers, namely corporate management, mine site management, 
middle management and workers?  
 
In addressing this, the thesis draws on the fieldwork findings to identify the most 
promising avenues for corporate management, and mine site management, to build 
trust with workers and middle management to the betterment of their WHS policies and 
practices.  
 
1.3.4 Mistrust and external WHS regulation 
 
In addition to mistrust within mining companies, both at corporate and mine site levels, 
there is the question as to the impact of mistrust between mining companies and the 
regulatory inspectorate on the achievement of broad WHS goals. In this context, the 
Gretley mining disaster may be viewed as a significant turning point for coal mining 
company and inspector relations (in New South Wales, at least). Prior to this tragedy, 
inspectors had employed an ‘advise and persuade’ approach. Following Gretley, and 
its protracted legal aftermath, however, considerable political pressure was placed on 
the inspectorate to adopt a far more adversarial ‘deterrence’ approach to WHS 
compliance and enforcement. This was characterised by a much greater propensity to 
prosecute. In this context, pertinent thesis research questions are: 
• Has the shift to regulatory adversarialism increased levels of mistrust between 
Australian coal mining companies and WHS mining inspectorates? 
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• To the extent that it exists, what impact has mistrust between Australian coal 
mining companies and WHS mining inspectorates had on the achievement of WHS 
outcomes through, in particular, management-based regulation? 
• What opportunities are there to reduce mistrust between Australian coal mining 
companies and WHS mining inspectorates? 
 
Briefly, as these issues are discussed in detail in a following chapter, the thesis’ 
findings suggest that despite the apparent appeal of a much tougher enforcement 
policy stance, the spill over effects in creating mistrust between mine company 
managers (and workers) and the inspectorate may have delivered perversely negative 
WHS outcomes. In particular, that communication between mine companies and 
inspectorates suffers. On the company side, preventative information is withheld for 
fear of it being used against mine sites in future prosecutions, internal investigations, 
statistics and remedial actions are kept secretive and personal relations between, for 
example, mining engineers no longer speak candidly to inspectors. On the regulatory 
side, inspectors are reluctant to give out advice for fear of that exposing them to 
potential future litigation and/or undermining future prosecutions. These findings 
highlight the importance of mistrust in shaping efficacy of WHS mining regulations, and 
through this, WHS outcomes in the Australian coal mining industry.  
 
1.3.5 Codes of practice 
 
Codes of practice are central to the changing landscape of WHS regulation in 
Australia. Ideally, as regulators step back from overtly prescriptive and traditional forms 
of regulatory oversight, codes of practice have an important role to play in providing 
guidance to mining companies and others as to ways in which they can meet their 
regulatory obligations. Crucially, however, they are not mandatory – companies may 
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incorporate all, some or none of particular codes of practice into their corporate WHS 
management systems, as best suits their individual circumstances. In practice, there 
are risks that they may be relied on as a default regulatory standard by inspectors and 
the courts. As such, the inappropriate application of codes of practice may stifle the 
progress of WHS management-based regulation and innovative approaches to WHS in 
mining companies. The importance of codes of practice is recognised in efforts, albeit 
recently stalled, to harmonise them across Australian jurisdictions. This gives rise to 
the following thesis research questions: 
• How have codes of practice been used under current WHS regulatory systems? 
• Has this inhibited the progress of WHS management-based regulation? 
• How has the process of WHS legislative harmonisation fared in relation to codes of 
practice? 
• How might codes of practice be designed and used to best meet their potential 
contribution, particularly in the context of WHS management systems? 
  
As explored in depth in a following chapter, codes of practice are an important step in 
the journey towards management-based regulation in the Australian mining industry. 
However, there are serious deficiencies in the design and implementation of codes in 
Australian mining jurisdictions. In particular, there is a large gap between theory and 
practice in that mines WHS inspectorates use codes as a form of ‘regulation by stealth’. 
Further, the national harmonisation process has largely failed to design codes of 
practice that are best suited to a mining industry specific context.  As such, there are 
various reforms that are needed for them to fulfil their promise as a key component of 
effective and efficient WHS management-based regulation.  
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1.3.6 Inspectoral competencies, capacities and enforcement strategies 
 
In addition to the issue of mistrust with coal mining companies, and the misuse of 
codes of practice, the institutional capacities and capabilities of WHS inspectorates 
(both generic and mining specific) are a key determinant of WHS compliance and 
enforcement outcomes. This is the case irrespective of the presence or not of particular 
regulatory policy tools. In this respect, it is apposite to identify what constitute core 
inspectoral competencies for regulatory WHS in the Australian mining sector. And 
beyond institutional competencies, there is the closely related issue as to what makes 
a ‘good inspector’. Relevant issues include the capacity to conduct effective workplace 
inspections, to foster preventative actions and to build trust with mine site managers 
and workers in order to facilitate better WHS outcomes. Further, it may be useful to 
identify and present the critical decision-making steps on the ground that, arguably, are 
instrumental in determining the efficacy and consistency of inspectoral behaviour and 
actions. As has been noted, “making decisions about appropriate enforcement is 
fundamental to the role of an inspector” (Health and Safety Executive 2005a, 1). In this 
regard, a practical, comprehensive and practical enforcement guide may assist raising 
the inspectoral bar in the mining sector across Australian jurisdictions. These issues 
give rise to the following thesis research questions: 
• What are the core competencies and capacities that mining WHS inspectorates 
should possess? 
• How do WHS inspectorates (including mining and generic) measure up against 
such core competencies and capacities? 
• What should an enforcement guide for inspectors look like? 
 
As a following chapter expands on, an investigation of WHS mines inspectorates of 
seven Australian jurisdictions revealed that there is a high degree of variability in their 
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inspectoral competencies with many falling short in critical areas. In light of this, the 
identification of core inspectoral competencies is pertinent. The thesis does this by 
drawing on relevant international precedents, including those from outside the mining 
sector, as well as workshops conducted with Australian WHS regulators. Further, and, 
again, explored in a following chapter, there is scope to provide specific guidance to 
inspectors in making enforcement decisions. In this regard, the United Kingdom Health 
and Safety Executive’s (UK HSE) (2005a) ‘Enforcement Management Model’ (EMM) 
and the Heads of Workplace Safety Authorities’ (HWSA) National Occupational Health 
and Safety Compliance and Enforcement Policy (NOHSCEP) provided a useful starting 
point, although there is considerable room for improvement on these earlier efforts. In 
so doing, the proposed enforcement guide incorporates the principles of risk-based 
regulation and responsive enforcement.  
 
1.3.7 Summary 
 
In summary, the thesis addresses two broad themes. The first theme seeks to identify 
those factors that may have substantially impeded the achievement of continuous 
improvement in WHS outcomes across the industry, as well as at individual mine sites 
within coal mining companies. This analysis encompasses internal company WHS 
operations, in particular, the interactions between WHS management systems, culture 
and mistrust. Specific issues include the nature and efficacy of corporate WHS 
architectures; potential difficulties in applying sophisticated WHS management systems 
across multiple mines sites within a single company; the reasons why some mines 
sites have much worse WHS outcomes than other ostensibly comparable mine sites, 
again, within the same company; the nature of and extent to which cultural factors, and 
in particular, mistrust, impact on WHS operations; and potential avenues for enhancing 
the effectiveness of WHS management systems through building a culture of trust.  
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Collectively, these issues raise an important question. Has too much faith been placed 
in the efficacy of WHS management systems? The thesis’ findings suggest that WHS 
management systems may be, to a considerable extent, subservient to the culture into 
which they are received. In this regard, the Australian coal mining industry is, arguably, 
especially vulnerable – geographically remote mine sites that have traditionally enjoyed 
a high degree of autonomy and evolved distinct cultures, and a history of antagonism 
between highly unionised work forces and management, conspire to impede the 
effective adoption of WHS management systems. And high levels of organisational 
mistrust, in particular, are more prevalent in those mine sites that appear to have 
resisted most strongly the imposition of corporate wide WHS management systems 
and standards.  
 
The second theme addresses the external regulatory environment, in particular, how 
the tools, behaviour and attitudes of mining inspectorates influences WHS behaviour 
and outcomes. Specific issues include the interplay between WHS regulatory 
compliance and enforcement and company WHS responses, in particular, the role of 
mistrust; potential limitations with the use of management-based regulation in the 
context of persistent cultural resistance; whether the use of codes of practice, in 
particular, have overreached their usefulness and instead begun to undermine policy 
intentions to pursue management-based regulation; and, ways in which external 
regulation can best complement and enhance internal WHS management systems 
adopted by coal mining companies. More broadly, this theme considers how mining 
inspectorates should interact with mining companies at the ‘coal face’ in seeking to 
enforce WHS compliance, what inspectoral competencies, characteristics and 
behaviours should they possess, and what enforcement guidelines should they operate 
under. 
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The findings of the thesis may resonate beyond the Australian coal mining industry. In 
this respect, this is most likely in other industries that share relevant characteristics 
with coal mining, namely multiple and/or geographically separated sites, the 
widespread application of management systems to improve their WHS outcomes 
and/or a history of fraught management and union relations.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
The chapters of this thesis are based on seven published articles, one recently 
submitted article and two reports, with the following structure. Chapter 2 – 6 address, 
broadly, WHS managements systems, safety culture and mistrust within Australian 
coal mining companies and their mines sites. Chapter 2 sets the scene for the rise of 
WHS management systems within the coal mining industry by examining the corporate 
safety architecture of five coal mining companies operating within Australia. It is 
revealed that there is a high degree of convergence of corporate safety tools and 
strategies, including: agenda setting; systems, standards, rules and procedures; core 
arrangements (WHS risk management, investigation, major hazards and worker 
participation); behavioural and cultural change; monitoring, auditing and accountability; 
and the centralised provision of resources. The positive features of this architecture are 
described, including how it has contributed to a substantial improvement in WHS 
outcomes. However, as the rate of WHS improvement has slowed, possible 
explanations for this are explored. 
 
Far from being homogenous organisations, Chapter 3 reveals that Australian coal 
mining companies experience considerable variation in mine safety performance 
across their mine sites. Notwithstanding impressive gains in WHS across the industry, 
some mines substantially outperform others in terms of WHS outcomes. This raises the 
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question as to why this occurs, particularly given the introduction of sophisticated and 
systemic risk management. This chapter considers and rejects several potential 
contributory factors, before examining the role of safety culture. As such, it provides 
insights as to whether, to what extent and in what circumstances site specific cultural 
variables served to undermine or reinforce the effectiveness of a company’s overall risk 
management strategy. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between mistrust, adversarial industrial relations 
and safety performance across Australian mining companies, and their respective coal 
mines. A key finding is that the formation of mistrust is closely associated with a cluster 
of characteristics that, in turn, may negatively impact on mine site safety performance. 
Consideration is also given to the broader ramifications of these findings for non-mining 
sectors, in particular, for companies with a corporate head office overseeing separate 
sites. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the question: what are the origins of different safety cultures at 
mine sites? Safety culture is often assumed to be uniform across companies. In this 
chapter, however, substantial and persistent differences in WHS performance across 
mines sites of a single coal mining company are associated with the formation of a 
‘bottom-up’ safety culture. This has significant implications for the implementation of 
corporate-wide, ‘top-down’ corporate WHS initiatives. 
 
Given the ‘cluster of characteristics’ closely associated with the formation of mistrust 
identified in Chapter 3, and the negative impact such characteristics can have on WHS 
outcomes, Chapter 6 considers how best to overcome such mistrust. In particular, it 
suggests ways to nurture trust between workers, mine site management, corporate 
management and trade unions, in the context of WHS management.  
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Chapters 7-11 consider the roles, interactions, strategies and regulatory styles of 
mining inspectorates that impact on WHS practices and outcomes. In this regard, the 
chapters mirror to a large extent the internal mining company WHS issues addressed 
above. Chapter 7 investigates how regulatory style can undermine trust, and, in so 
doing, stifle potential WHS improvement. The role of prosecution in achieving 
compliance with social regulation is a highly contentious issue in regard to WHS in the 
New South Wales mining industry. Following a mining disaster, political pressure 
prompted the mines inspectorate to abandon its traditional ‘advise and persuade’ 
approach in favour of a much tougher, deterrence oriented approach. While the former 
approach can result in regulatory capture, the latter can be equally counterproductive. 
Interactions between inspectors and the regulated industry are frequent and ongoing 
and trust is central to constructive relations between them. When those relations break 
down (as under an inappropriate prosecution policy) then dialogue ceases, information 
is withheld rather than shared, company accident investigation, prevention and 
remedial action are inhibited and both sides adopt an adversarial posture that 
undermines regulatory effectiveness. In addition to demonstrating the centrality of trust 
to regulatory effectiveness, this chapter identifies both how it can be lost and how it can 
best be regained. 
 
Chapter 8 examines WHS management-based regulation through two case studies. 
The first describes how corporate WHS management systems and standards were 
interpreted and implemented differently at different mine sites within the same 
company and how, in particular, mistrust between workers and management 
underpinned variations in WHS outcomes. The second explores the difficulties in 
moving from highly devolved WHS responsibility to a externally mandated and 
centralised approach, in particular, the impotency of regulation in changing behavior at 
site level in the absence of a supportive workplace culture. Notwithstanding the heavy 
emphasis currently being placed on both internal (company driven) and external 
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(government driven) management-based regulation, a commitment at corporate level 
does not necessarily percolate down to individual facilities where ritualistic responses 
or resistant sub-cultures may thwart effective change.  
 
Codes of practice have the potential to do much of the ‘heavy lifting’ under 
management-based regulation. Chapter 9, however, identifies various deficiencies in 
the design and implementation of codes under Australia’s harmonising WHS legislation, 
including a failure to design codes of a type or types that are best suited to their industry 
specific context; and a failure to implement codes appropriately. In particular, there is a 
gap between theory and practice and that, far from providing a form of authoritative 
guidance, codes of practice, in the hands of the mines inspectorates, more frequently 
become a form of regulation by stealth. The chapter concludes by identifying various 
reforms that will be needed if codes are to fulfil their promise as a central plank of an 
effective and efficient WHS regime.  
 
Chapters 10 and 11 are two parts of two related reports to the National Mine Safety 
Framework (NMSF) to improve the operation of WHS inspectorates (whether mining 
specific or generic) under the achievement of a nationally consistent WHS regime for 
the mining industry. Chapter 10 draws on the national and international literature to 
identify best practice principles for inspectorates with WHS mining responsibilities. In 
particular, to identify the competencies that an ‘ideal’ inspectorate should possess. In 
this regard, five key outcomes govern inspectorate capabilities: the ability to 
recognised those risks and hazards with the greatest potential for adverse WHS 
outcomes; assisting industry to comply, while also maintaining an effective mix of 
positive motivators and effective deterrents; consistency, both in terms of process and 
outcomes, to ensure fairness in the treatment of different regulated entities and to 
maintain the credibility of the inspectorate; developing and maintaining good 
professional relationships with mines sites and other stakeholders; and complementing 
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and enhancing internal corporate systems and controls, in order to encourage and 
facilitate continuous improvement.  
 
To give effect to the identified competencies of the ideal inspectorate, Chapter 11 
outlines a set of national enforcement implementation guidelines to provide practical 
guidance to mines inspectors in their compliance and enforcement decisions. In 
particular, this takes the form of a decision-making framework based on five discrete 
steps, and an associated enforcement matrix. The intention is to generate more 
effective enforcement through greater consistency, a more efficient allocation of 
regulatory resources and improved transparency for and understanding by duty-
holders.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
The findings in this thesis are drawn from a mixture of interview-based fieldwork, 
desktop research and literature reviews. Each chapter describes in more detail the 
specifics of the methodology applying to that piece of research. Nevertheless, an 
overview of the research sources and methodology is as follows. 
 
The fieldwork spanned a period from 2007 to 2012. During that time, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted at three Australian coal-mining companies, across two 
jurisdictions (New South Wales and Queensland) and encompassing – mine sites, as 
well as their respective corporate headquarters. A typical sample of approximately 12 
interviewees from each mine site consisted of the mine manager, shift or process 
supervisors, undermanager, safety officer, engineering (mechanical and/or electrical) 
managers, crew leaders (deputy under managers, team supervisors), and mine 
workers and tradesmen (including local ‘check’ inspectors and mine site safety 
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representatives). In most cases the balance between mine managers and employees 
was approximately even. In addition, senior corporate managers from each of the mine 
companies were interviewed (including the chief executive, head of safety, head of risk 
management, and operations managers). In total, over 180 mining company interviews 
were completed. 
 
The mine site interviews were conducted during two-day site visits, and corporate 
interviews were conducted during a single day visit. All interviews were held in private, 
generally lasted between 40 and 60 minutes and consisted of a series of pre-
determined questions or prompts, with only those questions that elicited a substantive 
response being explored in greater detail. This approach ensured that a diversity of 
perspectives was explored, and that respondents were not constrained to address only 
particular preconceived issues. Consistent with the University ethics approval, 
interviewees were provided with an information statement of the research project, a 
consent form (signed by each participant) and informed in advance that all information 
arising from their interviews would be treated confidentially, and used anonymously in 
any subsequent publications. They also had they right to withdraw from the interview at 
any point. 
 
Theses coal mining interviews are summarised at Table 1 below. The findings from 
these interviews were used in Chapters 2-8.  
 
Table 1: Interviews at five coal mining companies, across three jurisdictions 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E 
Location NSW NSW Queensland Western 
Australia 
Western 
Australia 
Mine sites 
 
7 4 2  nil nil 
Mine site 
interviews 
83 45 23 nil nil 
Corporate 
interviews 
8 7 4 5 6 
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In addition to the mining companies, face-face-interviews were conducted with officials 
from WHS regulatory agencies in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western 
Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory. This included 
specialist mining regulators as well as generic WHS regulators. In the case of the 
former, both senior management and mining inspectors were interviewed. In the case 
of the latter, only senior management was interviewed. Interviews followed the format 
identified above. A total of 38 such regulator interviews were completed. 
 
Finally, two other stakeholder groups were interviewed face-to-face. These were WHS 
representatives of national and state mining industry associations (New South Wales, 
Queensland and Western Australia) and, trade union representatives (New South 
Wales and Queensland). Again, all interviews followed the above format. A total of 16 
such stakeholder interviews were completed. 
 
In addition to, and, in some cases, as well as, face-to-face interviews, phone-based 
interviews were conducted with WHS management from over 20 metalliferous and coal 
mining companies across New South Wales and Queensland.  
 
Theses additional interviews are summarised at Table 2 below. The findings from 
these interviews were used in Chapters 8-11.  
 
 
Table 2: Interviews at additional mining companies, and with regulatory inspectors and 
other stakeholders 
 Additional 
coal mines 
Metalliferous 
mines 
State regulatory 
inspectors 
Mining 
industry 
associations 
Trade 
unions 
Total interviews 6 14 38 11 5 
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Beyond interviews, the thesis draws on a range of safety statistics. These included 
both those available in the public domain, and internal company records. In the case of 
the former, the major sources of safety statistics were those published by the mining 
regulators of New South Wales and Queensland, Safe Work Australia, as well as those 
produced by the New South Wales Minerals Council and the Queensland Resources 
Council. In the case of the latter, each of the three mining companies that engaged in 
face-to-face interviews also provided unfettered access to their internal WHS policy 
documentation and databases (including audit results and safety statistics in addition to 
those required to be supplied to regulators by law). As with the interviews, internal 
company statistics were provided on the basis of confidentiality and anonymity.  
 
Qualitative material derived from the interviews and public and company statistical data 
were supplemented by reviews of both the domestic and international literature, 
including covering regulatory theory and practice, organisational and safety culture, 
mine safety, and WHS in general.  
 
Detailed methodologies are provided at the beginning of each of the thesis chapters 
that are based on published articles. 
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Chapter 2: Corporate WHS management architecture in the 
Australian coal mining industry  
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Darren Sinclair published in Policy and 
Practice in Health and Safety (Volume 10, Number 2, 2012, pages 3-24). 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Managing WHS remains a substantial challenge for many corporations, especially 
those with multiple, complex and hazardous operations. Companies in the Australian 
coal mining industry, which have all of these characteristics, have particular reason for 
concern. Theirs is a dangerous industry that has in the past had more than its share of 
injuries, disease, fatalities and disasters. 
 
However, since the early 1990s, the Australian coal mining industry has committed 
substantial resources to reducing work related injury and disease. Mining companies 
now regard WHS performance as a priority, for which there is a compelling ‘business 
case’ (Health and Safety Executive 2005b). Mining injuries can cause serious 
disruption of the production process, escalate already high workers’ compensation 
costs, and increase staff absences and reputation risk. They can also threaten the 
company's ‘social license to operate’, which is increasingly important, given that 
community expectations of WHS performance have risen, that failures in WHS may 
spill over and threaten access to new mine sites, and the imposition of more stringent 
environmental controls (Gunningham 2007). 
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Responding to these pressures the industry has made considerable efforts to improve 
its WHS performance. The rates of fatal and other recorded injuries in the mining 
industry as a whole, and in the coal mining sector of that industry, have declined 
markedly in the last 20 years. As Table 3 below shows, for the period for which national 
data are available since the late 1990s, there has been a downward trend in the 
number and incidence rate of fatalities in the coal sector, and in the mining industry 
generally. Table 3 also shows the general decline in the incidence rate for occupational 
injuries and disease claims, whether measured as an injury incidence rate (per 
employees) or frequency rate (per hours worked), in both the coal sector and the 
mining industry as a whole. 
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Table 3: Trends in fatalities and other injuries in the coal mining sector and the mining 
industry overall.1  
 
Year Fatalities –  
number2 
Fatalities – 
incidence rate3 
Injuries –      
incidence rate4 
Injuries – 
frequency rate5 
 Coal Mining Coal Mining Coal Mining Coal Mining 
1997/98 1 18 4.3 23.1 62.6*6  43.3 32.3 19.6 
1998/99 3 13 17.5 17.1 56.4* 32.8 26.0 14.4 
1999/00 3 14 15.3 18.8 43.9* 32.6 21.5 13.9 
2000/01 3 18 16.9 23.9 34.3 29.9 15.5 12.7 
2001/02 3 10 16.2 13.1 38.3 30.4 18.3 13.3 
2002/03 0 13 0 15.7 37.9 27.5 17.6 11.7 
2003/04 2 8 10.1 8.8 39.5 26.0 18.8 11.4 
2004/05 0 7 0 7.0 31.8 24.2 16.7 10.5 
2005/06 3 15 10.9 12.2 25.4 19.4 13.9 8.6 
2006/07 0 7 0 5.4 30.5 20.3 16.5 8.8 
2007/08 0 7p 0 5.0 24.1p7 17.8p 12.9 7.9 
                                                
1 The data in Table 1 are sourced from Safe Work Australia 2010, Safe Work Australia 2008 
and Safe Work Australia’s National On-Line Statistical Database (NOSI).     
2 These are fatalities for which workers’ compensation was paid. 
3 The incidence rate of fatalities is the number of fatalities for which compensation was paid 
expressed as a rate per 100 000 employees. 
4 The incidence rate of injuries is the number of claims for occupational injury or disease that 
resulted in an absence from work of one working week or more, and expressed as a rate per 
thousand employees.  
5 The frequency rate of injuries is the number of claims for occupational injury or disease that 
resulted in an absence from work of one working week or more, and expressed as a rate per 
million hours worked by employees. 
6 Due to limitations in the estimates of employees and hours worked for detailed industry 
categories (such as coal mining), incidence and frequency rates should be used with caution, as 
they may vary slightly from the true figures. 
7 Safe Work Australia denotes data by the letter ‘p’ if they are subject to change as more claims 
are accepted or absence from work increases to be equal to or greater than one working week. 
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It would appear then, that whatever the industry has been doing (particularly the large 
companies whose improved WHS initiatives substantially accounts for the statistical 
improvement of the industry as a whole), they have been doing something ‘right’ with 
generally improving performance. If so, then the practices of these companies may 
suggest lessons for other companies within the mining industry (in particular, mid-
sized/national companies) and for other industries more generally. However, the data 
in Table 3 also show that improvement has slowed in recent years and, for the coal 
sector in particular, there has been some fluctuation in performance, with injury or 
fatality rates in some years being higher than in the preceding year.    
 
This chapter is centrally concerned with the question: how have major coal mining 
companies addressed the WHS challenge, and how have they achieved such 
substantial improvements in their overall WHS performance? To answer this question 
the focus is particularly upon the particular and distinctive WHS management 
architecture that they have employed, why they have employed it, and what results it 
has achieved across the industry.  
 
Before engaging with these questions the methodology is described (Section 2) and 
theorising on WHS summarised, locating this research’s contribution within it 
(Section 3). In the results, based on the study of five mining companies, the central 
pillars of WHS management architecture identified are described. Discussion then 
turns to the forces underlying architectural convergence, the relationship between this 
architecture and improved WHS performance, and the extent to which limitations in this 
architecture may be constraining further WHS improvements (Section 5). The chapter 
concludes by examining the policy implications of this analysis (Section 6). 
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2.2 Methods 
 
The chapter is based on the corporate WHS management architecture of five 
Australian coal mining companies, four of which are large multinationals (A, B, C and 
D) and one which is a medium sized domestic company (E). Consistent with the 
precepts of qualitative social science research, neither the identities of the companies 
to whom ‘in confidence’ access was given, nor those of the interviewees, can be 
disclosed. The five companies operate multiple mine sites across three Australian 
jurisdictions (New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia). Unfettered 
access to internal WHS policy documentation was provided by all five companies, and 
to their WHS databases (such as audit results and safety statistics) at three of those 
companies. In addition to desktop research, interviews were conducted with 15 senior 
managers at corporate (across all five companies, and including chief executives, 
corporate safety managers and operational managers) and 120 senior, middle and line 
managers and workers at mine site levels (10 mine sites, across three companies – 
four at C, two at D and four at E) – the ratio of site management to worker interviews 
was approximately one to one. Interviews were typically conducted during a two-day 
site visit, were held in private, generally lasted between 40 and 60 minutes and 
consisted of a series of questions or prompts addressing WHS management 
architectures (it is important note that the interviews covered a broad range of WHS 
topics, the majority of which have been addressed in separate articles – those relevant 
to this chapter are highlighted in the box below, and as can be seen, are restricted to 
identifying and detailing the characteristics of each company’s corporate WHS 
management architecture). Consistent with the research’s ethics clearance, 
interviewees were provided with an information statement of the research project, a 
consent form (signed by each participant) and informed in advance that all information 
arising from their interviews would be treated confidentially, and used anonymously in 
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any subsequent publications. Finally, the WHS management profile of Company A was 
supplemented through the records of a Ministerial WHS Inquiry into the WHS practices 
of this company (with regard to which the first author was specialist WHS advisor).  
 
2.2.1 Interview questions 
 
Corporate managers were asked to identify and explain the operation and 
implementation of corporate wide WHS policies, targets, programs, standards and 
procedures. Key follow-up prompts were:  
• What was the origin of corporate-wide WHS initiatives? 
• Have corporate WHS initiatives been adopted and implemented at mine sites? 
• Are mine sites granted flexibility in how they adopt and implement corporate WHS 
initiatives? 
 
Mine site senior and middle managers were asked to identify and explain the 
implementation and operation of key corporate WHS polices, programs, standards and 
procedures at their mine site. Key follow-up prompts were: 
• Have corporate WHS initiatives been adopted and implemented at mine sites? 
• Are mine sites granted flexibility in how they adopt and implement corporate WHS 
initiatives? 
 
Workers were asked what knowledge they had of corporate WHS policies, targets, 
programs, standards and procedures, and their operation and implementation at their 
mine site. Key follow-up prompts were: 
• Have corporate WHS initiatives been adopted and implemented at your mine site? 
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• Are you granted flexibility in how to adopt and implement corporate WHS 
initiatives? 
 
2.3 Theory  
 
Since the mid 1990s, large mining companies have devoted considerable attention and 
resources to the prevention of work related fatalities, injuries and disease. Each 
company has sought to achieve increasingly ambitious WHS targets by invoking a 
variety of instruments, mechanisms and strategies that in combination form their 
corporate WHS management ‘architecture’. The architectural metaphor is an apt one to 
encapsulate the way WHS management approaches and strategies are integrated into 
an overall structure that is much more than its individual parts. For example, one 
company describes its WHS initiatives as involving “a process of cascading goals and 
targets from the corporate level to the individual level [that] provides clear linkage and 
alignment to support the vision of Zero Harm and also provides the framework for 
accountability through performance reviews and evaluations”. Thus it is made clear 
that its overall WHS management strategy is not just about the individual elements or 
management tools, but also about how these different elements integrate and interact.  
 
To locate the evolution of a common WHS management architecture to contemporary 
WHS theory, it has been said that WHS had developed through a series of stages.3 
While there is some disagreement as to precisely what these stages are, they are 
widely recognised to include a technical age, a ‘human factors’ age, a management 
systems age and a culture age (Hale & Hovden 1998; Hudson 2007). While some 
suggest that these ‘ages’ are sequential it is more likely that each age has been 
superimposed on, and to some extent integrated with, the subsequent one. Indeed 
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Glendon et al (2007) argue that we are now approaching an ‘integration age’ in which 
the learning of previous ages is not rejected but rather informs a new synthesis.  
 
But this begs the question of exactly what such a synthesis might involve and why a 
particular form of synthesis, rather than any other, gains traction, and what the broader 
implications of this might be for WHS outcomes. It is with these questions that this 
chapter is concerned.  
 
One striking finding, explored below, was the degree of convergence in the WHS 
architectures of the various firms in the sample. Was this because all had 
independently realised the virtue of a particular approach, or by trial and error, found 
the same path to improved WHS performance? Drawing from the new institutionalism 
perspective on organisations, a rather different explanation is persuasive (Powell & 
DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Meyer & Scott 1992). According to DiMaggio & Powell’s 
(1991) well-known classification, three distinct mechanisms are capable of producing 
what Marquis et al (2007) term ‘community isomorphism’ (the resemblance of a 
corporation’s social practices to those of other corporations within its geographic 
community): normative/cultural; coercive; and mimetic mechanisms. Normative or 
cultural isomorphism is driven by a desire for organisational legitimacy, which is 
achieved by being aligned with institutionalised models of what constitutes a properly 
constructed corporate body – a wide range of actors influence these perceptions, 
including business and legal academics, consultants, managers, business associations 
etc. (Marquis et al 2007). Coercive isomorphism entails external pressure in the form of 
state legislation, regulation and intervention by the courts. To bring about isomorphism 
there must be a degree of uniformity in the coercive approaches adopted across 
jurisdictions to encompass disparate multinational mining corporations (it is also 
possible to conceive of intervention by a remote corporate headquarters on their 
individual mine sites as being a form of internal coercion). Mimetic isomorphism is 
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simply a form of imitation. Organisations imitate the behaviour of others, particularly 
industry leaders. This imitation may be focussed on particular operational aspects, 
such as environmental responsibility of WHS. This imitation facilitated and promoted 
through a range of industry networks, communications, contacts, peer-to-peer 
engagements and third parties, such as accountancy firms. The role of isomorphism in 
explaining convergence is returned to in Section 2.5.1. 
 
2.4 Results 
 
A striking feature to emerge from the research was the extent to which the corporate 
WHS management architecture of the four large Companies A – D have converged 
(with the fifth, medium-sized Company E, to some degree playing ‘catch-up’). This is 
not to suggest that the corporate WHS management structures of these companies are 
identical (there is, for example, considerable variation in terms of worker participation, 
the role of trade unions, the importance of incentives, and the use of interactive 
databases). However, in terms of their use of the very large majority of WHS 
management practices described below, and their integration into an overall corporate 
architecture, the similarities are compelling. Each of the architectural pillars is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.4.1 Agenda setting 
 
This arises from a desire to provide a clear statement of corporate intent of what a 
company aspires to achieve and what it ‘stands for’ in terms of WHS. This corporate 
vision is communicated throughout the company structure and, in most cases, is also 
addressed to the general public as part of a broader commitment to corporate social 
responsibility. Agenda setting therefore serves both as an internal moral compass for a 
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mining company as a whole, and as a yardstick by which WHS performance may be 
judged by external stakeholders.  
 
The principal value of agenda setting lies in how it contributes to other aspects of the 
overall WHS architecture (alone it could be little more than empty rhetoric). Once a 
company has articulated its broad aspirations, it can develop a range of concrete and 
detailed policies, practices and programs to achieve them. Agenda setting can also 
support the development of a safety culture (see below) to the extent that it is invoked 
to inspire and lead WHS improvement across the company. Agenda setting includes 
policy statements, target setting and framing. 
 
The research revealed that the companies in the sample have produced broad 
statements of WHS policy referred to variously as ‘mission statements’, ‘charters’, 
‘policies’, ‘goals’, ‘principles’ and ‘objectives’. They all include: an ambitious, 
overarching statement of the WHS aspirations for their company and workforce (eg “to 
create a workplace environment free of work related fatalities, injuries, and diseases”); 
a statement that WHS takes priority over production (eg “there will be no compromise 
on safety”); a commitment to the very highest standards of WHS performance (eg “to 
achieve health, safety, environment and community leadership in all levels of 
management”); recognition of personal responsibility for achieving safety outcomes (eg 
“every employee and contractor shares responsibility for the safety of themselves and 
their fellow workers”); a statement that injuries are preventable, and that the best way 
of achieving this is through WHS risk management (the identification of hazards, and 
assessment and control of risks); and a commitment to continuous improvement. 
 
Interviews with corporate managers revealed that all the companies are progressively 
establishing measurable and publicly available WHS improvement targets. These have 
implications for corporate reputation – once a target is in the public domain, companies 
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can be held accountable by stakeholders if they fail to achieve it. Companies choosing 
to go down this path, by implication, also commit themselves to revealing their 
progress towards these targets, and to justifying any shortfall in meeting them. Such 
targets, provided they are widely communicated and understood, also send a message 
to individual mine sites that they will be held accountable in contributing to the 
aggregate corporate-wide targets. They may be high level targets, for example the 
‘zero harm’ target, or the target of maintaining certification to the Australian/New 
Zealand Standard 4801 on WHS management systems. 
 
The third element of agenda setting, framing, is a means of providing the parameters 
and language for internal and external WHS discourse. Framing is a means by which 
corporate management attempts to shape how WHS issues are perceived and acted 
upon at its geographically remote and semi-autonomous mine sites. In this respect, 
framing is a crucial step in extending the reach of corporate management, and 
provides a vital link between agenda setting and subsequent practices and outcomes 
on the ground. Farming includes a clear outline of a company’s WHS priorities (and 
how they are defined and to be integrated into mine site operations), but framing is 
much more than priority setting as it also addresses underlying corporate values. For 
example, if the company regards workers as valued members of a team, they need to 
be fully engaged and consulted on all aspects of their job, and worker participation will 
be a priority, as well as open two-way communication, the provision of training and 
consultation about new technologies (Barling & Hutchinson 2000). In this way framing 
has implications for other pillars of WHS architecture.   
 
As framing is a means for shaping response to WHS in far-flung locations, on the basis 
of the interviews, it is not coincidental that it is the larger coal mining companies with 
multiple sites that emphasise WHS framing. However, even with smaller mining 
companies, framing is increasingly evident. Perhaps the best example, and one 
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endorsed and adopted by the sample companies, is the Minerals Council of Australia 
(MCA) statement of vision and beliefs. This not only identifies the ambitious industry 
target that no minerals fatality, injury or disease is acceptable, but also states that all 
such occurrences are preventable, that no task is so important that it cannot be done 
safely, that all hazards can be identified and their risks managed, that everyone has a 
personal responsibility for their own and others WHS, and that WHS performance can 
always be improved (Minerals Council of Australia 2007). 
 
2.4.2 Systems, standards, rules and procedures  
 
Having determined a corporate WHS ‘agenda’ through policy statements, targets and 
framing, the next major challenge lies in translating these aspirations into better mine 
site WHS practices. This involves establishing management systems and 
arrangements that convert broad objectives into practices for dealing with WHS 
systemically (rather than as individual deficiencies) – putting the ‘flesh’ onto the ‘bare 
bones’ of broad policy statements. At the five companies this was achieved by a 
number of related mechanisms with different degrees of specificity. These included the 
organisational structures, responsibilities and resources for implementing, maintaining, 
monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of WHS management, and correcting 
problems in order to improve overall WHS performance. Appropriate training and 
development, supervision and communication are critical elements, as are the 
documentation of arrangements in standards, rules and procedures.   
 
Although there are variations in the precise details, respondents in the interviews 
revealed that all the companies have located WHS management systems as the 
cornerstone of their internal corporate control of WHS preventative strategies. For 
example, all Company D sites maintain certification of their WHS management system 
to the Australian and New Zealand Standard for Occupational Health and Safety 
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Management, AS/NZS 4801. On the other hand, Company B states that it has “world-
class safety systems in place and used by all”, and that its “systems are simple and 
developed with employees” and “designed around programmes and methods to 
identify hazards, aspects and opportunities in the business processes”. 
 
There is some variation between companies with regard to the degree of flexibility that 
mine sites have in implementing and conforming to corporate WHS management 
systems. Company A, for example, is very prescriptive in its requirements for mine 
sites to comply. On the other hand, Company C allows some discretion as to precisely 
how they construct their WHS management system, as long as each of their corporate-
wide standards is adequately addressed. In Company E, until recently, there has been 
little corporate guidance as to the scope or contents of WHS management systems 
with the result that individual mine sites have established largely independent (and 
diverse) systems.  
 
According to interview respondents, the companies seek to ensure consistently high 
levels of WHS performance across their mine sites through the use of corporate-wide 
standards (although these are at varying stages of development and implementation). 
These form the basic WHS infrastructure upon which virtually all other mine site WHS 
management strategies are built. The four large companies (A-D) have introduced 
similar corporate WHS standards, including: leadership and accountability; legal 
compliance and document control; risk and change management; planning and targets; 
health and hygiene; communication and consultation; incident reporting and 
management; assessment, monitoring and reporting; suppliers and contractors; 
emergency and crisis management; incident reporting and management; stewardship; 
operations and maintenance; community; competency and behaviour; and project 
design, management and commissioning. Individual standards are further sub-divided 
into more specific components. The medium sized Company E has not yet developed 
  
47 
equivalent corporate wide standards, preferring to let individual mine sites determine 
their own WHS priorities. This has led not only to substantial variation in sites’ WHS 
priorities but also in how they translate their priorities into WHS practices and, 
unsurprisingly, substantial variation in WHS outcomes. 
 
The interviews also revealed that corporate-wide WHS rules are established to specify 
in very precise terms what managers or workers should do when confronted by a 
particular task or challenge and how they should do it (prescriptive rules), or specify the 
WHS outcome or desired level of performance but leave open the concrete measures 
for achieving this in local circumstances (performance rules) (Gunningham & 
Johnstone 1999). Rules may also specify disciplinary action where breaches occur. 
 
In particular, the five companies rely substantially on prescriptive rules. For example, 
company B has seven ‘Golden Rules’, two of which are never working on equipment 
without first applying personal isolation lock(s) in accordance with isolation procedures, 
and never working above 1.8 metres without fall protection and fall prevention. In 
serious cases, non-compliance can result in dismissal or, at a minimum, ‘recorded 
counselling’. Company D has a similar approach with its ten-rule version of the Golden 
Rules, and also threatens dismissal for breaches. 
 
A further mechanism that came to light during interviews, and common to the five 
companies, was ‘safe work procedures’ (SWPs). These specify the action to be taken 
by workers, allowing them to carry out tasks without needing to know about the 
company’s WHS management system as a whole. This approach has the advantage 
that individual SWPs can be updated without requiring management system 
modification. However, it is impractical to prepare SWPs for every single task in a 
mining environment that is inherently changeable and unpredictable. Accordingly less 
formal decision-making mechanisms are also employed.  
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2.4.3 Core arrangements – WHS risk management, investigation, major 
hazards and worker participation 
 
Interviews clearly indicated that central to the companies’ corporate-wide WHS 
management systems is WHS risk management, which is also a mandatory 
requirement under mining WHS regulation. This includes the organisational 
arrangements for proactively identifying hazards, assessing risks and controlling risks. 
Although all the companies have comprehensive processes in place, it is not always 
practical to complete a fully-fledged risk assessment. As such, they have also 
introduced different forms of ‘mini-risk assessment’. For example, Company E employs 
a ‘job safety analysis’ (JSA) and Company B has a hierarchy of risk assessment 
procedures, from ‘Take 5’ and ‘Job Hazard Analysis’ through ‘Qualitative risk 
assessment’ facilitated by a leader and involving a cross functional team’ to ‘Semi 
Quantitative Risk Assessment’ for any risks rated as ‘High and Critical’. 
 
Another specific component of overall WHS risk management to emerge was the 
development of major hazards management plans by individual mines sites (under 
corporate guidance) to address hazards that may have catastrophic or very serious 
consequences. Here, the focus is on identification of, the potential for, and 
management of low frequency, high consequence events (spontaneous combustion, 
inundation, strata control and so forth), with an emphasis on critical controls. Such 
plans are also mandatory in some jurisdictions. The companies have adopted similar 
processes, albeit with different names, to identify and manage major hazards. For 
example, at Company C: 
 
[E]ach of our operations identifies opportunities for improvement following a 
formal hazard review and includes these in the site strategy review and business 
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plan. We undertake targeted programs to address a specific hazard …  [We 
have] developed a leading practice process for monitoring the critical controls of 
major hazards. … [We] are now customising this process to monitor critical 
controls of all major hazards more effectively.  
 
Company D’s version of this is its ‘Target Zero Action Plans’ (TZAPs). The purpose of 
TZAPs is to clearly enunciate practical solutions to key safety challenges and each 
plan comprises various interventions and programs to support the achievement of 
Target Zero. Site and line managers, as well as corporate management, are 
accountable for the successful implementation of TZAPs. Company A has pioneered 
the use of ‘fatal risk protocols’ to eliminate fatalities in its activities across the world. 
Here, common hazardous activities have been identified (by workers and managers) 
from the analysis of incidents, and practices developed to eliminate both the fatalities 
and the incidents that could cause them.  
 
In all of these activities, worker participation can play a significant role and is 
fundamental to reducing work related fatalities, injuries and disease. Workers have the 
most direct interest in WHS of any party, and often know more about the hazards 
associated with their workplace than anyone else. Workers are also more likely to 
abide by WHS rules if they have contributed in a meaningful way to their design and 
implementation. Thus genuine participation facilitates the development of positive 
safety behaviours in the workforce. However, effective participation requires 
constructive dialogue between management and workers (Gallagher 1997; Vassie & 
Lucas 2001) and such dialogue has often been in short supply in the mining industry. 
According to respondents, all the companies are actively pursuing worker engagement 
through a variety of initiatives. These include: peer-to-peer behavioural based safety 
(BBS) programs (see below); regular meetings and consultations between workers and 
senior mine management (both formal and informal, and including WHS committees); 
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worker involvement in risk assessments and accident investigations; feedback through 
incident reporting and WHS suggestion programs; and participation in internal audits. 
 
2.4.4 Changing behaviour and developing a positive safety culture 
 
Even with the presence of highly sophisticated corporate WHS initiatives, mine sites 
may still struggle to achieve desired WHS practices and performance levels on the 
ground. Ultimately, workers determine how they carry out mining tasks (and managers 
how they should be supervised and enforced) and, if either workers or managers 
choose to resist or ignore corporate standards, rules or procedures, this can seriously 
compromise WHS performance. Shaping worker and management behaviour therefore 
depends as much on changing culture as it does on enforcing rules. Indeed there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that culture, and the institutional structures that 
support culture (routines, incentives, cultural scripts), exert an important influence over 
both managers and workers, and may sometimes trump standards, rules and systems 
(Gunningham & Sinclair 2009). 
 
Safety culture is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour (norms) that collectively determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s management of 
health and safety management (United Kingdom Health and Safety Commission 1993). 
Potential contributors to culture are therefore extensive and include: personal 
characteristics (eg the capability to learn and develop competency); past behaviour 
which guides future behaviour; values supporting and attitudinal barriers towards WHS; 
perceptions of risks, and of long term versus short term benefits; motivations which 
affect whether individuals ‘buy into’ organisation goals, how willing they are to learn, 
how they rate safety and risk behaviours, and emotional reasons underlying their 
decisions and actions related to safety; and trust. Trust between workers and 
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management is of particular importance in extracting the maximum benefit from WHS 
management initiatives – an absence of trust can result in workers treating 
management initiatives with suspicion and refusal to buy into them.  
 
While respondents from all the companies were in agreement about the desirability of 
having a positive safety culture at mine sites, the challenge confronting them is how 
best to inculcate such a culture given that many existing attitudes, norms and 
motivations at mine sites may be pushing in the opposite direction. Longstanding 
antipathy between trade unions and management and an entrenched ‘us and them’ 
attitude amongst workers and management (Gunningham 2007) conspire to undermine 
the establishment of a positive safety culture. Consequently, respondents across all 
five companies acknowledged that they have only recently begun to contemplate how 
to build a robust safety culture at mine sites. In particular, it was claimed, that to date 
they have principally sought to address some of the ingredients of safety culture 
through BBS programs, training and leadership programs.  
 
BBS programs that focus on changing workers’ behaviour have found currency across 
industry sectors (Lingard & Rowlingson 1998). Proponents claim that unsafe 
behaviours account, either directly or indirectly, for some 90% of WHS incidents 
(Hollnagel 1993) and that these can be most effectively addressed through the 
techniques of BBS. The approach entails formal ‘observations’ or ‘inspections’ of one 
party by another which are intended to provide a non-judgmental record of work 
practices (especially unsafe behaviour), followed by one-on-one feedback to draw 
attention to the undesirable behaviour (Health and Safety Executive 2002; Hopkins 
2006a; Latham & Locke 1991). The results of observations are recorded, and patterns 
of unsafe behaviour identified by an oversight committee that can then make 
recommendations intended to change them (Geller 2004). The goal is modification of 
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hazardous behaviour, rather than worker participation or modification of a hazardous 
work environment.  
  
It emerged in the interviews that all five companies have introduced some form of BBS 
program. For example, Company A has applied the Du Pont ‘STOP’ program, a central 
tenet of which is that if you can change behaviour then values will follow. Company B 
employs ‘peer to peer’ safety actions, and ‘safety interactions’ that entail targeted 
discussions between employees to better understand WHS issues. Company C 
requires middle managers to complete a specified number of ‘safety observations’ per 
month (workers do not conduct observations, which is a departure from conventional 
BBS theory). Company E has not introduced a corporate wide BBS program, leaving it 
to individual sites to initiate and implement any such programs, which several sites 
have done with varied success. 
 
Training in WHS provides another way for companies to influence safety culture 
through changes to attitudes, perceptions, competencies, norms and motivations. This 
influence can be indirect, for example, through technical training programs aimed at 
developing competency in the safe operation of particular machinery that also contain 
an element of norm reinforcement. Alternatively, training programs may directly 
address attitudes, perceptions, norms and motivations. For example, Company D uses 
the ‘Zero Incident Process’ and ‘People Performance Growth’ training packages, which 
unlike conventional competency based training, address the psychology underpinning 
safe behaviour with the aim of moving away from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation 
(Sentis 2010). According to respondents, all the companies have comprehensive 
training policies and programs that aim to maintain operational competencies, although 
there are differences arise in the extent to which training programs are administered 
centrally, or devolved to mine sites.  
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In addition to BBS programs and training, respondents noted that all the companies 
have programs and strategies to improve leadership in their workforces (and, as noted 
at Section 4.2, leadership is a key component of corporate wide WHS standards). For 
example, in Company A, responsibility and accountability for WHS rests with the 
company vice president and departmental managers who are charged with integrating 
safe thinking and behaviour into every aspect of their work by: demonstrating strong 
leadership and commitment; providing goals, a clear purpose and responsibilities for 
direct reports, teams and individuals; supporting and driving new initiatives; and 
recognising safe behaviour and correcting unsafe activity. Similarly, at Company B: 
“leadership for health and safety is a line function and an integral part of management 
accountability. Good safety and health leadership is built upon a foundation of solid 
understanding regarding core skills, competencies, planning and execution”. This 
company has “worked collaboratively to develop the Safety Leadership Development 
Programme (SLDP) which all sites and offices can use to improve the quality of safety 
leadership at all levels of the business”.  
 
In summary, the companies studied were beginning to take steps to build a positive 
safety culture but their initiatives were in the early stages. Support involves working 
with the leadership of an enterprise, as management concurrence is needed to be able 
to alter priorities and resource initiatives to change how things are done within an 
organisation (Dejoy 2005). Such leadership is essential to shaping safety culture and 
instituting a WHS morality, both of which lie at the heart of effective WHS 
management. 
 
2.4.5 Monitoring, auditing and accountability 
 
Following the mantra ‘what you measure is what you manage’, the companies studied 
place an emphasis on monitoring and verification to ascertain WHS performance 
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across mines sites, and their success in implementing corporate-wide WHS 
management. To do so they rely to a substantial extent on information provided by 
individual mine sites. However, this gives rise to concerns about consistency and 
accuracy of reporting, leading to the development of performance indicators. Ideally 
indicators should be chosen so that they are not vulnerable to manipulation, while 
being closely linked to the target setting process and to company standards (described 
above). Performance must also be independently verified to increase the credibility and 
confidence in results. Knowing that periodically there will be external assessment can 
also provide an ongoing incentive for those who are monitoring and measuring 
performance to do so accurately.  
 
One critical step in the monitoring process is a robust system for reporting, collecting 
and analysing data, but what sort of data should be collected? As noted above, it is 
widely acknowledged that lag indicators can have serious limitations. The most widely 
used indicator in industry generally, the lost time injury (LTI) is particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation by providing restricted work to injured workers so that lost time is not 
recorded. Further, there is no relationship between the causes of LTIs (often minor, 
slips, strains etc) and low frequency but very high consequence events (that is, 
disasters) (Flin et al 2000). 
 
Respondents from the five companies acknowledged while they do monitor LTIs, they 
compensate for some of its limitations by also monitoring total recordable injuries 
(TRIs), which include LTIs, restricted work injury or medical treatment injury, as well as 
incident reporting, and provide mine management with valuable information on WHS 
management practices and areas of vulnerability. For example, incident reporting may 
reveal a high safety failure rate in certain operations or hazards not previously 
identified. All the companies, it was claimed, have mechanisms in place to encourage 
incident reporting. The companies also use forward-looking positive performance 
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indicators (lead indicators) that can anticipate rather than react to failure (Flin et al 
2000; Falbruch & Wilpert 1999). Appropriate indicators are still being developed but 
include: the percentage of training completed against that planned; the percentage of 
emergency exercises and training of personnel carried out against that planned; the 
percentage of incident investigations completed within the due date; and the 
percentage of risk assessments completed against those planned. There is 
considerable variation in the lead indicators currently being applied by the companies. 
 
Self-reporting against lag or lead indicators is the most common form of monitoring, but 
it raises concerns of conflict of interest: mine sites may be reluctant to make full or 
accurate disclosure when this would reflect poorly on their performance. Some 
operations may also resist such reporting because it is administratively demanding. For 
both reasons auditing, either at corporate level or by independent auditors, is needed 
to verify performance.  
 
Respondents from all the companies described how they conduct some form of 
external audit, that is, an audit by parties’ external to the mine site. For example, 
Company C conducts comprehensive external audits of mines within its geographical 
sphere against corporate wide WHS standards on a twice-yearly basis. The results are 
used to determine each mine’s progress towards implementation of the WHS 
standards, and to rank its performance against other mines in the company. Managers 
of low performing mines are required to explain why they have failed to meet corporate 
WHS expectations. They also conduct a series of external ‘system audits’, involving a 
detailed investigation of an entire operation, with a focus in each audit on selected 
discrete safety systems, such as crisis management or cabling. Similarly, at Company 
A, all sites are externally audited at least every three years to verify performance 
results, to check that standards are being applied, and to identify gaps in management 
systems. The audit team is drawn from those who have had responsibility for key WHS 
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matters at other company operations – a peer-review process. Company E, with fewer 
resources, does not conduct corporate audits, or a single corporate wide external audit 
(nor does it have a set of corporate wide WHS standards against which to conduct 
such audits). Instead, it relies on each mine site contracting professional auditors. All 
the companies also require their mines sites to conduct their own internal audits. 
 
In addition to monitoring and auditing, the respondents from all companies claimed that 
they placed a high priority on accountability and have in place structures and 
processes that make it difficult for managers (wherever they are sit in the chain of 
command) to avoid their WHS responsibilities. Company A, for example, in its Guide to 
Business Conduct, states that: “managers are held accountable for [the company’s] 
policies and standards, even if compliance costs the Company business in the short 
term”. To this end, management performance is measured, monitored and assessed, 
to ensure that it is transparent to others (eg by demonstrably completing recommended 
audit actions and responding appropriately to incident reports). On this view (shared by 
the other companies), accountability is a vital supplement to both framing and 
rulemaking. Without it, there is no assurance that WHS policy statements, targets and 
programs will translate into improvements on the ground.  
 
It was also claimed by respondents across the companies that there is increasing 
reliance on interactive databases to ensure accountability. A sophisticated example of 
this approach is found in Company C where its interactive WHS database is applied 
across all their mine sites, and has three principal attributes. First, it acts as a receiver 
of safety statistics, such as injuries, near misses, and other incidents, in a common 
format that allows for analysis and performance comparison. Second, it is a repository 
of vital safety information concerning management systems, risk analysis, audit 
information, and safety alerts that is readily accessible to staff and capable of 
transmitting information rapidly between different sites. Third, it provides a mechanism 
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for allocating responsibility for actions arising out of its receiver and repository aspects, 
and for ensuring that such actions are acted upon and completed.  
 
Although less obvious, corporate managers noted that they also rely on peer pressure 
as a form of accountability. This may be harnessed through a variety of mechanisms 
that encourage critical evaluation of colleagues’ WHS practices. For example, some 
companies apply peer pressure at mine site level using their audits and other statistical 
comparisons to construct ‘league tables’ which serve to alert corporate management to 
poor performing mine managers and can also fulfil a ‘peer shaming’ function. At 
Company C mine managers are required to attend quarterly meetings with corporate 
management at which the first item on the agenda is the WHS performance of each 
mine during the previous quarter, with managers of poor performing mines being 
required to account for their level of performance.  
 
2.4.6 Centralisation and the provision of resources 
 
Until quite recently, some mining companies allowed their mine sites to operate as 
semi-autonomous business units, with little direct intervention from corporate 
management. A consequence of this approach was that individual mines, even within a 
single company, adopted markedly different approaches to WHS management, 
including unique WHS management systems, databases, BBS programs and training 
programs. This devolved approach had substantial resource implications. Mine sites, in 
effect, had to ‘re-invent the wheel’, with limited opportunities to learn from others’ 
experiences, and were not able to capture the economies of scale inherent in a more 
coordinated corporate approach to WHS management.  
 
There was consistent responses from respondents all five companies in describing 
have they have moved away from largely devolved operations towards much more 
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centralised management (with the development of corporate WHS management 
policies, tools, systems and reporting procedures), although some have gone faster 
and further than others. Companies A and B (and, to a lesser extent, C and D) have 
sought to allocate additional resources to their corporate WHS divisions commensurate 
with additional WHS management responsibilities, making centralisation more 
effective. In contrast, at Company E, which is still transitioning away from a centralised 
approach to WHS, resource provision lags badly behind stated ambitions. For 
example, when this company’s corporate office conducts a program of systems audits 
across all its mine sites, a single corporate manager has responsibility for the entire 
audit program – this is an ambitious workload given several different systems to audit, 
and more than ten mines to cover. Not surprisingly, corporate audit resources are 
badly stretched and the audit program is far from comprehensive. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
Examined below are, first, the factors that may have contributed to the form and 
content of the prevailing corporate WHS management architecture identified above, in 
particular, the obvious convergence, and, second, the effectiveness and potential 
limitations of this architecture. 
 
2.5.1 Architectural convergence 
 
How and why has such a striking convergence of corporate WHS management of five 
different companies, with unique histories and corporate cultures, eventuated? In terms 
of external pressures for change, regulation, in particular, is often seen as an important 
driver of company behaviour (coercive isomorphism). Certainly there has been a 
profound shift away from prescriptive standards towards process- and principles-based 
  
59 
approaches, including management systems, in some of the mining jurisdictions in 
which the sample companies are based. Although such regulation is undoubtedly a 
contributing factor, it falls considerably short of explaining why coal mining companies 
have convergent WHS management architectures for four reasons. First, existing 
mining WHS regulation applies to individual mine sites, not entire companies. As such, 
there is no obligation to adopt uniform WHS management systems across mine sites 
with a single company. Indeed, until the last decade, in Australia at least, most 
companies left their individual mines sites to develop their own approaches 
independent of one another, with inevitable differences arising. Second, principles-
based regulation still leaves regulated entities with considerable discretion as to how to 
achieve required regulatory outcomes, and the type and nature of management 
systems employed (Gunningham 2007). Third, regulatory requirement are far more 
limited in their scope than convergent corporate WHS management architectures. For 
example, regulation does not specify mission statements, improvement targets 
(including leading and lagging indicators), cultural and leadership issues, or the use of 
third party audits, all of which are addressed under convergent architectures. As such, 
they have the capacity to go further than that required by legislation to bring about 
beyond compliance practices and performance. Fourth, not all jurisdictions have gone 
down, at least not to the same extent, the path of process or principle-base regulation. 
For example, in general, regulation in the United States is more prescriptive and 
adversarial than that in Australia (Gunningham 2007). And yet, mining companies have 
adopted convergent architectures across international jurisdictions.  
 
The findings suggest that it is not external, but internal drivers that are the most potent 
determinants of corporate WHS management architecture – with legislation following, 
not leading change. In particular, new technologies of control available to corporate 
head quarters (HQs) such as WHS management systems, standards and audits (which 
have enabled large companies to focus on systemic problems and to do so across 
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multiple facilities, and multiple jurisdictions) have been shaped by the collective 
influence of major corporations – with a greater influence than that exerted by 
governments, or trade unions. In the language of the new institutionalism (Powell & 
DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Meyer & Scott 1992), normative/cultural isomorphism 
(striving for organisational legitimacy), coercive isomorphism (uniformity in and through 
external interventions) and mimetic isomorphism (imitating others whose practices are 
believed to be beneficial) may be pertinent in the context of corporate WHS 
management architecture. 
 
In the case of multinational companies (including the four largest companies in the 
sample, comprising Anglo/American, Anglo/Australian, Australian/South African and 
European corporate backgrounds) the international aspect is important, as in each the 
architecture of internal control adopted has been largely shaped by their international 
HQs (arguably, this is form of internal coercive isomorphism, with HQs taking the role 
of external regulator). For example, the international HQs of Company B has 
developed 17 corporate wide WHS standards, which have been progressively rolled 
out across all international its operations – subsequently, each site is extensively 
audited to ensure compliance. And Company D has completely revised its internal 
WHS architecture in line with directives from its international management. However, 
the dictates of international HQs is far from the only factor explaining convergence – 
and in any event, it only explains convergence within the multi-national corporations, 
not between them.  
 
As to the latter, one plausible explanation for convergence between such companies is 
that they form a ‘community of shared fate’ in terms of their WHS performance. As 
history demonstrates, an incident involving multiple fatalities at a single site can 
reverberate throughout the industry and produce a regulatory and societal backlash. 
This in turn can undermine the industry’s ‘social license to operate’ (that is, the wider 
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community’s consent for a business or industry to exist, and which is in addition to 
conventional regulatory licences). According to Gunningham et al (2004, 308): 
 
Corporations no longer perceive their social obligations as necessarily 
synonymous with their legal obligations. Two decades of tightening regulatory 
rules and legal threats have led many businesspeople to assume that any 
hazards and harms that their enterprise engenders, even if not clearly illegal 
today, will sooner or later be subject to public censure, government action, and 
legal liability. … In consequence, corporation executives increasingly talk about 
the importance of operating in accordance with their “social license”, meaning 
that they are constrained to meet the expectations of society and to avoid 
activities that societies (or influential elements within them) deem unacceptable. 
And in some instances the conditions demanded by “social licensors” may be 
tougher than those imposed by regulation. 
 
Rees (1994) in describing a similar phenomenon in the nuclear power industry, refers 
to companies as ‘hostages to each other’. From this perspective, it is in the interests of 
companies to not just reduce WHS incidents within their own mines, but across the 
industry as whole. 
 
Being part of a community of shared fate may be a powerful motivator for mining 
companies to improve WHS performance across the industry, but does it necessarily 
mean that they will adopt a similar WHS management architecture? There is ample 
evidence to suggest that they have indeed overcome their competitive instincts to 
cooperate on WHS, bringing about, in effect, a form of normative/cultural isomorphism. 
For example, at annual WHS conferences, corporate initiatives, strategies and 
experiences are freely shared. WHS managers from different companies also regularly 
meet to address a range of WHS issues. Like self-regulation professionals more 
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generally (Parker 2002), WHS managers in the mining industry build professional 
networks, meet informally with colleagues from other companies, and acquire values 
and skills independent from the business of their organisations. The companies also 
regulatory benchmark their standards and systems against their industry peers 
(mimetic isomorphism). 
 
The opportunity for corporate mimetic isomorphism in the WHS sphere is also provided 
by the activities of mining industry associations, with the MCA in particular playing a 
WHS leadership role. It has developed a statement of vision and beliefs, identified an 
ambitious and clearly defined industry target, and embarked upon the task of building 
an industry WHS morality through identifying a broader set of Safety and Health Beliefs 
(Gunningham & Rees 2008). The role of the MCA is supported and supplemented by 
the state bodies (especially the New South Wales Minerals Council and Queensland 
Resources Commission), and replicated at the international level by the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) which has its own set of principles and 
recommended practices that, it is hoped, individual companies will copy (International 
Council on Mining and Metals 2010; MMSD 2002). 
 
Once, as a result of a combination of the above drivers, an almost ‘off the peg’ 
corporate WHS management architecture is readily available, then even companies of 
lesser resources, sophistication and/or economies of scale may begin to copy it (this 
encompasses both normative/cultural and mimetic isomorphism). A case of such 
imitation of specific organisational architecture is arguably in process at Company E, 
particularly in its use of the ICMM principles and international recognised management 
systems. Here, however, the company was also strongly influenced by coercive 
isomorphism in the form of new WHS regulations with which they (in contrast with their 
larger brethren) were not yet in compliance. 
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2.5.2 Effectiveness and potential limitations  
 
Australian coal mining companies have achieved considerable success in reducing 
workplace injury and disease over the last 15 years. This has largely coincided with the 
implementation of the corporate WHS management architecture described above. 
Although a correlation is not necessarily a cause, the striking improvement in WHS 
performance, in the absence of any other plausible explanation, is at least suggestive 
of the effectiveness of this architecture.  
 
Further support for this proposition is provided by a related study in which a 
comprehensive examination of 13 mine sites at Companies C and E was examined 
(Gunningham & Sinclair forthcoming (b)). This study examines the effectiveness of this 
architecture at the mine site level, highlighting its considerable virtues and providing 
data as to how it can lead to improvements in WHS practices and performance in many 
circumstances. Within Company C, for example, internal WHS measures (based on 
safety statistics and extensive corporate safety audits) indicate that as individual mine 
sites progressively implemented initiatives under its corporate WHS management 
architecture, their performance improved, sometimes dramatically so – in two cases, 
mine sites with very poor WHS records have, since the introduction of this architecture, 
become industry leaders over a period of three to five years.  
 
Moving from the empirical to theory, there are many ‘in principle’ reasons why the 
current architecture might be expected to be effective. At its core, it employs a 
systems-based approach built on a clearly defined WHS agenda, documented 
standards and procedures, ongoing arrangements for investigating and managing 
WHS risks, including major hazards, and mechanisms for systematic monitoring, 
auditing and accountability. This approach, which can be termed ‘management-based 
internal regulation’, holds the promise of delivering improved WHS outcomes 
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(Coglianese & Nash 2006). In terms of companies’ self-regulation of social and 
business responsibilities generally, Parker (2002, Chapter 8) has suggested that 
“institutionalising internal corporate commitment” might best be achieved by a diversity 
of mechanisms: 
 
High level statements and demonstrations of commitment to compliance with the 
law or ethical obligations; institutionalised in management and worker 
accountability and performance measurement systems and in standard 
operating procedures; communication and training programs for dissemination of 
information about these policies and systems and management and worker 
responsibilities under them; internal reporting and monitoring systems for 
gathering information about compliance with those obligations and procedures; 
processes for gathering and resolving relevant complaints, grievances, 
suggestions and whistle-blowing reports from those both internal and external to 
the organisation; and internal and external reviews or audits of the functioning 
and performance of the whole system and provision for that to feed back to the 
highest level and into the design and operation of the systems. 
 
It will be apparent that Parker's above list of necessary ingredients of what might be 
required for self-regulation to work is a long and demanding one, but the gap between 
Parker's ideal and the architecture of internal control in the coal mining industry 
(leaving aside issues of implementation) is remarkably modest. Indeed, although the 
language adopted in this chapter is sometimes different, the substance of Parker’s list 
and the pillars described above for the industry is substantially similar.  
 
Despite the potential attractions and successes of the prevailing WHS management 
architecture, as indicated earlier, recent WHS statistics for the Australian coal mining 
industry show that the rate of improvement has slowed. In particular, there are still 
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fatalities periodically (if low in overall frequency), and the downward trend in injury 
incidence and frequency rates has levelled off and fluctuated in recent years, albeit at a 
lower level than previously (see Table 1 above).   
 
One possible explanation for the slower improvement in WHS performance is the ‘low 
hanging fruit’ argument, namely that most, if not all, of the easy WHS gains have now 
been captured, and that from here on in any further WHS improvements will require a 
much larger injection of effort and resources. Closer scrutiny of national data for the 
continuing injuries and diseases at mine sites suggests that this explanation has some 
merit. Safe Work Australia’s analyses of serious workers’ compensation claims indicate 
that musculoskeletal injuries are an enduring challenge. This is the case across all 
Australian industries with 43% of serious claims in 2007-08 being for sprains and 
strains but in the coal mining industry the rate was 56%, which was also higher than for 
the mining industry generally (48%) (Commonwealth of Australia 2008; 2010). Key 
causes of these injuries were lifting, carrying and otherwise handling objects.  
 
A rigorous approach to recognising and controlling manual tasks risks is indicated. This 
would include maximising learning from manual task related injuries by thoroughly 
investigating each instance of such injury in order to identify organisational, work 
environment and individual contributors to these injuries, as well as proactive and 
systematic identification and minimisation of risk factors. As companies develop and 
implement preventive programs they will also need to evaluate these to determine and 
share learning about the most successful preventive initiatives within the industry.8   
 
While there is a case to inject more effort and resources into tackling ‘higher hanging 
fruit’ (and there are other persistent problems in coal mining such as exposure to noise 
                                                
8 For an example of such a program see Burgess-Limerick et al (2007). 
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(Commonwealth of Australia 2008; 2010)) there may be additional factors underpinning 
the slowing of improvement in WHS performance. Reason (2000a) in particular, has 
argued that an organisation’s safety culture takes on a profound significance precisely 
at the point where accident rates reach a plateau, that is, arguably at the point the 
mining industry has now reached. Others similarly have argued that that “in order to go 
beyond this ‘low but (seemingly) unassailable’ plateau and to continue improvement in 
safety performance, it is necessary to address the hearts and minds of the 
management and workers” (Parker et al 2006) and to achieve a ‘generative’ safety 
culture (Hudson 2006). The latter implies actively involving all people, encouraging 
work initiatives in WHS, being willing to try new ideas, being obsessive planners, 
constantly scrutinising procedures, training and re-training and having a chronic 
unease about safety (Hudson 2006). 
 
This, and others recent and related, research suggests that there may be a substantial 
gap between the architecture as it is intended to operate, and as it operates ‘on the 
ground’. Again, drawing on the related study highlighted above, some mine sites within 
Company C (and therefore subject to the same WHS management architecture) are 
much more successful than other sites in adopting and implementing corporate WHS 
initiatives – this is evidenced by widely divergent WHS outcomes between these mine 
sites (Gunningham & Sinclair forthcoming (b)). Another study identified the coal mining 
industry as being susceptible to the formation of a ‘bottom-up’ mine site safety culture 
resistant to ‘top-down’ corporate WHS initiatives – such characteristics include 
industrial polarisation, remoteness from corporate HQ, and underground work teams 
with little exposure to senior site management (Sinclair 2010). In a further study, in 
particular, a lack of trust between management and workers, borne of years of 
antagonism, as having a corrosive impact on the implementation of corporate WHS 
initiatives was identified (Gunningham & Sinclair 2009). Crucially, where mistrust is not 
overcome, workers treat almost all management safety initiatives with suspicion and 
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refuse to ‘buy’ into them. Finally, some studies have identified that even a highly 
sophisticated corporate architecture, with a systems-based approach built around 
safety management systems, audits and risk management, may be undermined by a 
unsupportive workplace culture (Gunningham et al 2003; Parker & Neilson 2006). 
 
Another possible explanation for the plateauing of improvement is that the remaining 
WHS incidents and injuries are occurring in smaller companies, in particular, those that 
have not embraced the sophisticated WHS management architectures of larger 
companies. Whilst this is certainly plausible, in the context of this study it is not relevant 
as there are no small companies operating in the Australian coal industry. 
 
Although this scope of this chapter does not extend to a comprehensive analysis of the 
implementation of the prevailing corporate WHS management architecture, some of 
the responses of senior and middle managers and workers at the mine sties resonate 
with these other related findings, and point to some of the potential difficulties in 
applying the existing architecture. Impressive sounding policy statements do not 
necessarily translate into meaningful WHS change at site level, ambitious targets (zero 
harm) may be so far from the reality that they cease to have any practical meaning, or 
the targets may be so broad and general that it is unclear precisely what is being 
measured. Equally, data may be manipulated at site level so that targets appear to be 
met (as is common with LTI data), at the expense of genuine improvement, while the 
spread of standardised approaches may encourage a ‘tick the box’ mentality. 
Alternatively, rules may be perceived by the workforce or local management as lacking 
in credibility, or as being merely for the benefit of corporate management (to ‘protect 
their arses’) and accordingly fail to inspire confidence or compliance. Rules may also 
encourage mindless compliance in workers when to protect themselves and others 
they actually need to attend to the risks they face (Hopkins 2005). Even BBS 
programs, which are widely supported by senior management, may encounter 
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opposition from middle managers (usually required to conduct the observations) and 
work crews (that may perceive them as a ‘blame the worker’ approach). They may also 
channel safety effort into observation of rule compliance rather than rigorous 
identification and control of hazards, as they arise. 
 
Beyond possible implementation limitations of the prevailing architecture, there is a 
potentially more profound, inherent and structural limitation: whether the striking 
convergence (brought about by various isomorphic drivers) ultimately undermines 
future improvements in WHS practices and performance by reducing the amount 
innovation and experimentation. That is, if all companies are effectively the adopting 
the same approach, then, ipso facto, none can be trialling novel approaches outside 
the mainstream. This entirely speculative point is worthy of further investigation.  
 
2.6 Conclusions  
 
It is clear that large Australian coal mining companies have increasingly focused on 
corporate WHS management and in doing so, have converged on a single well-
developed corporate architecture. This architecture, based as it is on a sophisticated 
systems based approach to WHS management, has coincided with a steady and 
impressive improvement in WHS outcomes across the industry. Moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that is has been at least partially responsible for this improvement. 
 
The are several potential drivers of this architecture, including external regulation and 
international HQs; however, the high degree of convergence evident may also be a 
consequence of several synergistic isomorphic tendencies, where companies put aside 
their natural competitive rivalries to cooperate on a single issue, namely improved 
WHS outcomes across the industry. The suggestion that they perceive themselves to 
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be part of a community of shared fate, with a collective social license to operate (in 
relation to WHS), is supported by the many formal and informal mechanisms 
established across and within the industry to facilitate WHS cooperation. This in turn 
has led to increasing similarities in WHS management architectures across companies. 
 
Despite these largely positive developments, challenges remain. The current 
architecture appears to be have been adopted unequally across mine sites within the 
same company, and may to date have dealt largely with the ‘low hanging fruit’ of 
improvement in WHS practices and performance. Further, additional improvements 
may require corporate initiatives to overcome historical antagonism, pockets of 
resistance and mistrust (amongst both workers and middle managers), and the ‘us and 
them’ divide between management and workers, particularly at some mine sites. The 
result can be that without worker (and often middle management) ‘buy-in’, the best 
systems in the world are destined to be ineffective and corporate WHS initiatives built 
around the an elaborate WHS management architecture will be undermined.  
 
Such shortcomings of WHS architecture may well explain an otherwise puzzling 
phenomenon: why an impressive reduction in workplace injuries and fatalities has been 
followed in recent years by a levelling off of WHS performance, with an inability to 
maintain the momentum of earlier gains. It also remains to be seen whether, in the 
longer term, continued architectural convergence stifles corporate WHS management 
innovation across the industry. To the extent that the practices and experiences of the 
Australian coal mining industry are mirrored in other jurisdictions, and other industries, 
similar benefits and challenges may apply.  
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Chapter 3: The impact of safety culture on systemic risk 
management 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of article by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
accepted for publication in a forthcoming volume of	 the European Journal of Risk 
Regulation. The relative contributions were split 60/40 respectively between Sinclair 
and Gunningham. Sinclair contributed to the fieldwork, the processing of interview 
material, the background research and literature reviews, the preparation of initial 
drafts and the preparation and editing of the final draft.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade the Australian mining sector has achieved impressive 
improvements in WHS performance. During this period, there has been heavy reliance 
on systemic risk management that is mandated by mine safety legislation. Many large 
mining companies now use this approach as the principal vehicle through which to 
improve safety performance (sometimes referred to as ‘internal regulation’), often going 
‘beyond compliance’ with safety regulation. 
 
However, recent statistics suggest a plateauing (or even a reversal) of safety 
performance across companies (Department of Natural Resources and Mines 2012a; 
2012b), and uneven outcomes within companies. These raise questions as to the 
difficulty of achieving consistently high WHS outcomes, even with the advent of 
mandated management tools, and, in terms of the latter, the reasons for internal 
variation.  
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There has been a growing realisation that while ‘hard’ safety management variables 
(technology, equipment and risk management systems) have achieved a great deal, 
further improvement and greater consistency is only likely to be achieved through 
addressing ‘soft’ issues such as trust and ‘safety culture’ (Clarke 2006).  
 
This chapter examines the relationship between mandated systemic risk management 
safety performance and safety culture (including trust) through the experiences of five 
mine sites within a single Australian coal mining company.9 This company has in place 
a uniform approach to safety risk management across the entire organisation. The 
mine sites are subject to the same safety risk management systems, standards and 
tools. These prioritise hazard identification, along with assessing and controlling risks, 
and are built around the central pillar of a safety management system (the structures, 
responsibilities and resources for implementing, maintaining, monitoring, reviewing and 
improving safety risk management). And yet, as we will see, the mines experienced 
substantial variation in safety outcomes.  
 
The primary objective of the study was to understand the causes of this variation in 
safety performance. This included examining the role of localised safety cultures, and 
whether, to what extent and in what circumstances, they undermined the effectiveness 
of the company’s safety risk management strategy as mandated by law.  
 
Safety culture has been the subject of numerous empirical and theoretical writings 
(Gadd & Collins 2002; Guldenmund 2000), but remains a difficult concept to 
operationalise, not least when it comes to issues of trust (Consortium of Social 
Sciences Association 2014). Our concern, however, is not with safety culture per se, 
                                                
9 We are grateful to the coal mining company for providing us with access to five of its mine 
sites in order to interview managers and workers, as well as corporate management, and to 
detailed internal safety statistics and audit data. 
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but with the relationship between safety culture and regulatory mandated systemic risk 
management (commonly applied in Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular the USA 
(Coglianese & Lazer 2003). As such, we set out to test the claim that ‘culture eats 
systems for breakfast’ – that cultural variables may mediate (or even neutralise) the 
impact of safety risk management systems of a leading mining company. Recognising 
that the coal industry may be in some ways atypical, we sought to identify both 
particular characteristics that shape its culture and safety outcomes, and some more 
general insights.  
 
3.2 Methods 
 
The research is based on the experiences of five mine sites of a single coal mining 
company operating within New South Wales, Australia. The research was conducted 
with the cooperation of the company in question. The identities of the company to 
which we were given ‘in confidence’ access, or those of our interviewees, cannot be 
disclosed.  
 
The five mine sites included one open cut and four underground. They were selected in 
consultation with the company, with the intention of having both leading and laggard 
mine sites to provide a broad range of safety experiences.  Access was given to 
internal policy documentation and safety statistics, in particular, lost time injury 
frequency rates (LTIFRs) and total recordable incident frequency rates (TRIFRs), as 
well as internal safety audit data. 
 
Interviews were conducted with six senior managers located at corporate headquarters 
(chief executive, head of safety, head of risk management and operations managers) 
and 62 workers and managers across the mine sites. A typical sample of 
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approximately twelve interviewees from each mine consisted of the mine manager, 
shift or process supervisors, undermanager, safety officer, engineer (mechanical 
and/or electrical), team leaders (deputy undermanager, team supervisor), mine 
workers (the ‘crew’) and tradesmen (including safety representatives). The balance of 
managers to employees was approximately even. Interviews were conducted during 
two-day site visits, held in private, generally lasted between 40 and 60 minutes and 
consisted of a series of questions or prompts, with only those questions that elicited a 
substantive response being explored in greater detail.  
 
Interviewees were not constrained to address only preconceived issues, and were 
provided with an information statement on the research project, a consent form (signed 
by each participant) and informed that all interview material would be treated 
anonymously. Reviews of both domestic and international literatures, including 
organisational and safety culture and mine safety literatures, were conducted.  
 
3.3 Internal variation in safety performance 
 
We began by ranking the safety performance of the five mine sites. Internal safety 
statistics and audit data were collated over a five-year period,10 and annual information 
was aggregated and weighted (with the highest weighting given to the most recent 
statistics/data11). This yielded a single percentage score for each mine, with a lower 
                                                
10 The five-year period was chosen because it corresponded to the period in which corporate 
management had imposed uniform WHS standards and systems across the five mine sites, and 
it also minimises the chance of annual aberrations in WHS performance outcomes. 
11 The most recent year’s data was given a weighting of five, the next most recent data was 
given a weighting of four and so until the five-year old data was given a weighting of one. This 
was done to reflect the greater likelihood that more recent data would accurately reflect current 
circumstances, but at the same time attempting to smooth our results over a longer time frame 
so as to minimise annual anomalies. 
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score reflecting a better safety performance (see Table 4, below). This produced close 
to a two-fold range in safety performance, with Mines A and B clear leaders, Mine C 
having a middle ranking, and a large gap to the worst safety performers, Mines D 
and E. 
 
Table 4: Variation in safety performance 
Mine A Mine B Mine C Mine D Mine E 
51% 62% 77% 96% 98% 
 
In addition, five corporate managers were asked (independently) to rank the five mines 
according to their subjective views of safety performance. This produced similar results 
both across corporate managers, and as compared to the quantitative results: Mines A 
and B were the undisputed safety leaders, and Mines C and E were ranked as near 
unanimous poor performers. Only the ranking of Mine D produced some dissension in 
that it was placed somewhere above the bottom group of Mines C and E, but still well 
short of the top ranking Mines A and B.  
 
Finally, and subsequently, the company conducted a series of additional safety audits 
on the sites using a team from its international headquarters. Encouragingly, these 
audits produced remarkably similar results to our independent quantitative and 
qualitative rankings, again placing Mines A and B as the clear leaders, with Mines D, C 
and E at a substantial lower level (in that order). 
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The extensive overlap between the different rankings provides a considerable degree 
of reassurance as to their validity. This is despite legitimate criticism that has been 
raised about the susceptibility of LTIFRs to manipulation (Hopkins 2002a).12  
 
3.4 Explaining variation 
 
Possible explanations for the large differences in safety performances across the mine 
sites fall into three categories. First, there may be differences in the physical 
environment and/or technologies employed. For example, one mine utilised open cut 
mining techniques, which are arguably inherently safer than underground mining, whilst 
other mines had more recently been refurbished with new equipment, again with the 
potential to deliver safety advantages. Against this, however, differences in physical 
environments and/or mining techniques within each of the top and bottom ranked 
groupings of mines are just as great as the differences between the two groups. 
Further, prior to the introduction of corporate management’s safety risk management 
system, the two highly ranked Mines A and B were among the worst performing mines 
                                                
12 Critics point out that there are many mechanisms and practices that result in workers under-
reporting injuries – making many commentators rightly suspicious of reliance upon LTIFRs as a 
measure of injury levels (Ekevall et al 2008). However, in the jurisdiction in question, LTIFRs 
have become much less capable of manipulation since it was made a statutory requirement to 
also report injuries to the regulator. In any event, for purposes of our analysis LTIFRs are just 
one of the multiple measures that we use to ‘triangulate’ (validating our data through cross 
verification). Moreover, we do not rely on LTIFRs as a measure of injury levels, but merely 
suggest that at most, they might be one (but only one) useful indicator of relative safety 
performance if the degree of underreporting is consistent across mines. We cannot be sure that 
this is the case but there is nothing in our interviews with union officials or a diversity of other 
industry insiders to suggest it is not. It is also noted that the safety statistics employed in the 
quantitative ranking gave equal weighting to TRIFRs that, arguably, are far more difficult to 
manipulate.  
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in the company. If the physical and/or technology factors were a significant determinant 
of rank, then this influence would persist to some degree over time.  
 
Second, there may be differences in the systemic risk management systems, 
standards and tools mandated by law and those utilised by the company – whether in 
terms of structure or implementation (this is addressed in detail below). And third, there 
may be differences in mine site culture.  
 
3.5 Safety risk management systems and regulation 
 
The company has sought to impose an ambitious and uniform safety risk management 
approach across its mine sites, against which they are regularly and comprehensively 
audited. The evolution of such systems in coal mining has occurred in tandem with 
developments in government (‘external’) regulation. Regulators view safety 
management tools (especially risk management) as a new form of regulation – 
requiring companies to achieve public goals through a systemic approach rather than 
through remedying individual deficiencies: 
 
Effective management of OHS … nearly always requires employers to develop 
measures to address OHS risks. To supervise and enforce OHSM regulations 
effectively, labour inspectorates therefore have to find ways to influence duty-
holders to build better capacity to manage risks at their workplaces. Influencing 
how employers achieve this through improving the organisations and 
management of their operations in ways that take full account of OHS risks may 
require different approaches to inspection to those with which traditional 
inspection of technical risks have been addressed (Walters et al 2011, 9).   
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Consequently, there has been a shift away from traditional, prescriptive regulation 
towards ‘management-based regulation’ (Coglianese & Lazer 2003; Gunningham 
2007), although there are more than a few vestiges of prescription.  
 
Mine safety legislation provides a quintessential example of management-based 
regulation. In Queensland, Australia, mines are required to develop, implement and 
document a safety and health management system that incorporates risk management 
– it must be adequate and effective to achieve an acceptable level of risk (Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) s 62). Comparable provisions apply in New South 
Wales (Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 (NSW) s 23; Gunningham 2007, 
Chapter 1). It is these systems, rather than technical or performance standards, that 
are intended to become the focus of government inspections. 
 
A distinguishing feature of both New South Wales and Queensland regulations is that 
they go beyond general obligations to require highly detailed and specific safety 
management plans. For example, New South Wales imposes Major Hazard 
Management Plans to address slope stability, surface transport, underground 
transport, strata failure, inrush, fire and explosion, dust explosion, explosives and 
airborne dust (and relate these to standards for ventilation quantities, gas levels, and 
incombustible content of roadway dust). The plans are just one component of a 
broader safety management system (Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 (NSW) ss 
19-23, 32). Similar arrangements exist in Queensland (where there is a general duty to 
manage risk to an acceptable level), including requirements for standard operating 
procedures and other measures to control risk (Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 
1999 (Qld) ss 62, 63; Gunningham 2007, 26-31). 
 
In complying with external regulatory requirements, each mine in this study has a 
safety risk management system. This includes identifying assessing and controlling 
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risks, and developing major hazards management plans (under corporate guidance) to 
address low frequency, high consequence events (eg spontaneous combustion, 
inundation and strata control).  
 
To a large extent, the company implements safety risk management systems through 
SWPs. These specify the action to be taken by workers, allowing them to carry out 
tasks without needing to know about the company’s safety risk management system as 
a whole. An advantage is that individual SWPs can be updated without requiring 
system modifications. However, it is impractical to prepare SWPs for every single task 
in a mining environment that is inherently changeable and unpredictable. Accordingly, 
less formal decision-making mechanisms are also employed.  
 
Finally, there is an emphasis on worker participation and nurturing constructive 
dialogue between workers and management (often in short supply in coal mining). This 
is being pursued through regular meetings and consultations between workers and 
senior mine management (both formal and informal), worker involvement in risk 
assessments and accident investigations, feedback through incident reporting, safety 
suggestion programs and internal audits. 
 
The mines must also conform to a further set of safety standards issued by the 
international headquarters – these are subject to additional regular audits by 
international auditors. Monthly and quarterly meetings are held where individual mine 
managers are required to report on safety processes and performance. In addition, 
they have behavioural-based safety programs with regular ‘safety observations’.13 
Finally, all safety risk management systems, reporting and actions from each mine are 
                                                
13 Contrary to the substantial literature that the most critical safe behaviour is that of managers 
the company’s approach was exclusively worker-oriented (see: Hopkins 2000; Vaughan 1996). 
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placed on an interactive database that is accessible across all mines and to corporate 
management.  
 
Clearly, the company’s safety risk management approach is comprehensive. For 
example, it would appear to be more sophisticated and extensive than those described 
in another Australian study of a large chemical plant.14 The key point, however, is that 
the company has also gone to very considerable lengths to minimise differences in 
safety risk management systems between its different mines. For this reason it 
appears implausible such differences are the primary source of variation in safety 
outcomes across the mines.  
 
It might be argued that even if safety risk management systems were uniform between 
mines, implementation was not. However, as evidenced above, great attention was 
given to consistency through internal and external auditing and reporting – only if there 
had been a serious auditing failure would discrepancies have failed to come to light. 
But there is no evidence to suggest any such failure. Audits were conducted at arms-
length by professional audit teams drawn from the company’s international operations, 
and their findings were consistent with other performance indicators described above.  
 
Nor would it be plausible to argue that the standards set out were so vague and ‘fuzzy’ 
that managers at some mines could avoid them without formally violating them. On the 
contrary, individual standards specify in very precise terms what managers or workers 
should do when confronted by a particular risk, task or challenge, specifying the safety 
outcome or desired level of performance, but leaving open the concrete measures for 
achieving this in local circumstances. 
 
                                                
14 See Hopkins 2000; and for broader reviews of risk management development see Frick et al 
(eds) (2000). 
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One may also discount the influence of different regulatory requirements, as all five 
mines exist within the same regulatory jurisdiction. It would appear, then, that the 
striking variation in safety performance cannot be explained by differences in the 
physical environment/technology or safety risk management systems. It may be that a 
more plausible explanation can be found in terms of mine site safety culture. What, 
then, do we mean by ‘safety culture’ in this context? 
 
3.6 Defining safety culture  
 
Safety culture derives from the broader concept of organisational culture that refers to: 
 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as a 
correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems (Schein 
1992, 20). 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through its report ‘Safety Culture’, 
attracted widespread attention to its extension of this concept (International Atomic 
Energy Agency 1991). Subsequently, the term ‘safety culture’ entered mainstream 
policy discussion with bodies such as the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety 
Executive (Health and Safety Executive 1993). 
 
Unfortunately, safety culture is a much used (and abused) term, with disputes about 
how it is to be defined and measured, and its influence on safety outcomes 
(Guldenmund 2009; Tharaldsen & Haukelid 2009). Some argue that it is a dubious 
‘catch-all for social-psychological and human factor issues' (Mearns & Flin 1999, 8). 
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Similarly, Guldenmund (2000, 216) points out that however appealing such ‘umbrella’ 
concepts might be to management, there is a danger that because “these concepts are 
so global and abstract, they can also run the risk of becoming virtually meaningless”. 
 
Guldenmund (2010) suggests that three principal approaches as a way out of a 
definitional morass: an academic approach where culture is something an organisation 
‘is’ rather than something that it ‘has’; an analytical approach where culture is an 
attribute of an organisation (something it ‘has’ rather than ‘is’), with a focus on the 
present over the past and its impact on worker behavior (Clarke 2006; Sibley 2009); 
and a pragmatic approach where organisational structure is seen as involving the 
division of authority, responsibility and duties, and culture as the basic assumptions 
and processes as patterns of activity taking place throughout that structure.  
 
Our own approach is closely aligned with Guldennmund’s academic approach, as it 
emphasises field research or ethnography and is qualitative in nature. The priority is to 
locate safety culture in the specific context of the coal mining industry, which has a 
distinctive history involving decades of acrimony, dissent and disaster that continues to 
shape current perceptions, behaviours and outcomes. To this end, we are guided by 
Cooper’s categorisations in exploring the influence of the cultural characteristics of the 
five mines sites on safety performance (Cooper 1998 and 2000).  
 
Cooper describes three main components of safety culture as being psychological, 
situational and behavioural (Cooper 2000). The psychological component includes 
peoples’ norms, values, attitudes and perceptions of safety. The situational component 
involves the structure of the organisation, its policies, working procedures and 
management systems. And the behavioural component addresses practices adopted 
by employees that can be observed. These categories readily accommodate the 
distinctive circumstances of coal mining: psychological factors are to be ascertained 
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through interaction with workers and managers (this occurs independently at individual 
mine sites); situational factors through the study of an organisation's rules and policies 
(this occurs company wide through corporate WHS arrangements); and behavioural 
factors can be empirically observed (and are examined internally through safety 
observations).  
 
Cooper’s approach allows for the concept of 'reciprocal determinism' that sees each 
category interact with, and bear influence, upon the others (Cooper 2000, 119). In 
comparison, Schein (1992) and the UK HSE (1993) have definitions that favour linear 
chains of causation: underlying beliefs manifest themselves in behaviours and 
outcomes (Cooper 2000, 121-123). Cooper’s more nuanced approach is suited to the 
interaction of company wide, high-level policies with distinct behavioural and 
psychological profiles of its various worksites in producing divergent outcomes. It also 
addresses the process by which such cultures are created, for example, the interaction 
of safety risk management (situational factors) with the psychological and behavioural 
factors that are so often analysed as measures of the efficacy of a safety culture.  
 
3.7 Safety culture and safety performance 
 
There is much in the literature to suggest that safety culture can influence safety 
performance. Reason argues that safety risk management systems may operate far 
more effectively if they exist in the presence of a ‘robust safety culture’ (Reason 
2000c). More generally, Deal & Kennedy (1982) and the IAEA (1991; 1996 and 2006) 
highlight culture as the most important factor in determining company safety 
performance. Clearly, while safety culture definitions may be contested, there is little 
disagreement on its impact on safety outcomes. 
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Generally underplayed in the literature, however, is whether culture can play an 
important role not only at the level of the corporation, but of individual sites within it. Do 
companies, for example, possess one readily identifiable homogenous culture or a 
number of distinct mine-site sub-cultures? (Willcoxson & Millet 2000). Support for the 
former is provided by the advent of large, multinational companies with numerous sites 
– the Toyota Motor Company is cited as an example of this (Vaghefi, Woods & 
Huellmantel 2000, 65). An alternative view suggests that often a number of distinct 
sub-cultures exist within a single organisation in the form of ‘silos’, which in turn may 
act to preserve their own interests, sometimes at the expense of wider company goals, 
including safety (Willcoxson & Millet 2000). This accords with our focus on differences 
in safety culture and performance between mines sites within the same company. 
 
3.7.1 High ranked mines (Mines A and B) 
 
Mines A and B shared considerable historical and cultural similarities. Both mines had, 
until the last five years or so, been among the lowest ranked safety performers in the 
company. In particular, it was claimed that there were serious and ongoing disputes 
between workers and management, poor housekeeping standards, and a ‘bad’ culture, 
the only answer to which, according to management, was radical change: 
 
Bad culture goes with old mines. It produces a ‘them and us’ approach, and 
mistrust of management. Lots of people say the only way to change is a forced 
closure - to put the mine in care and maintenance for a minimum of six months 
and a maximum of twelve, and then cherry-pick a new workforce.  
 
Following brutal worker-management conflicts, and the equally brutal closure of the old 
mines, both were reopened as ‘new’ mines (Gunningham 2008). As such, they were 
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able to recruit new employees (including the selective hiring of some of the previous 
workforce), with a clear bias towards those seen as more sympathetic to 
management’s production and safety initiatives. Common patterns that contributed to 
their overall positive safety culture were as follows. 
 
3.7.1.1 High norms of safety risk management 
 
Following their closure and re-opening, senior management claimed that there was a 
concerted effort at both mines on setting and maintaining high safety risk management 
standards. There were clear goals to ‘be the best’ coal mines in their jurisdiction in 
terms of both safety and production (which, according to the internal statistical data, 
they achieved). In this respect, integrating safety risk management with mainstream 
decision-making was key (see below). Our interviews suggested workers and middle 
management ‘bought into’ this approach soon after the mines re-opened by engaging 
them in the formation of the mine sites’ safety risk management goals.  
 
These goals were then promulgated throughout the mines through communication, 
devolution and accountability. Communication is discussed in detail below. Devolution 
and accountability are ‘two sides of the same coin’ with middle and line managers 
being given greater authority to make decisions about safety risk management issues, 
confident of senior management support, at the same time as having greater 
accountability. In terms of daily operations, good ‘housekeeping’ (‘a tidy pit is a safe 
pit’) was targeted as a key area for instituting high safety risk management standards: 
‘if the guys know that you are fair dinkum well then they adopt that standard’. 
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3.7.1.2 Safety risk management placed above production 
 
At Mines A and B, mine managers took the initiative in halting production for safety 
reasons. This gave a clear message down the management hierarchy about the 
importance of safety risk management. Middle and line managers at these mines did 
not hesitate in articulating a willingness to halt production if circumstances warranted it, 
and in several cases were able to point to specific examples where this had occurred. 
Workers in turn reported a belief that mine management had a commitment to safety 
risk management. Overall, this helped build trust between management and the 
workforce.  
 
3.7.1.3 Integration of WHS risk management systems 
 
A striking feature of Mines A and B was the integration of safety risk management in 
mainstream decision-making. For example, weekly management meetings have safety 
as their first agenda item – and senior managers are expected to provide a detailed 
account of safety risk management performance and actions across their areas of 
responsibility. Further, managers allocate safety risk management actions to each 
other, which remain on a company database until they have been addressed (senior 
management receives regular updates on any outstanding actions). Although this 
system operates across the company, it is only at Mines A and B that senior 
management has insisted upon its application. Internal audits revealed that Mines A 
and B had far fewer outstanding action items than that other mines, and managers 
throughout the hierarchy expressed strong support for the system. 
 
Another example where Mines A and B appeared to be far more diligent in 
implementing safety risk management is in respect of monthly ‘safety observation’ 
obligations under the company’s BBS program. Again, internal audit data and mine-site 
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interviews supported a much stronger commitment to this as compared to other mines 
– as one manager noted, ‘it can be a pain to do them, but it is worth the effort’. 
 
3.7.1.4 Communication, consultation, reporting and feedback 
 
At Mines A and B it was reported that the mine management emphasised 
communication and consultation. As one worker put it: ‘the mine manager does lots of 
things to be seen around the workforce – and chases up all the complaints’. Mine 
managers engaged directly with the workforce, and middle management and workers 
confirmed the high visibility and approachability of senior management. Specific 
examples included, managers’ maintaining an open door policy, regularly conducting 
‘rounds’ of the crews as they are working, holding regular shift meetings, and having 
monthly ‘rostered-on’ mine meetings.  
 
Crucially, from the workers’ perspective, management was seen to respond promptly to 
safety risk management issues raised by workers. Workers reported that individual 
feedback occurred even in cases where no action was taken. As such, managers and 
workers reported a strong emphasis on reporting incidents, even where this might 
potentially cast the worker in a poor light – the emphasis was gathering safety risk 
management data, not apportioning blame. Internal audit data confirmed that these two 
mines had substantially higher rates of incident reporting, particularly near misses, over 
the other mines, suggesting the successful introduction of ‘blame free’ reporting 
(Reason 1997). 
 
3.7.1.5 A reduction in ‘us and them’ 
 
Although ‘us and them’ attitudes were not entirely absent, respondents reported a 
notable reduction in the traditional adversarial relationship between workers and 
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management. A key explanation was that workers had a ‘stake’ in the future prosperity 
of the mine, and that effective safety risk management was key to this collective vision. 
The placement of management and workers into discrete processed-based teams 
helped break down barriers between workers and management. And a ‘flatter’ 
management structure with line managers being elevated to overall shift based 
management responsibility had, from the workers’ perspective, meant ‘one of their own 
has been put in charge of day-to-day operations’. 
 
Respondents at both Mines A and B claimed that there had been a conscious effort to 
foster trust, through: social gatherings where workers and management can mingle 
informally; seeking workers’ views on safety risk management; and emphasising the 
long term benefits of a safe and productive mine. Consequently, it was claimed that 
workers had confidence that when raising safety risk management concerns or 
suggestions with management they would be given a genuine hearing. As such, 
worker input and engagement (in short, ownership) was actively sought in the 
implementation of new safety risk management systems and initiatives. Again, 
although not all responded positively to these overtures, it was claimed by workers and 
managers alike that many workers had.  
 
3.7.1.6 Cooper’s categories 
 
In summary, Mines A and B align with Cooper’s (2000) safety culture typology as 
follows: (i) psychological factors - high safety risk management standards, a 
preparedness to halt production if safety is compromised, high levels of trust between 
workers and management; (ii) situational factors – integration of corporate safety risk 
management into mainstream decision-making, and middle and line management 
accountability; and (iii) behavioural factors – good communication, good housekeeping, 
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regular quality safety observations and blame free reporting. Collectively, these created 
of a virtuous safety cycle.  
 
One difference between the mines was management’s relationship with trade unions. 
In the case of both Mines A and B, management had excluded ‘union troublemakers 
and hardliners’ in selecting workers for employment. It was claimed that this provided 
an opportunity to create a new, more production and safety orientated culture. Since 
then, however, management at Mine B has pursued a more conciliatory approach with 
unions through constructive engagement, including regular meetings with senior 
management and informing them of key management decisions including those 
relating to safety risk management. In contrast, Mine A has sought to marginalise union 
input. As such, we tentatively conclude that a successful nurturing of a new safety 
culture was due not to the exclusion of unions per se but rather direct engagement with 
the workforce, whether mediated via a union or not.15  
 
3.7.2 Middle and low ranked mines (Mines C, D and E) 
 
At Mine C, it was claimed that geographical remoteness fostered a more independent, 
autonomous culture, despite the advent of comprehensive corporate safety risk 
management systems. This was compounded by a relatively high turnover of 
management, and a workforce that was drawn predominantly from the local farming 
community – with little experience in mine work, and inclined to self-reliance.  
 
At Mine D, there was an undercurrent of antagonism between workers and 
management dating back to a pay dispute, approximately four years previously. In 
                                                
15 While noting the considerable volume of literature that suggests that a powerful trade union 
committed to WHS issues is a strong determinant of improved WHS outcomes (Gunningham 
2007, Chapter 9). 
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response to strike action, mine management had taken over production. This 
generated resentment amongst workers that has continued to permeate relations with 
management, even with those not involved in the original dispute. Almost without 
exception, middle managers identified this as impeding safety risk management, 
despite the considerable efforts of contemporary management.  
 
At Mine E, there was a widespread perception that the mine was operating under a 
threat of closure. Workers reported that this had detrimental implications for safety risk 
management. Many were resistant to new safety initiatives, as they did not see a long-
term future. An aging workforce – with many looking forward to retirement – and 
historically adversarial union relations, exacerbated this. 
 
Beyond these individual mine characteristics, there were several shared experiences 
that, collectively, undermined safety risk management outcomes. 
 
3.7.2.1 High levels of mistrust  
 
Mines C, D and E were characterised by high levels of mistrust between management 
and workers, and to a lesser extent between middle/line management and senior 
management, and senior and corporate management:  
 
It’s an inherent thing … nobody will trust anybody … we’ve been told things that 
many times and the opposite’s just happened … the bigger the company gets, 
the less they trust.  
 
Mistrust has its roots in the long history of antagonism between workers (unions) and 
management (often contributed to by a catalytic event, eg ‘spilling’ the workforce, that 
soured relations). Mistrust creates a negative prism through which subsequent 
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management actions are interpreted – workers are less likely to report incidents for 
fear of ‘getting nailed for something’ and resist initiatives such as safety observations 
as they feel threatened or doubt management motivations. They may also choose not 
to follow safety procedures because they resent management telling them how to do 
their job, they have little trust in management’s abilities or they believe such 
procedures are really there to ‘protect management more than workers’. Apart from 
workers, senior management at these mines expressed mistrust of corporate 
management and viewed, in particular, corporate safety initiatives as unwarranted and 
unwelcome attempts to keep ‘tabs’ on their behaviour and performance. 
 
3.7.2.2 A lack of commitment to middle management ‘accountability’ 
 
In mines C and E, middle management’s obligations to conduct ‘safety observations’ 
and ‘safety action items’ remained largely unmet (Mine D, in contrast, has made some 
progress on these fronts, though still well short of Mines A and B): 
 
It has only been very partially implemented. It is not taken seriously by middle 
managers, with overdue actions allowed to accumulate unimpeded.  
 
This lack of accountability flowed from the attitudes and behaviour of senior managers: 
 
Some have a very cynical attitude towards it, in particular that it is a malicious 
attempt by management to control their behaviour. Others think it is just another 
extra burden that makes their job harder. 
 
Further, middle managers left audit recommendations ‘on the shelf’, did not follow 
safety risk management systems and delivered safety briefings by ‘going through the 
motions’.  
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3.7.2.3 A widespread acceptance of poor housekeeping 
 
Apart from cleaning up the accumulation of rubbish, good housekeeping involves 
planning for equipment, materials and storage, and is closely associated with improved 
safety outcomes – one manager claimed that the quickest and easiest way of 
assessing mine standards is to ‘look around and see how much crap has been left 
around the place’. However, housekeeping standards were especially poor at Mines C 
and E: 
 
They would rather walk or trip over something or walk around it than move it, 
because that is not my job. ‘I didn’t put it there, that’s your problem’.  
 
Such attitudes contributed to an increased risk of WHS incidents, through slips and 
trips, and to a lack of ‘safety pride’ by lowering expectations of acceptable safety 
standards. Further, there was a perception that housekeeping would detract from 
production, and that line managers either lacked the inclination and/or authority to 
insist upon higher housekeeping standards. Line managers, in their defence, cited a 
lack of support from their supervisors.  
 
3.7.2.4 A perceived (or real) reluctance on the part of mine management to respond to 
worker feedback  
 
Another consistent finding at Mines C, D and E was that workers reported, rightly or 
wrongly, being ignored or ‘taken for granted’ by management. Consequently, they 
claimed that they did not see value in the process of reporting safety incidents, since 
they had no confidence that any action would be taken. Internal audits supported these 
claims. Systematic underreporting has the potential to seriously undermine risk 
management.  
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3.7.2.5 A focus on short-term production  
 
Underlying many of the above characteristics at Mines C, D and E is an emphasis on 
short-term production. Worker bonuses are geared towards production because of 
below par performances over time. This creates a ‘catch 22’ whereby they avoid 
implementing practices, such as safety risk management initiatives, that could lead to 
long-term improvements in both production and safety for fear of sustaining short term 
losses: “[we’re] always playing catch-up and never taking a stand”. This reluctance to 
‘take a stand’ sends a message to the workforce that safety is not taken seriously by 
mine management.  
 
3.7.2.6 Cooper’s categories 
 
A summary of the key individual and collective features of safety culture at Mines C, D 
and E, according to Cooper’s (2000) typology, is as follows: (i) psychological factors – 
independent ‘can do’ attitude, lack of mine safety background, reluctance to embrace 
corporate management safety vision (Mine C); lack of trust between management and 
workforce, resentment of management by workers (Mine D); adversarial relationship 
between workers and management (Mine E); and limited middle management 
accountability in safety risk management systems; (ii) situational factors – disconnect 
with corporate safety risk management systems (Mine C); and (iii) behavioural factors 
– poor communication, poor housekeeping standards, safety observations either not 
conducted or perfunctory, and an unwillingness to report safety incidents. 
 
In summary, Mines C, D and E have a ‘negative feedback loop’ whereby mine 
management is suspicious of corporate safety interventions, and workers mistrust mine 
management, resulting in a lack of commitment to safety risk management systems – 
they are viewed as being “simply there to protect management’s arses”.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 
Over the last decade or so, large sophisticated mining companies have increasingly 
been subject to management-based regulation. As such, they have sought to improve 
safety performance across their mine sites through the introduction of corporate-wide 
risk management systems, standards and tools. Indeed, in this respect there has 
clearly been a high degree of policy convergence between major international mining 
companies. The Australian coal mining company that is the subject of this study is a 
prime example of this trend. Over a five-year period, it has implemented uniform 
standards (focused on risk management), safety management systems, key 
performance indicators, regular reporting, in-house auditing, safety observations and 
an interactive safety database. These have been allocated considerable resources, 
with the full backing of corporate management.  
 
Despite these efforts, however, the company has been unable to achieve anything 
close to consistent safety performances across its various mine sites.16 A twofold 
difference between the best and worst mine sites safety performances (over the same 
five-year period) was confirmed by the subjective assessments of corporate managers, 
and a subsequent international audit program. This finding indicates that other factors 
beyond corporate risk management systems and standards are at play.  
 
Since neither differences in equipment/technology, nor standards and wider risk 
management arrangements, provided a plausible explanation for mine site variation, 
attention turned to the culture of individual mines. Utilising Cooper’s categories, a 
number of distinctive patterns linking safety culture to safety performance emerged 
between high and middle/low ranking mines. In terms of psychological characteristics, 
                                                
16 We make no comment concerning health, since no reliable statistics are available. 
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high ranked mines demonstrated a willingness to stop production for safety concerns, 
and high levels of trust between management and workers (and benefited from 
selective recruitments after earlier purges of staff and workers).  In contrast, middle/low 
ranked mines displayed antagonism between management and workers, and an 
emphasis on short-term production goals. In terms of situational characteristics, 
differences emerged in their embracement of safety management systems and 
databases to achieve middle management accountability. In terms of behavioural 
characteristics, differences in housekeeping, incident reporting, safety observations 
and communication were even starker. 
 
While corporate safety risk management standards and systems are increasingly 
employed by multinational mining companies to improve safety outcomes, a receptive 
workplace safety culture would seem to be a necessary pre-condition for their success. 
The variation in safety performance witnessed across one company’s mine sites in this 
study demonstrates the determinative influence (positive and negative) localised safety 
cultures have on corporate management’s safety risk management initiatives (and, by 
extension, management-based regulation).  
 
It may well be that the coal mining industry, with its history of conflict and polarisation, 
and geographically isolated mines sites, is more susceptible than many industry 
sectors to the influence of local safety cultures on the success or otherwise of 
corporate safety risk management systems. However, some industries, e.g. 
commercial shipping and offshore petroleum, may also be susceptible to such 
influences. And although somewhat speculative, it is plausible then that these findings 
will resonate for other such industries, particularly those struggling to achieve 
consistency in safety outcomes across sites. More generally, the results may be 
relevant to a deeper understanding of the potential limitations of a regulatory imposed 
systemic based approach to safety risk management (and indeed to environment and 
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other social challenges) that fails to also address safety culture. At the very least, the 
findings clearly demonstrate that corporate safety standards and systems are often 
dependent on the culture into which they are received, and that culture can indeed ‘eat 
systems for breakfast’.   
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Chapter 4: A cluster of mistrust: Safety in the mining 
industry  
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
published in The Journal of Industrial Relations (Volume 53, Number 4, September, 
2011, pages 450-466). The relative contributions were split 60/40 respectively between 
Sinclair and Gunningham. Sinclair contributed to the fieldwork, the processing of 
interview material, the background research and literature reviews, the preparation of 
initial drafts and the preparation and editing of the final draft.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
There is growing evidence that trust between corporate and site management and 
between management and the workforce, is crucial to improved safety outcomes.  
Indeed, trust is often referred to as the lubricant for open and frequent safety 
communication (Reason 1997), and as crucial in maintaining co-operation (Morgan & 
Hunt 1994), promoting the acceptance of decisions (Tyler 2003), improving knowledge 
sharing (Dirks & Ferrin 2002), supporting all aspects of organisational functioning 
(Bijlsma & Koopman 2003) and enhancing safety performance (Barling & Hutchinson 
2000). Lack of trust is closely associated with a history of adversarial industrial 
relations, although a number of other factors also contribute to its development. 
 
Trust can be regarded as an individual or group’s belief that another individual or group 
makes good faith efforts to behave in accordance with explicit or implicit commitments, 
is honest in negotiations preceding such commitments, and does not take excessive 
advantage of the other, even when the opportunity arises (Cummings & Bromley 
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1996). In the context of worker and management relations around safety, trust is best 
understood as an individual’s willingness to rely on another person, based on 
expectations that he or she will act safely or intends to act safely. For example, 
management might trust workers not to ‘cut corners’, break safety rules or take 
unreasonable risks. Workers in turn might trust management to keep them safe (Risk 
Analysis 2006).  
 
Notwithstanding the crucial importance of trust to improving safety performance, there 
is a paucity of research examining the concept within the realms of safety (Cox et al 
2004). There is still much we do not know about how trust is best nurtured, how it is 
lost and might best be regained, the consequences of an absence of trust, how it 
varies between different groups within an organisation, and the relationship between 
trust and industrial relations (Risk Analysis 2006; Conchie et al 2006; Zeffane & 
Connell 2003).  
 
This chapter explores trust in the context of the Australian mining industry, an industry 
that has more reason than most to have major concerns about a lack of trust, given its 
long history of acrimonious industrial relations. Indeed the 2005 New South Wales 
Mine Safety Review identified a “debilitating mistrust between the members of the 
tripartite process” (Wran & McClelland 2005) as a principal obstacle to improved safety 
in the industry. In Western Australia the Ritter Report documented the enormous 
difficulties of successfully implementing managerial safety strategy with “a workforce of 
whom a significant number had strong opposition to a key management strategy” 
(Ritter 2004). In Queensland, a 2005 report pointed to a series of disputes that have 
had a detrimental effect on trust between the inspectorate, the Construction Forestry 
Mining and Energy Union and mine operators, and the antagonistic and confrontational 
climate that is not conducive to optimal safety outcomes (ACiL 2005).  
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In Tasmania, the report of the investigation of the Beaconsfield Gold Mine collapse 
provides several pertinent insights (Melick 2006). In particular, the report detailed that 
there was a prevailing atmosphere of mistrust that had undermined safety reporting 
and responses prior to the incident (Quinlan 2007). Further, it highlighted the limitations 
of relying on ‘top-down’ safety management, which in turn can undermine worker 
perceptions of the effectiveness of, and trust in, corporate safety initiatives (a 
phenomenon that may be replicated across the industry). Finally, in his concluding 
report, the Coroner highlighted the failings of risk assessments that did not adequately 
consult workers (Chandler 2009). 
  
There are a variety of reasons why building trust is far from easy in the mining industry. 
For many years, workers and management have been polarised on a plethora of 
issues; relations between unions and mining companies are often acrimonious; and 
although safety might arguably be kept separate from industrial relations (Carson & 
Henenberg 1988), in practice it is often ensnared within it (Creighton & Gunningham 
1985). Hostile labour relations, it is argued, may be further entrenched within export 
orientated and/or foreign owned companies (as applies to many Australian coal mining 
companies, and two of the three companies in this research) that have historically been 
less amicable towards Australian labour interests (Bennett 1994). 
 
Notwithstanding the argument that there is no place for industrial relations in safety 
because both sides have common interests (Robens 1972), this is not a view 
supported by history. On the contrary, in the event of disagreement (as when the 
production process is speeded up to the detriment of safety), common interest 
evaporates (Nichols & Armstrong 1973; Berman 1978; Carson 1981). On this view, 
industrial relations and safety cannot be kept apart. As such, achieving a co-operative 
and constructive approach to safety, and enlisting worker participation to improve 
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safety outcomes, presents an enormous challenge, which is unlikely to be resolved in 
the absence of trust. 
 
In the Australian mining industry (and coal mining in particular), trust has been an 
extremely scarce commodity. Many managers express a strong mistrust of union 
dominated workforces, and of union representatives in particular and, even in the 
absence of unions, regard the entrenched attitudes and behaviours of many mine 
workers as being antithetical to modern management and improved safety outcomes. 
In turn, many workers and their representatives have a deep mistrust of, and hostility 
towards management, borne from a history of death, injury and disease for which 
employers were, historically, hardly blameless (Hargraves 1993; Shaw & Bruns 1947). 
Lockouts, strikes, and the use of leverage (by both sides, depending on the economic 
climate) have also left their scars (McColl 1982), reinforcing negative stereotypes. The 
fact that both government and employer priorities sometimes seemed to exclude safety 
considerations and that the ‘welfare of mine workers and families is regarded as 
subsidiary’ (Bullimore 1999), served to entrench worker mistrust. 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between trust (and mistrust) and safety. 
Section 4.2 outlines the methodology. Section 4.3 describes a cluster of characteristics 
identified as being at the heart of mistrust between workers and management. 
Section 4.4 discusses the implications of these findings, including the interaction 
between different characteristics and a ‘tipping point’ beyond which mistrust becomes 
both entrenched and a potent constraint on safety. The chapter concludes with some 
comments on how mistrust might best be overcome and trust created. 
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4.2 Methodology  
 
This research was based on in-depth interviews with corporate and mine management, 
union officials and miners across ten mine sites, three companies (four each from the 
first and second companies, and two from the third), and two states (eight in New 
South Wales and two in Queensland). The intention was to identify and examine 
(where they existed) critical relationships between safety and trust (or a lack thereof). 
Researching different mine sites within individual companies enabled a number of 
variables to be held constant across those companies (in particular, corporate 
management approaches and safety systems), while exploring variation in others 
(namely differences in safety performance and levels of trust at the mine site level). 
 
We began by identifying high and low safety performing mine sites within each of the 
companies (and avoiding sites in the middle of the spectrum) – no attempt was made 
to pre-judge individual mine sites as being either high or low in trust. To do this, internal 
WHS statistical measures (including LTIs, TRIs, incident reporting and workers 
compensation data), together with the annual results of internal company safety audits, 
were collated over a five-year period17 and then aggregated and weighted (with the 
weighting factor of 5 given to the most recent year’s data, stepping down by 1 through 
each year to a factor of 1 for the five year old data) to give each mine a safety 
performance ranking (the combination of different statistical data makes it makes it 
more reliable than if we relied on, in particular, LTI data alone, which has been subject 
to legitimate criticism of being open to manipulation (Hopkins 2002a)). In addition, 
corporate managers (including corporate safety managers) provided a subjective (and 
independent and confidential) ranking of the safety performance of the mines sites 
within each of their respective companies.   
                                                
17 A five-year period was chosen because this was the extent to which companies could provide 
consistent data, and was deemed to be sufficient to overcome annual aberrations.  
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The combined ranking process produced three striking results. First, there were very 
large differences in the aggregated statistical weightings between the highest and 
lowest ranked mines. Second, the spread of mines was highly polarised, with distinct 
groupings at the high, middle and low rankings. Third, there was a very high degree of 
consistency between the quantitative (aggregated statistics) and qualitative (managers’ 
views) rankings, with only limited differences in the middle rankings. On the basis of 
these results, then, mine sites for inclusion in the research project were selected from 
only the highest and lowest safety rankings. This methodology was deemed sufficiently 
robust for the purpose of this research project (which was, simply, to identify mine sites 
within each company at either end of the safety performance spectrum, not to identify 
and quantify in detail the precise gradations across the entire spectrum).18 
 
Following the selection of high and low safety performing mine sites, fieldwork was 
conducted between August 2007 and May 2008 with the full cooperation of the 
participating companies, key unions and the workforce. The principal means of data 
collection was semi-structured interviews, as this method yields more unexpected 
insights and candid revelations than a more structured interview or survey method, and 
allows the interview to be tailored to the circumstances and experiences of each 
interviewee.  
 
A total 120 interviews were conducted. In each two-day site visit, typically, twelve 
interviews were conducted spanning senior, middle and line management, and 
workers. The balance of management and worker interviews was approximately equal. 
In addition to the site interviews, 12 representatives from corporate management 
                                                
18 Subsequent to the research, the mines sites of one of the companies underwent 
comprehensive international safety audits conducted by a specialist team of auditors from their 
international head quarters, the results of which were entirely consistent with our own safety 
rankings – this provided external support as to the credibility of our ranking methodology. 
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(including chief executives, corporate safety managers and operational managers) 
were interviewed across the three participating companies. Twelve inspectors were 
interviewed across both jurisdictions, including mines inspectors and electrical and 
mechanical engineering inspectors, and discussions were held with a chief mines 
inspector. Six union officials were interviewed across both jurisdictions (either district 
check inspectors, industry safety representatives or industry check inspectors), and 
discussions were held with a senior union official. Generally, interviews lasted between 
40 and 60 minutes and were conducted in private (but in the field) and consisted of a 
series of questions or prompts addressing the following topics: the nature of the 
relationship, communication, history with their superiors, subordinates and/or peers (in 
case of company managers and workers, and depending upon applicability), the nature 
of their relationship communication, history with company managers and workers (in 
the case of union officials and inspectors), the impact of these relationships on safety 
practices and performance and their perceptions of company safety policies and 
procedures. Interviewees were provided with an information statement of the research 
project, a consent form (signed by each participant) and informed in advance that all 
information arising from their interviews would be treated confidentially, and used 
anonymously in any subsequent publications.19 
 
Qualitative data arising from the interviews was subject to ‘grounded theory’ - this 
entailed transcript material being codified and collated into ‘like’ categories, which in 
turn were analysed for relationship patterns and used to inform our research findings 
(Charmaz 2006). The qualitative data was supplemented by reviews of the domestic 
and international literature, and internal policy and safety related information provided 
by the three participating mining companies. 
 
                                                
19 This process was in accordance with the ethics clearance provided by The Australian 
National University to the authors for conducting the research. 
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4.3 Findings: A cluster of mistrust 
 
The mine sites with low safety performance displayed a cluster of characteristics 
strongly associated with a heightened presence of mistrust. This is not to suggest that 
all the lower performing sites expressed identical characteristics, or that such 
characteristics were uniformly displayed throughout each site, or that mistrust is the 
only factor at play. Nevertheless, it became clear that not only is mistrust a central 
theme running through each of the characteristics included in the cluster, but that 
combinations of these characteristics had a tendency to interact. Overall, the greater 
the number of the characteristics, the greater the likelihood that mistrust impacted 
negatively on safety processes, practices and outcomes.  
 
The cluster of characteristics closely associated with the formation and maintenance of 
mistrust (and conversely their absence, with high trust) were: (i) a catalytic event; (ii) a 
divided workforce; (iii) mixed messages, inconsistent actions; (iv) a high turnover of 
senior management; (v) closed management style; and (vi) a resentment of corporate 
intervention. In identifying these characteristics, our primary interest was in the factors 
underlying mistrust, not its subsequent effects.   
 
4.3.1 A catalytic event 
 
In many of the lower safety sites, a single catalytic event had precipitated a serious 
breakdown of trust between management and workers. For example, one mine 
experienced a mishandled downsizing, where all worker positions were ‘spilled’, and 
workers who wanted to resume working at the mine had to reapply, generating 
considerable fear and uncertainty. The consequences, in terms of animosity between 
workers and the managers perceived to be responsible, continued for several years. At 
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two other mines, management ‘cut coal’ during the course of industrial disputes, 
crossing the picket line to do so. This meant that management was able to hold out for 
much longer than would otherwise be the case, and in so doing put considerable 
pressure on workers to reduce their demands. This action generated acrimony that 
continued several years after the event.  
 
Although the precise events varied from case to case, there were striking similarities 
between the mines that had experienced such an event in terms of their negative 
consequences. Such events created a ripple effect throughout a mine site’s operations, 
with mistrust infusing relationships outside the original context. For example, a dispute 
concerning a specific incident might impede good management and worker 
communications more generally with a corrosive effect on safety initiatives. The ill-
feeling on the part of the ‘wronged’ party (usually workers) often persisted for years, 
flaring up at points of stress, such as changes in management practices or structures.  
 
In terms of safety, a particularly debilitating consequence of a catalytic event is its 
potential to reshape perceptions. Subsequent disputes or disagreements become 
framed in such a way as to reinforce prejudices arising from the original event. In 
consequence, even when senior management introduces safety initiatives in a genuine 
attempt to raise standards, these may fail to penetrate a powerful cultural mythology of 
mistrust. Where this mistrust was not overcome, workers treated almost all 
management safety initiatives with suspicion and refused to buy into them, safety 
observations were perfunctory, incident reporting was trivialised or ignored, systems 
were honoured more in the breach, and sophisticated electronic monitoring systems 
were side-tracked. This suggests that once lost, trust may be particularly hard to 
regain.  
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4.3.2 A divided workforce 
 
A second feature found in four lower safety mine sites was the presence of highly 
visible and distinctive divisions within the site workforce, such as between workers on 
staff agreements and those on collective agreements (or enterprise agreements), 
between miners who had been rehired in the face of an impending pit closure and 
those who had not, between managers (and some workers) who had come over to a 
new mine as a ‘block’ from another mine and those already employed at the recipient 
mine, and between company employers and contractors.  
 
Clearly, all work environments to a greater or lesser extent are prone to the formation 
of cliques or factions. What was distinctive here was the ways in which such divisions 
became a prominent feature of the prevailing work culture. At one mine, individual 
contracts (as opposed to collective agreements) were offered to workers, the 
inducement to sign such contracts being a higher pay structure. Among miners, a 
commonly voiced opinion was that there was a management attempt to divide and 
conquer, with the strategy being to get enough of a core of workers to run the mine 
without the union. The fact that some union members chose to go onto contracts 
created a high degree of animosity, directed at those who accepted management’s 
offer to go onto contracts by those who did not. Threats were made, and individual 
contract workers were ostracised. Outside, property, such as private vehicles, was 
damaged, and the extended community of miners’ families, split. 
 
Such divisions generated tension that undermined both productivity and safety. It is 
difficult to maintain high safety standards when one group of workers will not speak to 
another group.  
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4.3.3 Mixed messages, inconsistent actions 
 
A third characteristic associated with mistrust, and common at lower safety mines, was 
a perception of management giving ‘mixed messages’ and failing to ‘walk the talk’ in 
terms of safety. The most commonly cited example of such behaviour involved 
management exhorting workers to ‘put safety first’, while placing greater pressure on 
them to achieve production targets (these two goals commonly being in tension). 
 
For example at one mine, workers were required to complete a JSA card at the start of 
each shift and when starting a new job. However, workers told us that management 
had not provided adequate training nor allocated time to complete the cards. Instead, 
they reported that if they took the time out to complete a card, they would incur the 
wrath of management for wasting time. In short, there is a strong ‘production comes 
first’ message undermining the value of the program. This in turn leads to tokenism. 
Miners admitted it was common practice to take a week’s worth of JSA cards home 
and complete them in advance of the actual jobs, completing them without thought to 
actual risks or safety mindfulness as a ‘tick-and-flick’ exercise, or completing them after 
the job.   
 
Such mixed messages and management turning their backs on workers not doing 
things the safe way generated cynicism and mistrust. There was a widespread view 
that the real purpose of safety initiatives is ‘arse-covering’ by management.   
 
One aspect of management inconsistency that is deeply resented by workers and 
enormously damaging to trust is when there is a perceived breach of ‘no-blame’ 
policies. Many companies have introduced such policies in relation to the reporting of 
WHS incidents and equipment damage, as one important step towards establishing a 
safety culture (Reason 1997). However, in some of the lower safety sites the no-blame 
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policy was not evenly applied. At one mine, for example, workers acknowledged that 
they were not reporting ‘micro-sleep’ incidents (where a worker momentarily falls 
asleep on the job), notwithstanding the fact that such incidents could be extremely 
dangerous (particularly when operating large, mobile machinery), for fear of losing their 
job, despite management claims to the contrary.  
  
4.3.4 High turnover of senior management 
 
At four of the five lower safety mine sites there was a high turnover of senior 
management, including mine managers. One site, for example, had lost approximately 
50% of its senior management team in the last six to nine months, and another had 
several managers in the space of two and half years. Such experiences can greatly 
inhibit attempts to build and maintain trust between management and workers. A 
worker explained:  
 
This creates inherent problems because people are unable to relate to the mine 
manager, they’re unable to relate to the superintendent, because you can’t build 
that trust relationship up. … with each new person [there are] new ideas, new 
values, new ethics, and those situations are confusing sometimes, especially for 
lower level management and employees. 
 
High turnover of management also raises doubts in the minds of workers as to the 
viability of the mine, some workers interpreting this as evidence that management has 
no long-term commitment to the mine. It also stands in stark contrast to the experience 
of workers, who often remain in the same job for decades. Consequently, if workers 
fall-out with a manager they can simply wait them out, the attitude that, ‘I’ll still be here 
long after you are gone, so you’ve no hold over me’. This makes it difficult to develop a 
sense of shared destiny and overcome mistrust.  
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4.3.5 Closed management style 
 
A fifth characteristic was the wider issue of a ‘closed’ management style. There are a 
number of dimensions to this. One is the extent to which the management team is 
isolated from the workforce, as where they are perceived to be reclusive and isolated. 
This causes a distancing often accompanied by a lack of understanding and trust of 
management actions. At one low safety mine, for example, workers observed that 
managers ‘disappear into their offices’ whenever there is a change of shifts, an act 
which workers perceived as a cowardly way of avoiding interaction with them. At 
another mine, senior management is rarely seen. As one worker stated:  
 
I’d say 80 per cent of the workforce here probably don’t interact with 
management too much at all, except maybe when another manager comes into 
their section ‘’how you fellows going, blah, blah, blah, see you later’. 
 
In contrast, at higher safety mines, management created opportunities for informal and 
formal engagement, for example, taking advantage of shift changes to engage with the 
workforce. Workers expressed a strong preference for this style of management and 
reported that it was an important component of building trust.  
 
Another aspect of a closed management style is a lack of consultation. Workers at 
lower safety mines reported that management safety initiatives appear ‘out of the 
ether’, with little input from the workforce in their design or implementation. This can be 
particularly debilitating to the ‘ownership’ of safety initiatives for which worker 
engagement is essential. For example, at one mine there were complaints about the 
constant stream of new safety initiatives accompanied by little or no prior consultation 
with the crew, and at another, miners were scathing about the lack of consultation in 
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the introduction of mandatory mini-risk assessments for every shift, resulting in 
rampant tokenism.  
 
Particularly important, according to workers at all mines, was the extent and means by 
which management provided feedback, especially in the context of reporting on WHS 
incidents, near misses, equipment damage, and hazard identification. At some low 
safety mines responses to reports are simply posted on a notice board, without any 
feedback. In contrast, at higher performing mines, feedback is a priority and is provided 
directly to the worker who is the original source of the report. This occurs even where 
no action is taken. Workers do not object to a no-action decision provided they are kept 
informed in a timely fashion, and a reasonable explanation is provided. Not 
coincidentally, timely feedback served to build trust in management motives and 
commitment to safety. 
 
4.3.6 Resentment of corporate intervention 
 
As corporation-wide safety management becomes more sophisticated, this is inevitably 
followed by greater corporate intervention in mine site operations, including safety 
standards, systems, benchmarks, monitoring, and accountability mechanisms. In 
Australia at least, this has been magnified by safety legislative requirements. These 
twin drivers can reduce site autonomy, and to some extent flexibility and capacity for 
innovation. At some lower performing mine sites, corporate intervention may have a 
second, and unintended consequence, generating resentment and mistrust. It was 
striking that the three lowest performing mines (one from each company) displayed the 
highest levels of mistrust towards corporate management. As one interviewee stated:  
 
[At] the higher levels, they’ve decided that they can’t trust people at the mines … 
‘so we’re going to give them these standards or we’re going to audit them 
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against these standards and that will force them to get into line. Tell them that 
this is what they have to do before the next audit or there’ll be consequences 
and so on’. 
 
Management at each of the lowest performing sites typically complained that the site: 
was an ‘easy target’; was unfairly represented (as the poorest performer) in safety 
statistics and corporate audits (and other sites manipulated their results); did not have 
the same access to resources or quality equipment and technology as better 
performing sites; was burdened with a more militant and/or older workforce; and 
confronted unfavourable physical characteristics (such as fractured seams, high levels 
of methane, water intrusion). In short, these sites maintained that the ‘cards are 
stacked against them’. It was beyond the scope of this project to determine the validity 
of these claims independently. However, when these views were put to corporate 
managers, whilst they acknowledged that some mines do indeed confront greater 
physical difficulties, they rejected any consistent and causal relationship to safety 
performance – as evidence of this one manager noted that their two best safety 
performing mines had vastly different physical characteristics, while another asserted 
that a mine site that had once been one of their worst safety performers had, over 
several years, become one of their best performers with no discernable change in 
technology (over and above that of all their mines) or physical conditions. 
 
There was an element of circularity in the phenomenon of local resentment of 
corporate intervention. Lower safety performing mine sites often perceived that they 
were unfairly targeted. This created mistrust and resentment that undermined the 
success of corporate interventions, and in turn invited further corporate scrutiny and 
intervention.  
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Two distinct types of mistrust were identifiable. First, site management doubted the 
competence of corporate management to carry out their stated safety intentions and 
this bred resentment, exemplified by the statement: 
 
I’ve got no time for corporate at all. I just think they are pretty hopeless. Some of 
the systems, there’s no communication … Well, they just put it out, no training, 
no nothing, just dump it in their system ... We’re always the last to find out. … 
Well they say every pit stands on its own. Then they want to enforce things over 
the top of you from corporate. 
 
This resentment was typically coupled with a belief that corporate management had 
placed an unfair safety burden on the site and had failed to provide the necessary 
resources to discharge that burden, exemplified by the comment: 
 
I have to say they had a point to prove and they were there to do it. They were 
there to give you … an overview of your operation. The problem is that I found 
that some of the review, the outcomes of that audit, I didn’t have ownership to 
say well that’s not my area, but it was all lumped back to me to fix it after the 
audit. Why?  I had no resources, how the hell am I supposed to do all of this, 
how am I going to do it?   
 
Others had little trust in the ability of corporate management to understand the 
ramifications of their safety policies. Seemingly innocuous changes can have adverse 
impacts at the mine level, as an interviewee explained: 
 
What they change at the stroke of a pen can have dramatic and far-reaching 
consequences at the mine site. We have had to completely revise our 
management systems to accommodate a fickle change in one of our standards. 
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A second, more insidious form of mistrust was where site management doubted the 
motivations of corporate management, and interpreted corporate intervention as an 
indicator of corporate mistrust in site safety competence. In some cases, this 
generated resentment and a barely concealed contempt:  
 
Others I think are tolerating it [corporate intervention] because they realise that 
they won’t get a job unless they do pay lip service to it. We have a small core of 
managers who think it’s a load of crap and they’ve said so, ‘this is all bullshit’ 
and when you get to the mine level, because they think it’s all bullshit, they don’t 
do anything until the last minute and then your attempts at being professional 
come to nothing because you’re operating without all the information. 
 
In contrast, at many of the better safety performing mines there is far more acceptance 
of the desirability, effectiveness and benefits of corporate safety interventions. 
Although, site management readily admitted they were initially very sceptical, they 
have changed their minds and recognised the need for greater corporate oversight, 
and consequently, greater site accountability. Several site managers acknowledged 
this had been a difficult personal journey, but that their initial opposition was 
unfounded. The net effect was an increase in trust of corporate safety capabilities and 
intentions. Management at lower safety mines were yet to make such a transition. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
Based on the experiences of ten mine sites, across three companies and two 
jurisdictions, this chapter has identified six cluster characteristics closely connected 
with the development of mistrust at site level. Such mistrust has a corrosive effect on 
the implementation of safety initiatives at site level. Although the six cluster 
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characteristics have been examined individually, they may interact synergistically to 
amplify mistrust. For example, a catalytic event, such as spilling and subsequently 
rehiring a workforce, can accentuate or create divisions in the workforce. Similarly, a 
high turnover of senior mine management positions, with the inevitable loss of 
corporate memory, will increase the likelihood of mixed messages being given to 
middle management, line managers and workers. Organisational structures can 
influence management style, as when a more hierarchical structure reduces 
opportunities for workers, middle management and senior mine management to 
interact, accentuating tendencies for senior management to be reclusive. Equally, 
combinations of opposite characteristics can interact to reduce mistrust, as when new 
organisational structures result in a flatter management structure that brings line 
management much closer to senior management. 
 
When a sufficient number of negative characteristics are present at one mine site, it is 
very difficult to prevent that site from spiralling into a cycle of mistrust, where every 
interaction or decision (including new and genuine safety initiatives) is perceived 
through the prism of past history and mistrust, and discounted and/or resisted 
accordingly. Conversely, the absence of a sufficient number of characteristics can 
foster the building of trust. This suggests the presence of ‘tipping points’, where a 
critical mass of characteristics is reached, ‘tipping’ a site down the path of mistrust. 
  
The behaviour of the mine sites included in this study was consistent with the tipping 
point hypothesis. There was a clear division between the lower and higher safety 
mines in the frequency of the cluster characteristics. The three lowest ranked sites, 
each possessed six of the cluster characteristics. In contrast, the five leading safety 
sites each had three or fewer cluster characteristics. The two remaining sites, 
possessed four and five cluster characteristics respectively and were grouped with the 
lower safety sites. This suggests that the presence of a relatively small number of 
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characteristics is not sufficient to push a mine into a cycle of mistrust but that the 
development of mistrust involves a majority of cluster characteristics, although the 
strength of each characteristic at a site will also be important.  
 
The tipping point hypothesis suggests that once characteristics are over this point, 
achieving safety improvements will be extremely difficult. This may lead to extreme 
responses on the part of corporate management. This was evidenced at one company 
that closed an existing, operating mine and re-opened it as a ‘new’ mine with a different 
access point. This provided the opportunity to make the old workforce redundant, and 
to start again with a ‘clean slate’. Subsequently, management selected experienced 
workers from the ‘old’ mine who were considered to be more aligned with corporate 
management thinking (usually, those with weaker union ties) and also selectively 
recruited ‘suitable’ applicants from outside the old mine’s workforce. One mine 
manager summarised the rationale as follows:  
 
Bad culture goes with old mines. It produces an ‘us and them’ approach, and 
mistrust of management. Lots of people say the only way to change is a forced 
closure – to put the mine in care and maintenance for a minimum of six months 
and a maximum of twelve, and then cherry-pick a new workforce –  there’d be 
high agreement on who we should not reappoint. 
 
This is a strategy that a number of companies have contemplated. For example, one 
manager (who was far from alone) suggested that the only solution to dealing with a pit 
with a particularly acrimonious history is to ‘shut and rehire’. In their view: 
 
That should happen. You walk in and survey the whole place – identify the 
things going wrong – the one and a half hour cribs – that X goes home early on 
Friday and so on. So you stop all that and shut. But, you’ve got to get buy-in in 
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the future from the workforce. And you’ve got to by-pass the unions. In future, 
the workers must talk directly to me. Unions can be there – but then you develop 
milestones and guidelines eg zero injuries – then you work development month 
by month – if they reach this milestone, this happens [a bonus] … if not, there 
will be 50% redundancies – and so on. 
 
The danger of this approach is that it may build mistrust. A far preferable solution 
would be to act in ways that avoid the build up of cluster characteristics and to ensure 
that the tipping point is never reached.  
 
What wider implications do these findings have for safety beyond the mining industry? 
While the mining industry may be exceptional in its long and bitter history of industrial 
conflicts, and management-miner hostilities, in other ways it is not. Corporations in 
many industry sectors confront the problem of ensuring that their far-flung operations 
behave as corporate management would wish them to. Indeed, there is evidence that 
corporations may be mistaken in their belief that those who are encouraged or required 
to develop and implement safety plans, systems and other management-based 
strategies will necessarily improve their performance as a result (Gunningham et al 
2003; Parker & Neilson 2006). On the contrary, it may well be (as this chapter 
suggests) that site level management commitment is far more important than 
management-based strategies, that management commitment may not exist at 
individual sites even if it exists at corporate management level, and that the reason for 
this may be the presence of mistrust. 
 
Corporate policymakers generally may therefore learn much from the experience of the 
mining industry. While some of the cluster characteristics have particular resonance for 
the mining industry, the characteristics we identified can be found in other industry 
sectors. As such, lessons about how to avoid their formation have considerable merit, 
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particularly for corporations committed to improving safety but unsure how best to 
achieve it at site level. These lessons can be summarised as follows.  
 
First, the role of corporate management in creating trust is very important (Hopkins 
2002; Whitener et al 1998). It is they who set the priorities, establish the values, and 
provide the resources that substantially shape site management and workforce 
responses. Conversely, much hard work at site level can be quickly destroyed if 
corporate management is at odds with site management. However, it is in large part 
site management, not corporate management, with whom the workforce has direct 
contact, and it is the extent to which site management has the perceived competence, 
benevolence and integrity to safety values, that will have most influence in shaping 
workforce perceptions of management commitment. It will be impossible for site 
management to build trust unless they not only espouse the value of a safe workplace, 
but also demonstrate their commitment to that value by their actions. Unless 
management at all levels walks the talk, then worker cynicism about their motivations 
will remain high. This research suggests that there are a variety of ways management 
can overcome this suspicion, such as by being receptive to, and responding rapidly to, 
safety concerns raised by the workforce.  
 
Second, even where site (and corporate) management have a demonstrable 
commitment to safety, there remains a substantial impediment if the levels of middle 
management below them do not ’buy into’ the safety message. Here, mistrust is 
directed more at senior management’s abilities than its intentions, although the latter is 
sometimes also present. Pitzer (MCA 1999), for example, found that middle 
management showed signs of disillusionment with corporate safety initiatives. The 
present study suggests that this sometimes morphs into resistance by site 
management towards efforts by corporate management to impose greater 
accountability and responsibility upon them, particularly where this involves substantive 
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reporting, auditing and management systems (these research findings have significant 
implications for safety culture and corporate safety management systems and warrant 
elaboration – these issues a dealt with in detail in Gunningham & Sinclair (forthcoming 
(b)). A related issue is the devolution of safety decision-making and the extent to which 
workers are empowered to deal with safety issues. Workers were far more likely to 
accept and implement safety initiatives if they had a high degree of ownership.  
 
Third, overtly hierarchical relationships serve to constrain trust, as the organisational 
trust literature demonstrates. Those at the bottom often have a fear of exploitation and 
suspicion that they are being treated unfairly, while those at the top suspect that the 
individuals for whom they are responsible are shirking responsibility or engaging in acts 
that might endanger the organisation (Kramer 1996, 216). In the present research this 
occurred with line managers, many of whom reported a lack of support from senior 
management, with consequences for their trust in those above them. Workers also 
reported that flat structures and a lack of demarcation between jobs achieved real 
benefits, and many saw value in management not interfering in day-to-day issues.  
 
Fourth, communication is an important factor in overcoming mistrust. A distinctive 
feature of high safety mines was the high level of communication between workers and 
management. No single, successful formula for communication could be identified 
(communication could be as informal as after-work barbeques or as formal as weekly 
safety committee meetings) and much depends on personal management style. This is 
consistent with the finding of Cox et al (2006, 1126) that “managers who are willing to 
share information signal to their employees that they can be trusted”.  
 
Fifth, and closely related, is management’s willingness to listen and respond to 
workers’ safety concerns. Workers appreciated managers who acted promptly when 
they expressed safety concerns, even when this was only to explain why they did not 
  
118 
propose to take any further action. What Reason (1997) terms a ‘reporting’ culture can 
only be established when those who report such incidents trust that they will not be 
punished, or in any way adversely treated, for doing so (a ‘blame free’ culture). This is 
a good indicator because workers take a risk in reporting incidents in which they may 
be at fault, and will only do so where they are confident that they will not be punished 
as a consequence. This is part of a broader issue, the perception of workers that they 
will be treated fairly or justly that, as Tyler et al (2007) have demonstrated, can serve to 
reinforce trust. A just culture has been described as ‘comprising an atmosphere of trust 
in which people are encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential information, 
but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour’ (Cox et al 2006, 1124). Accordingly, it is only 
in these circumstances that workers are likely to act in the collective good. This points 
to a sixth characteristic of ‘high trust’ organisations: an expectation that managers will 
act with ‘consistency, integrity and concern’, even during periods of conflict or crisis. 
 
All of the above serve to illustrate that trust, and mistrust, are multi-faceted. At the very 
least, the aspects of trust identified here are mutually reinforcing, and some of them 
are so fundamental that it is difficult to conceive of trust developing in their absence. 
While these are necessary conditions for the creation of trust, they are insufficient in 
themselves. Without effective worker engagement trust between workers and 
managers clearly cannot be achieved. Accordingly, the other criteria described above 
are all important in the composite picture, albeit that trust might develop in the absence 
of a small number of them.  
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Chapter 5: The origins of safety culture in coal mining: ‘Top-
down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Darren Sinclair published in the Journal 
of Health, Safety and Environment (Volume 26, Number 3, June, 2010, pages 249-
258).  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last fifteen years there has been an increasing focus on the role of safety 
culture in curbing work related injury and disease. Particularly influential was the IAEA 
1988 report on this subject, prompted by the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl 
(IAEA 1988). Other reports too, gradually came to suggest that cultural factors (rather 
than just management systems, policies and procedures, or more technical aspects of 
safety) can play a major role in explaining the frequency and severity of injuries and 
disease within an organisation (Cullen 1990; IAEA 1991). 
 
Subsequently, the term ‘safety culture’ entered mainstream policy discussion with 
bodies such as the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive employing it in their 
policies and reports, and defining it as follows: “The safety culture of an organisation is 
the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency 
of, an organisation’s health and safety management” (Health and Safety Commission 
1993, 23)  
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Semantic disagreements (in particular, whether it was appropriate to refer to safety 
culture or only to ‘safety climate’) now seem to be largely over (Gadd & Collins 2002). 
And some important substantive questions – what distinguishes a positive safety 
culture from a poor one; how might a ‘good’ safety culture be achieved – have also, in 
the main, been comprehensively addressed.   
 
Reiman & Oedewald (2004) for example, were able to trawl the literature to generate a 
compilation of positive safety culture descriptors, including ‘a safety policy’, ‘visible 
commitment of management to safety’, ‘clear definition of responsibilities and 
obligations’, ‘balance between safety and production’, ‘good training’, ‘fairness and 
trust’, ‘quality … rules and regulations’, ‘reporting of events and accidents’, ‘flow of 
information between the different levels’, ‘continuous improvement’, ‘sufficient 
resources’ and ‘working relationships with authorities’. 
 
And the seminal work of Reason (1997) has addressed the crucial question of how to 
build a positive safety culture. Not least, Reason describes the significance of 
generating a reporting culture, a just culture, a flexible culture and a learning culture. 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2001, v), in another influential work, emphasise the importance of a 
collective “mindfulness” of organisations, in particular through: “(1) preoccupation with 
failures rather than successes; (2) reluctance to simplify interpretations; (3) sensitivity 
to operations; (4) commitment to resilience; and (5) deference to expertise, as 
exhibited by encouragement of a fluid decision-making system”. In this respect, a key 
requirement is for “a person to become a mindful observer and actor, a vigilant and 
attentive actor, rather than one dependent on mindless control systems”. 
 
Hale (2000) also identifies key aspects of a good safety culture, including the 
participation of workers at different levels of the management hierarchy, the active 
engagement and contribution of specialist safety staff, caring trust (looking out for each 
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other), open communication between workers and management, management belief in 
safety improvements, and the mainstreaming of safety within an organisation (for 
example, by including WHS in all decision making processes). Finally, Cooper (1998; 
2000) has attempted to remove some of the uncertainty surrounding precisely what 
safety culture is, by describing its three main components as being psychological, 
situational and behavioural. According to Cooper, the psychological component 
includes peoples’ norms, values, attitudes and perceptions of safety. The situational 
component involves the structure of the organisation (policies, working procedures and 
management systems). And the behavioural component addresses practices adopted 
by employees that can be observed.  
 
However, one critical issue that, notwithstanding its centrality, has attracted relatively 
little investigation is: where does safety culture come from? A widely held view is that it 
is management, in particular corporate leadership, that plays the crucial role in shaping 
organisational and safety culture. For example, Peters and Waterman’s view is that: 
“people way down the line know what they are supposed to do in most situations 
because the handful of guiding values is crystal clear” (Peters & Waterman 1982, 76). 
Similarly, according to Hopkins (2002, 7), “it is the leaders who determine how the 
organisation functions and it is their decision making which determines whether an 
organisation exhibits the practices which go to make up a culture of safety”. Schein 
(1992) has also argued that it is corporate management that creates culture, with the 
emphasis on its leadership role – culture is determined by what management pays 
attention to, that is, the things management measures, controls and provides financial 
incentives for.  
 
In much of the literature, however, there is little attempt to locate the origins of safety 
culture, and in particular, little or no attempt to understand the importance of cultural 
development in specific industries, nor to consider the possibility that some sectors 
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may have particular characteristics that do not conform to generic constructs. Nor does 
much of that literature give serious attention to the possibility that safety culture, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, is not necessarily a ‘top down’ phenomenon. It is 
important to challenge both of the above - largely taken for granted - views because to 
the extent that they are wrong or overstated this may have important implications for 
how WHS is addressed and, ultimately, WHS performance and practice. 
 
This chapter investigates the formation of safety culture in the context of one specific 
industry – the Australian coal-mining sector – and shows how sector-specific 
characteristics matter, and matter considerably. In doing so it challenges the 
conventional view that safety culture is predominantly a top-down phenomenon, with 
corporate/senior management the driving force. On the contrary, it provides empirical 
evidence that, in this industry at least, it is better understood as largely a ‘bottom-up’ 
creation of mine site management and workforces. This too has important implications 
for understanding safety culture and for the development of policies best able to 
improve that culture and with it, WHS outcomes. 
  
5.2 Methods 
 
The research was conducted with the cooperation of an Australian coal mining 
company, and five of its mine sites, and with the support of an Australian Research 
Council Grant. Consistent with the norms of social science research and the writer’s 
ethical responsibilities, this chapter does not identify the company or any of the 
individuals who participated in the research. Five mines were studied: one open cut 
and four underground mines. Mine sites were selected in consultation with the 
participating company, with the intention of including a range of safety performance 
outcomes. Each mine site visit occurred over a two-day period in which a 
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representative sample of both staff and workers participated in semi-structured 
interviews (62 in total). A typical sample of twelve interviewees from each mine 
included the general or operation manager, mine manager, shift or process 
supervisors, under manager, safety officer, engineering (mechanical and/or electrical) 
managers, crew leaders (deputy under managers, team supervisors), and mine 
workers (the ‘crew’) and tradesmen (including local check inspectors/site safety 
representatives). In most cases the balance of managers to employees was split 
approximately evenly. Each interview lasted approximately 40-60 minutes. 
 
Each interview was conducted in private, with interviewees informed in advance that all 
material arising out of the interviews would be treated confidentially, and used 
anonymously in any subsequent publications. In addition to the mine site interviews, 
representatives from corporate management, including chief executives, safety 
managers and operational managers, were interviewed. A total of six corporate 
interviews were conducted. Questions took the form of a series of prompts, with only 
those questions that elicited a substantive response, being explored in greater detail. 
This approach ensured that a diversity of perspectives was explored and that 
respondents were not constrained to address only particular preconceived issues. 
Qualitative material generated by the interviews was supplemented by reviews of both 
the domestic and international literature, including the organisational and safety culture 
literatures.  
 
In addition to quantitative data, the mining company provided comprehensive and 
historical internal policy background and safety statistical and audit data used by the 
companies themselves to determine WHS performance at individual mine sites. 
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5.3 Results  
 
Two key findings emerged from the research. First, the mine sites demonstrated very 
substantial differences between each other in their safety performance. Briefly, 
because this is dealt with in detail in a related article (Gunningham & Sinclair 
forthcoming (b)), internal safety statistics and audit data were aggregated and weighted 
to yield a single percentage score for each mine. This ranking produced a very wide 
range of safety performance indeed, with an approximate 100% difference between the 
best and worst performers (the spread of rankings, from best to worst, was as follows: 
mine 1 – 51%, mine 2 – 62%, mine 3 – 77%, mine 4 – 96% and mine 5 – 98%). This 
quantitative finding was largely consistent with qualitative rankings provided by 
interviewees. 
 
Significantly, this variation in performance was registered despite the presence of a 
sophisticated, comprehensive and uniform corporate WHS strategy. In particular, 
corporate management has increasing sought to impose ambitious and uniform WHS 
management standards across all the company’s mines, against which they are 
regularly and comprehensively audited. In order to comply with these standards, 
detailed and uniform safety management systems have been introduced at each mine. 
Mines must also conform to a further set of WHS standards issued by the international 
headquarters, including, again, regular audits, conducted by an international audit 
team. Monthly and quarterly meetings are held where individual mine managers are 
required to report on WHS processes and performance, including not only conventional 
safety statistics, but also positive WHS performance indicators (which are intended to 
anticipate future safety performance).  
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In addition, the company has a behavioural-based safety program across all mines 
under which senior and middle managers are required to conduct a minimum number 
of ‘safety observations’ per month. Finally, all WHS systems, reporting and actions at 
each mine are included on a single interactive database that is accessible across all 
mines and corporate management. Clearly, the company has gone to very 
considerable lengths to minimise differences in WHS systems and processes and it 
appears implausible that differences in management systems and processes are the 
primary source of variation in mine site safety performance. One may also discount the 
influence of different regulatory requirements, as all five mines exist within the same 
regulatory jurisdiction. Finally, there was no consistent relationship between mine site 
physical and/or technical factors and WHS performance. 
 
A second, and related, finding was that the variations in WHS performance persisted, 
and were consistent, over time (in this respect, the safety statistics and audit data 
covered a five year period). This is significant because several of the mine sites in this 
study had experienced numerous mine manager (and senior mine management) 
changes, sometimes in quick succession, and yet this had no detectable impact on the 
trajectory of each mine site’s WHS performance (as measured by the aggregated 
data). The mine sites were also subjected to successive waves of top-down cooperate 
management WHS overtures and initiatives over this same period. Again, this had no 
discernable impact on the relative difference in safety performance between the mines 
(although there was a steady and consistent improvement over the five year period 
across the mine sites as a whole, this was dwarfed by the persistence of differences in 
safety performance between the mines – if anything, the differences grew over time).  
 
These findings strongly suggest that mine site bottom-up culture, including workers, but 
also middle and line management (as opposed to senior mine management and mine 
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managers), is not only resilient, but resistant to top-down corporate and senior mine-
site management influences on WHS performance. As one worker noted: 
 
I wouldn’t trust them [corporate management] as far as I could throw them. … 
The safety stuff is just to cover their arses. 
 
And such views were not restricted to workers. As the following quote demonstrates, 
middle management can also have strong misgivings about corporate WHS 
interventions: 
 
They have totally unrealistic expectations about our workloads. Every time 
somebody in corporate dreams up a new safety initiative, I shudder because it 
just makes my job more difficult … and [it] doesn’t change the reality – it just 
adds more paperwork. 
 
The overriding finding, then, is that mine site culture is a primary determinant of WHS 
performance ranking amongst the five mines included in this study – a finding that is 
further supported by the fact that the five mines displayed distinctive cultural 
characteristics (again, this is explored in more detail in Gunningham & Sinclair 
forthcoming (b)). We explore below the reasons why and how bottom-up mine site 
safety culture can wield such clout in determining WHS performance outcomes, and 
the circumstances that give rise to this powerful culture in the first instance.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
Given these findings, what are the circumstances that may make coal mining 
particularly susceptible to a bottom-up formation of safety culture, and consequently, 
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allow divergent mine-site specific characteristics to emerge? Several features of the 
coal mining industry facilitate such an outcome, and these are examined below. 
 
Organisational culture is often seen as being “the way we do things around here” 
(Schein 1992, 9). The ‘around here’ of coal mining is particularly localised and, both 
practically and figuratively, a long way indeed from corporate management. Mine-sites 
are geographically remote, making it difficult for corporate management to exercise 
direct control, and particularly difficult to conduct regular visits. The high degree of 
remoteness does not end there, however. Mine workers are also physically remote 
from localised mine-site management. In some mines, particularly underground mines, 
travel times can be up to half an hour from the surface to the ‘coal-face’. Finally, there 
is a paucity of computer access at underground work sites. This means workers are 
effectively isolated from one of the principal means of communicating management 
decisions throughout the organisation. It is not surprising, then, that workers can and 
do spend virtually entire shifts without any senior or middle management contact, let 
alone direct supervision. Collectively, these circumstances conspire to create a very 
high degree of physical and communication remoteness of mine site workers from both 
corporate and senior mine site management.  
 
Another relevant feature is the longevity and insularity of the workforce. The average 
age of workers in most of the mines visited was approaching 50, with many of the 
workers having spent their entire working lives at a single mine, or at a very small 
number of mines. Further, many of these workers have worked side-by-side with a 
common set of colleagues, often in small team environments, in very confined spaces, 
for the majority of their working lives. This interconnectedness extends beyond the 
mine site too, with many workers having grown up together and continuing to live in the 
same communities, often socialising together and even maintaining a tradition of 
allocating worker positions to the children of existing mine workers. This creates a rare 
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degree of worker cultural insularity. As one worker described it, this can entrench 
attitudes and behaviours: 
 
Here ... we’ve being doing it this way for thirty years, we’re not going to change 
the way we do it. I’ve had many arguments … that because they have done a 
job a certain way for 10 years, doesn’t mean it’s been done the right way for 10 
years. 
 
The longevity of the workers can be sharply contrasted with that of senior and middle 
mine management, which are relatively transient, with rotation between mines, and 
movement between companies, common across the industry. In addition, during the 
average lifespan of a worker, the actual mine ownership can change several times. It is 
not surprising, then, that many workers, witnessing a procession of different 
management over the years, view themselves as the true custodians of ‘their’ mine 
site. From their perspective, it is management that comes and goes, while they are ‘in it 
for the long-term’. In the absence of stable management engagement, leadership 
inevitably flows to ‘informal high status workers’. These are usually experienced 
workers, often with a union role, that exert a disproportionate influence over the 
attitudes and behaviour of other workers, especially younger, new recruits. In extreme 
cases, informal high status workers may even attempt to sabotage management WHS 
programs, for example, by submitting fictitious incident reports. Conversely, they may 
play a crucial role in facilitating management WHS initiatives – as when an extremely 
controversial a BBS program was successfully introduced because it gained the 
acceptance and support of the most influential worker sub-group.  
 
The hierarchical nature of many coal mines facilitates these phenomena. Most mine 
sites operate on the basis of distinct work shifts, namely day, afternoon and night. The 
significance of this lies in their relative attractiveness from a lifestyle point of view. For 
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the vast majority of workers, for fairly obvious reasons, being placed on the day shift is 
the most desirable outcome, followed by the afternoon then, lastly, the night shift. This 
introduces a hierarchy within the workforce, with those on the day shift at the apex. The 
union often controls the allocation of workers’ shifts on the basis of worker longevity. 
The net effect is that the vast majority of new recruits work the night shift.  
 
In addition to the shift hierarchy, there is also a task hierarchy. Just as the older 
recruits are able to access the preferred shifts, so too are they able to secure the more 
desirable tasks on those shifts, for example operating key machinery. There are two 
important ramifications of this hierarchical distribution. First, as each worker progresses 
from the undesirable to the desirable shifts/tasks so too are they exposed to, and 
subsumed within, the more entrenched ‘us-and-them’ attitudes and sometimes laissez 
faire WHS practices often prevalent in the mining industry – it is very difficult for an 
individual to resist the views of numerically superior and more senior/experienced 
workers surrounding them. As one respondent noted: 
 
There are people here who walk on one side of the line and, I believe, really 
don’t necessarily want to be on that side of the line, but they’re there because of 
peer pressure. … I think that’s where culture lies, yeah. 
 
The above quote highlights the role and power of mine site peer pressure, particularly 
by informal high status workers, can wield in generating, at best, ambivalence towards, 
and at worst, active resistance to, corporate WHS initiatives. This observation was also 
supported by middle managers at a number of mines sites. In particular, they reported 
that night shifts, with their more recent, younger recruits, have less entrenched and 
anti-management attitudes, and a greater willingness to adopt new management 
initiatives, including those directed at improved WHS outcomes. In fact, night shifts 
were very often credited with being the most productive and safest at many of the 
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mines (this was an interesting finding given that other studies suggesting that night 
shifts have more WHS problems, however, it was not possible to independently verify 
the claim, and it was also not possible to disaggregate company quantitative data on 
the basis of different shifts). 
 
Closely related to hierarchy is the issue of union dominance. Indeed, coal mining is one 
of the most heavily unionised sectors in Australia. Not only has union membership 
been high, but the degree of control exerted by unions has been equally high, and only 
in recent times has this began to wane (although this has occurred to varying degrees 
across different mine sites and mining companies). Union solidarity amongst the 
workforce has to a large degree shaped attitudes and relationships between workers 
and management at mine sites. Thus workers have direct and deep exposure to an 
alternative ‘world view’ to that being promulgated by corporate and mine management, 
and in this respect, WHS issues often fall victim to a ‘tug-of-war’ between this two 
competing views.  As one respondent explained: 
 
I don’t think they’re [management and workers] all that much closer than what 
they were when I first got here, because there’s always a large suspicion 
between the two. ‘Why is management doing this?’ ‘Oh, it’s because they 
haven’t got safety in mind, it’s because they want to do this, it’s all saving 
money, or whatever.’ And I suppose management are saying, ‘Well, why aren’t 
the blokes doing it this way?’ And they’ll come up with a reason, whatever 
reason, but, you know… At times I feel that the management are trying to relay 
information, but whether it’s past history, catching up with the blokes, past 
disagreements, that’s still lodged in the minds of the men, there’s still that 
suspicion. 
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In addition to informal high status individuals, and the role of unions, the other major 
driver of a bottom-up safety culture is line management (also called crew leaders) that 
lead teams of six to ten workers at the coalface. There was unanimous agreement 
across all five mine sites that line managers are uniquely placed to influence safety 
culture and WHS performance, particularly through establishing minimum standards 
and attitudes amongst the crew. For example:  
 
Front line supervisors have a critical role to play in raising safety awareness.  
 
Equally, however, there was a widespread perception many fell well short of this ideal:  
 
The hardest job is getting the front line supervisor to do their safety job properly.  
You have got to set the expectation, help them to achieve it, hold them 
accountable, educate where necessary, and discipline also an option.  
 
It was claimed this is because line managers were not given necessary support by 
management, and did not have the appropriate management/leadership skills.  
 
Another related problem was line managers being ‘sandwiched’ between workers and 
management. This can lead to questions by both management and workers as to 
where their loyalty truly lies:  
 
The front line supervisor is the conduit between management and workers – is 
often seen by the workers as part of management, and seem by management 
as part of management, but are sometimes treated by managers as part of the 
workers. They run with the foxes and hunt with the hounds.  
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From the perspective of several line managers at middle and low ranked mines, 
management support for their role was often less than forthcoming. As one noted:  
 
We were told we were going to be made part of management and all the rest of 
the shit and we’ve always heard it that many time it ain’t funny and we went 
close at one stage. Our enterprise agreement is with the staff now … and we get 
paid staff superannuation what the staff get and a few things like that, but that’s 
where it stops. They were going to integrate us into the management system 
and it just sort of fell over I think. 
 
The above suggests that multiple factors contribute to the development of a bottom-up 
safety culture at mine sites, and that this in turn is likely to be resistant to corporate 
intervention, at least without serious engagement with site-specific issues.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In contrast to the prevailing top-down view of safety culture, this research revealed a 
range of mine-site characteristics that influenced the success or otherwise of corporate 
management’s WHS initiatives. In particular, it was found that mine management, and 
in many cases, the workers themselves, were the principal players shaping the 
interpretation and implementation of management tools, with corporate management 
little more than a shady background presence. That is, safety culture was found to be a 
predominantly bottom-up phenomenon. This in turn had a tangible and persistent 
impact on mine site safety performance over time. 
 
Of course it is possible that these findings are exceptional, and largely confined to the 
particular circumstances of the coal mining industry, but this is unlikely. There is 
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growing (albeit at this stage limited) evidence to suggest that the above findings and 
conclusions have much wider application. For example, the commercial shipping 
industry shares many traits with the coal mining industry: operational sites are very 
remote from corporate office, crews work in close proximity to one another for long 
periods unsupervised, WHS incidents have the potential for catastrophic 
consequences, and a single ‘site-level leader’ (the ship’s master – equivalent to a mine 
manager) rather than corporate management has the most influence on crew 
behaviour (Wake 2005, 6). Accordingly, the shipping industry has begun to recognise 
the importance of fostering a positive safety culture on individual ships, rather than 
across the fleet as a whole (Wake 2004). 
 
To the extent that the findings of this study into one Australian coal mining company 
resonate across other mining companies, and indeed other industry sectors, important 
policy implications follow. Not least, site-specific factors matter, and without engaging 
directly with the circumstances and sub-cultures that exist at individual sites, and that 
involve site level management and the workforce, progress in reducing work related 
injury and disease is likely to be seriously constrained. Only by focusing on a range of 
bottom-up, site-specific historical and cultural factors are corporate corporate-driven 
WHS interventions likely to realise their potential. 
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Chapter 6: Building trust: WHS management in the mining 
industry 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
published in Policy and Practice in Health and Safety (Volume 1, Number 12, 2014, 
pages 25-41). The relative contributions were split 60/40 respectively between Sinclair 
and Gunningham. Sinclair contributed to the fieldwork, the processing of interview 
material, the background research and literature reviews, the preparation of initial 
drafts and the preparation and editing of the final draft.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the role of trust in shaping WHS 
outcomes. Trust has been identified as important for improved WHS through a variety 
of means, including communication (Reason 1997), maintaining co-operation (Morgan 
& Hunt 1994), promoting the acceptance of decisions (Tyler 2003), improving 
knowledge sharing (Dirks & Ferrin 2002), supporting all aspects of organisational 
functioning (Bijlsma-Frankema & Koopman 2003) and enhancing safety performance 
(Barling & Hutchinson 2000). Concern about the role of trust (and the lack of it) has 
been particularly strong in the mining sector, where antagonism between workers and 
management is often deep seated and where building trust is a particularly challenging 
enterprise. 
 
The importance of trust to WHS outcomes is emphasised in a series of reports in 
Australia’s ‘mining jurisdictions’. For example a 2005 New South Wales Mine Safety 
Review identified a “debilitating mistrust between the members of the tripartite process” 
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as a principal obstacle to improved WHS in the mining industry (Wran & McClelland 
2005, 7), sentiment echoed in Western Australia in the Ritter Report (Ritter 2004) and 
by an internal review in Queensland which noted with regret “the antagonistic and 
confrontational climate that has developed [that] cannot be conducive to optimal safety 
and health outcomes” and which appears to be particularly pervasive in underground 
coal mining (ACiL 2005, 113). 
 
 Yet despite the potentially debilitating effects of mistrust on WHS performance only “a 
limited number of researchers have examined the concept within the realms of safety 
research” (Cox et al 2004), and “the exact nature of trust and its role in shaping 
organizational safety is poorly understood” (Conchie et al 2006, 1097). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly therefore, the current consensus is that “the formation of trust within 
workplace relationships is complex and elusive” (Zeffane & Connell 2003, 4). 
 
In previous work, we examined the relationship between mistrust and WHS 
performance in the Australian mining industry, concluding that there was indeed a 
strong relationship between WHS performance and the degree of trust at mine site 
level (Gunningham & Sinclair 2011). We also examined the importance of an evolving 
WHS architecture based on structured risk management concepts and WHS 
management systems to which the impressive gains that the coal mining industry has 
achieved in its WHS performance, are widely attributed (Gunningham & Sinclair 2012). 
So too, has one of us also examined the role of trade unions and worker participation 
in general and of check inspectors in particular, in WHS (Gunningham 2007, Chapters 
1 and 9). 
 
In the present chapter, rather than elaborating on the adverse effects of mistrust, we 
focus on how it might best be overcome and on strategies best capable of nurturing 
trust, not only between management and workers, but also between corporate and 
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mine site management, and management and unions. This is important because 
although there is a growing body of literature on how to establish a safety climate more 
broadly, little is known about “how trust can be increased in organizations experiencing 
low or fragile levels of trust” (Cox et al 2006, 1136). 
 
Drawing on the experience of mines that have been most successful in building trust 
and comparing them to those where mistrust is rife, we argue that there are a number 
of practical measures that corporate management, mine managers and other mine site 
personnel can take that serve to develop trust. Where available we also draw on the 
broader albeit limited literature on trust to build a composite picture of the architecture 
of trust in the mining sector. Many of the measures that seem necessary to build trust 
in this context appear to have application to other industries and other circumstances. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
 
The methodology entailed two stages. The first involved developing a safety ranking 
(no health ranking was developed, notwithstanding the importance of workplace health, 
because of a dearth of reliable information on which it could be based). Initially, 18 
mine sites across the three companies (eight, six and four, respectively) were ranked 
according to their safety performance using a combination of internal audits,20 LTIFRS 
                                                
20 There are some minor variations in the audit processes across the three companies, but in 
general internal audits include conventional quantitative safety statistics, namely LTIs and TRIs, 
as well as other quantitative measures, namely hazard identifications, reported incidents and 
near misses, as well as a range of measures of WHS management procedures, including the 
number of safety observations completed, feedback to workers reporting incidents or hazards, 
number of worker/management safety meetings, number of risk analysis completed, number of 
previous audit recommendations addressed, and number of outstanding safety actions. Audits 
also include qualitative components, including an assessment of safety recordkeeping, safety 
systems and safe work procedures. Internal audits are conducted by third party contractors, or 
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and where available, TRIFRs, and workers compensation data. This safety data was 
collated over a five-year period.21 Annual information was then aggregated and 
weighted (with the highest weighting given to the most recent statistics/data22). This 
process yielded a single percentage score for each mine, with a lower score reflecting 
a better overall safety performance.  
 
Critics are rightly suspicious of reliance upon LTIFRs as a measure of injury levels 
given the multiple incentives and opportunities for under-reporting (Ekevall et al 2008) 
although LTIFRs have become less vulnerable to manipulation since it was made a 
statutory requirement to also report injuries to the regulator.23 In any event, for 
purposes of our analysis, LTIFRs are just one of the several measures that we used to 
‘triangulate’ (validating our data through cross verification) and our results would have 
been much the same even if we had removed LTIFRs completely from our 
calculations.  
 
Having ranked the 18 mines according to the aggregated and weighted available data, 
the 10 highest and lowest performing mines were then selected for further study 
(thereby excluding middle ranked mines). As can be seen in Table 5 below, there was 
                                                
specialised internal audit teams comprising corporate safety managers and senior managers 
from other mine sites. Audits occur periodically, most commonly on an annual basis. 
21 The five-year period was chosen because it corresponded to the period in which corporate 
management had imposed uniform WHS standards and systems across the five mine sites, and 
it also minimises the chance of annual aberrations in WHS performance outcomes. 
22 The most recent year’s data was given a weighting of five, the next most recent data was 
given a weighting of four and so until the five-year old data was given a weighting of one. This 
was done to reflect the greater likelihood that more recent data would accurately reflect current 
circumstances, but at the same time attempting to smooth out results over a longer time frame 
so as to minimise annual anomalies. 
23 See, for example, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, NSW 2002, Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Regulation 2006, clause 202. 
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a dramatic difference (close to 100%) between safety outcomes in high and low 
ranking mines.24 
 
Table 5: High and low WHS mine site rankings  
 Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
High WHS 
ranking 
98% 
(Mine A) 
96% 
(Mine B) 
93% 
(Mine C) 
84% 
(Mine D) 
87% 
(Mine E) 
Low WHS 
ranking 
62%  
(Mine F) 
51% 
(Mine G) 
49% 
(Mine H) 
61% 
(Mine I) 
54% 
(Mine J) 
 
 
In addition, and subsequent to the quantitative identification process, corporate 
managers (12 in total) from across the three companies were asked (individually, 
confidentially and with no prior knowledge of the quantitative results) to rank the safety 
performance of the mines within their respective companies. This subjective ranking 
was employed as a final and independent validation of the mine selection process. 
Encouragingly, the qualitative rankings were consistent amongst corporate managers 
within each of the companies, and very similar to the quantitative rankings: there being 
no disagreement as to the polar extremes, and only some minor variations in the order 
of the middle ranking mines (which were excluded in any case).  
 
Even though there were large differences in the aggregated and weighted safety 
performance of the high and low mine groupings respectively, there were few 
differences in their operational circumstances. In particular, seven of the ten coal 
mining sites were underground, longwall operations, two were predominantly longwall, 
and one (Mine B) was open cut. Further, all the mines were owner operated (that is, 
none were operated by a third party contractor) and all workers were employees. In 
                                                
24 The inclusion of only the polar extremes was intended to enhance the reliability of the 
methodology and to facilitate identification of broad groupings of the highest and lowest WHS 
performers (rather than the precise ranking order). 
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eight of the mines, this was a single owner operator, the other two being joint ventures 
where only one partner had operational responsibilities (Mines C and F). Finally, within 
each company, the 10 mine sites were subject to uniform corporate-wide WHS 
management standards and systems. None of the mines involved ‘fly-in, fly-out’ or 
‘drive-in, drive-out’ workforces. 
 
The second stage of the methodology involved conducting detailed qualitative research 
at each of the ten mines to explore whether they were successful in building trust and if 
so how. This involved semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of staff 
and workers at each mine (120 in total), typically involving the general or operation 
manager, mine manager, shift or process supervisors, under manager, safety officer, 
engineering (mechanical and/or electrical) managers, crew leaders (deputy under 
managers, team supervisors), and workers and tradesmen (including local check 
inspectors/site safety representatives), with an approximately even split between 
managers and employees. Each interview was conducted in private, with interviewees 
informed in advance that all material arising out of the interview would be treated 
confidentially, and used anonymously in any subsequent publications. Additionally, 12 
representatives from corporate management, including chief executives, safety 
managers and operational managers, across the three coal mining companies included 
in the project, were also interviewed. All interviews were conducted between 2007 and 
2009. 
 
6.3 Mistrust in the mining industry: A context  
 
Trust can be regarded as “an individual’s belief or common belief among a group of 
individuals that another individual or group (a) makes good faith efforts to behave in 
accordance with any commitments both explicit or implicit, (b) is honest in whatever 
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negotiations preceded such commitments, and (c) does not take excessive advantage 
of the another even when the opportunity arises” (Cummings & Bromley 1996, 302). In 
the context of workplace safety, trust can be best understood as an individual’s 
willingness to rely on another person based on expectations that he or she will act 
safely or intends to act safely. For example, management (which particularly in 
underground coal mines has limited capacity to monitor or control workers directly) 
might trust workers not to cut corners, or break safety rules or take unreasonable risks. 
Workers in turn may trust management to keep them safe (Risk Analysis 2006). 
  
In Australia, the mining industry has been beset by rampant mistrust between the 
major stakeholders for many decades. Relations between trade unions and mining 
companies are often acrimonious, with managers regarding the entrenched attitudes 
and behaviours of unionised workers as being antithetical to modern management and 
safety practices. Many mine workers and union representatives have an equally deep 
mistrust of management, borne from a history of death, injury and disease for which 
employers were, historically, hardly blameless (Hargraves 1993; Shaw & Bruns 1947).  
 
The following quotes are representative and elaborated on in our previous work 
(Gunningham & Sinclair 2011): 
 
I think it’s an inherent thing … that nobody will trust anybody. It’s just … we’ve 
been told things that many times and the opposite’s just happened. That it’s just 
the bigger the company gets the less they trust and I don’t think you’ll ever get 
rid of that out of the coal industry. I think it is just one of those things. It’s more 
inherent in the coal industry I think than any other industry in Australia. 
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I don’t think they’re [management and workers] all that much closer than what 
they were when I first got here, because there’s always a large suspicion 
between the two. ‘Why is management doing this?’ ‘Oh, it’s because they 
haven’t got safety in mind, it’s because they want to do this, it’s all saving 
money, or whatever.’ And I suppose management are saying, ‘Well, why aren’t 
the blokes doing it this way?’ And they’ll come up with a reason, whatever 
reason, but, you know… At times I feel that the management are trying to relay 
information, but whether it’s past history, catching up with the blokes, past 
disagreements, that’s still lodged in the minds of the men, there’s still that 
suspicion. 
 
I don’t trust them. I don’t trust management. Everyone. …  they know that you 
can do it, but the way you are going to do it is not the safe way, they’ll turn their 
back. I think somewhere down the line at the higher levels, they’ve decided that 
they can’t trust people at the mines to actually do that so we’re going to give 
them these standards or we’re going to audit them against these standards and 
that will force them to get into line. Tell them that this is what they have to do 
before the next audit or there’ll be consequences and so on. 
 
Corporate, senior mine site, and middle management interactions are also susceptible 
to mistrust and its corrosive impact on WHS outcomes. For example, uniform safety 
standards and systems imposed by corporate management, are frequently treated with 
suspicion and resentment by site management, being seen as intrusive and sometimes 
as casting doubt on their managerial competence. 
 
Our empirical work led us to conclude not only that there is a strong association 
between low trust and low safety performance but that there are a cluster of 
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characteristics that are strongly associated with a heightened presence of mistrust at 
lower performing mines (for further detail, see Gunningham and Sinclair 2011). These 
findings (expressed as incident rates from the five high and five low WHS performing 
mines) are summarised in Table 6 below. 
  
143 
Table 6: Mistrust – a cluster of characteristics  
Cluster characteristics High performing 
mines 
Low performing 
mines 
1. A catalytic event (as for example 
where management ‘cut coal’ during a 
strike). 
1/5 4/5 
2. A divided workforce (with distinctive 
and antagonistic groups of workers). 
0/5 3/5 
3. Mixed messages, inconsistent actions 
(for example where management 
promotes a ‘no-blame’ culture, then 
criticises workers when reporting 
incidents). 
1/5 4/5 
4. A high turnover of senior mine 
management (in some cases mines 
have lost approximately 50% of senior 
management in a single year). 
1/5 4/5 
5. A closed management style (including 
a reclusive management team; a lack of 
communication and consultation, and 
issues of ownership of safety initiatives). 
0/5 3/5 
6. An under-utilised, isolated or 
ineffectual line management (in 
particular, crew leaders that are 
‘sandwiched’ between workers and 
management). 
2/5 5/5 
7. Traditional organisational structures 
(in particular, fixed shifts and hierarchical 
shift management). 
2/5 5/5 
8. A resentment of corporate intervention 
(middle managers in particular are 
increasingly frustrated by additional 
safety-related paperwork and obligations 
flowing from corporate safety initiatives). 
1/5 4/5 
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While different mines exhibited different combinations of these characteristics, and no 
one mine either expressed all or none of them, nevertheless, the overall conclusion 
was clear: the greater the number of these characteristics exhibited at any one mine, 
the greater the likelihood that mistrust will impact negatively on safety processes, 
practices and outcomes.  
 
6.4 Nurturing trust: Corporate and mine-site strategies 
 
Drawing on the experience of mines that have been most successful in building trust 
and comparing them with those where mistrust is rife, has enabled us to identify a 
number of practical steps that corporate management, mine managers and other mine 
site personnel can take to develop trust. This, combined with what is known from the 
broader albeit limited literature on trust, has enabled us to build a composite picture of 
the architecture of trust in this sector.  
 
6.4.1 Corporate safety leadership 
 
The role of senior management in creating trust is crucial (Hopkins 2005; Whitener 
et al 1998). Senior management sets the priorities, establishes the values, and 
provides the resources that substantially shape mine management and workforce 
responses. Messages conveyed by senior management, particularly as to whether and 
how much they value safety and the wellbeing of the workforce, form part of the picture 
that workers develop as to the company’s motivations and behaviour. For example, at 
one mine in our study, efforts to establish a genuine reporting (‘no blame’) culture were 
undermined when a middle manager was criticised by corporate management, for an 
increase in reported incidents, which likely reflected the success of the reporting 
initiative rather than any genuine deterioration in safety performance.   
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We also found that a lack of corporate leadership can exacerbate mistrust at mine site 
level, with adverse consequences for WHS. Strikingly, the three lowest WHS ranked 
mines displayed the highest levels of mistrust towards corporate management. In one 
case, mine management viewed corporate WHS interventions as an unjustified 
intrusion into their internal affairs, while two others doubted the competence of 
corporate management to fulfil their stated WHS ambitions, and perceived their 
intervention as a vote of no confidence in their own safety management.  
 
Overall, we concur with Conchie et al  (2006, 1152) that: “a good organizational safety 
culture typically relies on good safety leadership [that] promotes shared values and 
commitment to an organization’s safety policies”. However, we also found that senior 
management commitment was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
success of corporate WHS initiatives – their efforts were still likely to rendered 
ineffective if the workforce mistrusted corporate initiatives. Without trust workers 
treated almost all corporate initiatives with suspicion and refused to buy into them; 
safety observations were perfunctory, incident reporting was trivialised or ignored, 
systems were more honoured in the breach, and sophisticated electronic monitoring 
systems were side tracked.  
 
6.4.2 Mine management leadership 
 
Although the management literature emphasises the importance of corporate 
leadership, less recognised is the importance of leadership at facility (mine site) level. 
Not only must mine management espouse the value of a safe workplace, they must 
also demonstrate their commitment to that value by their actions – a failure to ‘walk the 
talk’ may foster worker cynicism.  
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Numerous workers and middle managers told us the level of safety that a mine 
achieves is in very large part the level that the ‘boss’ wants. And from their perspective, 
this is the mine manager (with whom they have regular contact), not a remote 
corporate management. Our findings suggest that an open and communicative style of 
management is particularly important in building trust. Managers at higher performing 
mines were more likely to create opportunities for both informal and formal 
engagement, such as taking advantage of shift changes to meet with the workforce, 
while those at low performing tended to “disappear into their offices”, and that middle 
management were similarly characterised as reclusive.  
 
At the best performing mines management found a variety of ways to overcome worker 
suspicion, such as by being receptive and responding rapidly to safety concerns raised 
by the workforce (described as an ‘empathic style’ by Hasle & Møller (2007). See also 
Hasle & Limborg (2006)). This has been strikingly lacking in the mining industry as a 
whole, the pervasive view being “that management does not ‘value’ employees” 
(Minerals Council of Australia 1999). 
 
The most compelling demonstration of mine managers’ commitment to safety was 
almost universally regarded as being their willingness to halt production if safety is 
seriously compromised. At high performing mines, managers appeared far more willing 
to ‘bite the bullet’ on this issue, notwithstanding the difficulties involved: 
 
We were well into the production panel – [when a problem arose] – I stopped for 
24 hours to fix it. I refused to put machinery down the pit if the situation is not 
satisfactory and if it’s a major issue – if it’s unsafe, that’s it. Full stop. We go 
down a framework approach. We have learnt to assess risks. If the risk is 
acceptable, we carry on. If you get the wrong answer (it’s unsafe) then too bad – 
you just stop work. That’s far better than spending the rest of your life walking 
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down the street with someone pointing to you saying ‘that bloke killed my old 
man’. (Manager) 
 
In contrast, poor performing mines were the most reluctant to halt production: 
 
Coal mining is basically production orientated. … What I’m saying is that the 
focus of almost everyone at the pit is basically production. They don’t see safety 
as being a large part of their job, it is something that’s incidental. (Worker) 
 
And this reinforced cynicism and mistrust on the part of the workforce, serving to 
undermine almost all other management WHS initiatives. Intriguingly, at some of these 
mines, it was not just management that displayed a preference for production values 
over safety values: workers too adopted this attitude, saying they “just want to cut 
coal”. 
 
Finally, given the importance of the personal relationships, mines that have a high 
turnover of mine managers inevitably face serious problems in building trust. Yet some 
companies frequently rotate mine managers and other senior mine level positions 
between mines. This not only results in a loss of corporate memory at individual mines 
sites, but constrains the development of good working relationships between managers 
and workforce. This suggests the need to avoid repeated and rapid senior mine 
management rotations, except where relations between the manager and the 
workforce are beyond repair. 
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6.4.3 Overcoming middle management inertia 
 
The behaviour and actions of middle managers also plays an important role in the 
formation and maintenance of trust (Cox & Flin 1998; Clark & Payne 1997) and their 
relations with senior management in particular, may be crucial. Middle management at 
a number of the worst performing mines, viewed corporate intentions with deep 
suspicion. A key concern was that corporate attempts to devolve responsibility in 
conjunction with greater accountability was just strategy to ‘protect their own arses’, 
with the result that middle management would get the blame in the event of an 
accident. Such resentment sometimes morphed into active resistance: 
 
We have a small core of managers who think [corporate WHS initiatives] are a 
load of crap and they’ve said so, and when you get to the mine level, because 
they think it’s all bullshit, they don’t do anything until the last minute and then 
your attempts at being professional come to nothing. (Senior manager) 
 
A major concern of middle management at low performing mines was that corporate 
WHS initiatives imposed excessive administrative demands on their time without 
achieving substantive safety improvements. These findings are consistent with those of 
others that middle managers show ‘disillusionment’ with corporate safety initiatives 
(Gunningham & Sinclair 2012). 
 
Crew leaders (front line supervisors) were especially mistrustful of senior management, 
with this problem being exacerbated by uncertainty as to whether they were ‘really’ part 
of management, and as to where their loyalty should truly lie:  
 
The front line supervisor is the conduit between management and workers – is 
often seen by the workers as part of management, and seem by management 
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as part of management, but are sometimes treated by managers as part of the 
workers. They run with the foxes and hunt with the hounds.  
 
Irrespective of the precise source of middle/line management mistrust, the 
consequences can be highly detrimental to WHS. For example, middle managers at 
low performing mines openly admitted to not meeting their obligations to conduct safety 
observations, or conducting them in a perfunctory manner, to audit recommendations 
being ‘left on the shelf’, to not following or referring to safety management systems, to 
delivering safety briefings where they are simply ‘going through the motions’, and to 
ignoring specific directives to engage in ‘safety actions’.  
 
We found that at the high performing mines, a mix of mutually supporting approaches 
served to reinforce middle management engagement with safety issues, and some of 
these also helped develop trust.  
 
In most high performing mines, high quality, regular training was a priority for middle 
management, with WHS a core feature.  Moreover, in these mines, WHS was a central 
feature of middle management duties, functions and responsibilities, and was 
recognised as such by senior management – this ensured that it was not just as an 
‘add on’ to their ‘real’ role. This provided a valuable avenue through which they 
achieved (and leveraged) a broad range of management objectives. Crucially, middle 
managers were supported in making WHS interventions even where this might result in 
a loss of production in the short term – a marked contrast to low performing mines, 
where a failure to support such decisions commonly reinforced middle management 
perceptions that senior management was ‘not serious’ about safety. 
 
Significantly, although all middle managers were to some degree pressed for time and 
resources when it came to discharging WHS obligations, this phenomenon was more 
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acute at low performing mines. The key difference was that at high performing mines, 
time spent on addressing WHS tasks was not only viewed by senior management as 
legitimate, it was expected. Finally, at high performing mines, line managers were more 
integrated into the management structure. For example, a clear management role was 
provided for crew leaders and this in turn helped to build trust with both superiors and 
subordinates. In contrast, at low performing mines, middle management often received 
mixed messages as to their standing, ‘officially’ being part of management but in 
practice being treated as ‘part of the crew’.  
 
Where these, or at least a majority of these characteristics were present (as was found 
in high performing mines) than a commitment to safety was reinforced, and mistrust of 
senior management was less apparent. In contrast, at low performing mines it was 
common to find a ‘tick the boxes’ mentality to WHS duties, underpinned in large part by 
cynicism or mistrust about senior management intentions.  
 
6.4.4 Flatter structures, devolved decision-making, rotating shifts 
 
The choice of organisational structure can have important consequences for trust at a 
mine. A majority of the high WHS performing mines had adopted a flatter management 
structure that requires devolved decision-making. This arrangement had the effect of 
removing layers of middle management, bringing line management and workers closer 
to senior mine management. In particular, it led to the creation of ‘coordinators’ – line 
managers elevated to oversee key operations (such as production) for each shift, but 
maintaining strong links with the crews. 
 
Where this structure had been introduced, there was widespread support for it amongst 
both management and workers: the less hierarchical structure had generated greater 
trust between crews, coordinators and senior management; the ‘lines of 
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communication’ were more open and efficient; and there was less interference by 
middle management in their day-to-day activities. Significantly, line managers had 
‘risen to the occasion’, avoiding the usual uncertainty over their role: “I see myself as 
probably part of junior management …. The coordinator is basically running the whole 
show now”.  Workers, too, were enthusiastic supporters. From their perspective, “one 
of their own” has been put in charge of day-to-day operations. Senior managers also 
supported a flatter structure because “the more levels of demarcation and hierarchy, 
the more individual workers can hide and buck pass”.  
 
These findings are consistent with the organisational trust literature which emphasises 
how overtly hierarchical relationships constrain trust – those at the bottom of the 
hierarchy often have a “fear of exploitation and the nagging suspicion they are being 
treated unfairly”, while those at the top suspect “that those individuals for whom they 
are responsible are shirking when performing their duties or engaging in acts that might 
endanger the organization’s welfare” (Kramer 1996, 216). Similarly, a cultural survey of 
the Australian mining industry found that “mines that reported their preference for a 
‘Team Performance’ mix of safety strategies were also the mines where more positive 
safety cultures were measured” (Minerals Council of Australia 1999). Certainly, in 
those mines that had not pursued flatter management structures, hostility and mistrust 
between management and workers was much more evident. 
 
The type of shifts mines use can also have important implications for the presence or 
absence of trust.  Under ‘fixed shifts’ unions have traditionally allocated ‘seniority’ to 
workers based upon their length of service, and those with the highest level of seniority 
are able to get first preference for their preferred shift. In contrast, under ‘rotating shifts’ 
all workers share the different shifts equally over time, irrespective of seniority. Further, 
all workers get equal exposure to management, making it easier for management to 
maintain open communication links with the entire workforce and to build a rapport with 
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new recruits. It is also possible to schedule safety training for all workers over a given 
shift cycle.  
 
Together, these benefits work to build trust. We found that despite strong in-principal 
opposition from unions and workers, where the removal of shift seniority has occurred 
there is broad recognition within the workforce of its benefits for safety and productivity. 
It appears counter-intuitive to suggest that the removal of one of the most cherished 
conditions of the mining unions, namely, shift seniority, could lead to greater levels of 
trust and safety between workers and management. And yet there are convincing signs 
that that this has indeed been the case in the higher performing mines. Shift seniority 
encourages the clustering of the older and usually least flexible workers in a single 
shift, namely the dayshift, reinforcing the development of an insular worker culture 
predisposed to mistrust towards management and resistant to management safety. 
Seniority can also limit the capacity of management to create more productive work 
teams, and the integration of new recruits. In contrast, we found that the removal of 
seniority reduces the risks of insularity and parochialism.  
 
The policy implications of these findings are clear. Notwithstanding potential resistance 
from trade unions during the transition period, management should consider the 
introduction of rotating shifts at more mines, in combination with flatter management 
structures. Having said this, it is unwise to rely on any single mechanism in isolation. 
While flatter management structures are likely to facilitate more effective feedback, this 
cannot be guaranteed and it will also be important to provide at least one other report-
back path so that if one is blocked, workers have another option.25  
                                                
25 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this insight. 
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6.4.5 Ownership 
 
Workers were found to be far more likely to ‘take on board’ and implement WHS 
initiatives over which they had a high degree of ownership. At high performing WHS 
mines this was usually achieved by engaging workers in the creation of these initiatives 
or, in the case of corporate initiatives, in how they were implemented at individual mine 
sites:  
 
Fundamentally, the process is driven by the workforce – there is a high degree 
of ownership. We provide the resources but we want the workers to identify the 
safety improvements. They’ve got their own committee, with about two members 
from management, and the rest of the eight or so are workers. (Manager) 
 
At another mine, the introduction of dedicated and relatively self-managed work teams 
in each shift had far reaching benefits for ownership and trust: 
 
They have changed the roster so that they have consistent teams – services, 
longwall and development – and they have become more specialised, with 
greater ownership. The teams get better at their jobs, develop more specialised 
skills, the workers have more input into the work program and have a vested 
interest in the crew’s success. 
 
In a third mine, the introduction of a behaviour based safety initiative – usually resisted 
by the workforce because it is seen as a ‘blame the worker’ approach – was adopted 
enthusiastically, primarily because a high status and influential group of miners were 
engaged at an early stage and came to feel that it was ‘their’ initiative.  
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And in perhaps the most striking example, a representative group of employees 
persuaded company management to re-open a recently closed mine. They did so 
under a new enterprise agreement that gave them no job security, but substantial 
incentives for increased production and greater autonomy. Under this agreement there 
were improvements in production, quality and industrial relations as well as in safety, 
notwithstanding the reluctance with which most workers had entered into the 
agreement.  
 
In contrast, lower performing mines often ignored the benefits of worker ownership. For 
example, workers complained they were not consulted before the introduction of a new 
management safety initiative requiring them to complete a written JSA at the start of 
work. This undermined trust and effectively destroyed the credibility of the initiative: it 
was common practice for workers to take the JSA cards home and fill them in advance 
of the actual jobs, clearly defeating the purpose of the system. Others simply treated 
the cards as a ‘tick and flick’ exercise, with no thought about actual risks or safety 
mindfulness.  
 
These findings are broadly consistent with those of Conchie et al (2006, 1101) who 
suggest that: “engaging employees in decision making not only increases trust in 
management … but also promotes within employees the perceptions that they are 
trusted by management. In turn these perceptions increase the personal responsibility 
that employees take for safety and safe behaviour”. 
 
6.4.6 Communication 
 
A distinctive factor of all mines with a strong safety performance was the high level of 
communication between workers and management on WHS issues. However, no 
single, successful formula for communication could be identified. Much, it would 
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appear, depends on personal management style. For example, effective 
communication might include ‘start of shift’ meetings with deputies, tool box talks, 
regular planning meetings with the management group and regular WHS committee 
meetings, as well as a simple ‘open door’ policy and informal dialogue with mine 
management, such as after-work barbeques. Perhaps the most common feature of 
successful initiatives was that they engaged workers in small groups, which in itself 
may well have facilitated greater communication.  
 
In contrast, most of the low performing mines reported a lack of communication as a 
major reason why safety programs fail to engage the workforce and disappoint in their 
results. For example, some complained that new safety initiatives were accompanied 
by little or no prior consultation with the crew, whilst others were scathing about the 
unilateral imposition of mini-risk assessments for every shift. This is consistent with 
Cox et al (2006, 1126) who found “that managers who are willing to share information 
signal to their employees that they can be trusted” (see also Clarke 1999; Firth 2004, 
56-61). 
 
A key aspect of good communication at high performing mines was management’s 
willingness to listen to and respond to workers’ WHS concerns and to be engaged in a 
genuine dialogue about them. For example at one high performing mine workers 
reported that: “we are very happy with the mine manager, [he is] not a bully, is always 
available, and not reluctant to go underground, asking what problems are you having”. 
Similarly, managers who responded promptly when they expressed safety concerns, 
scored highly in terms of communication, even if they simply explained why no further 
action would be taken. These findings resonate with Reason’s arguments with regard 
to the importance of developing a ‘blame free’ culture that encourages workers to 
openly report errors (Reason 1997). Not coincidentally, such initiatives also served to 
build trust in management motives and commitment to WHS.  
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Feedback from management to workers, particularly in the context of reporting on 
WHS incidents, such as near misses, equipment damage, and hazard identification, 
was also found to be important to building trust. Interviewees suggested that workers 
can quickly become disenchanted with the reporting process when they believe that 
their concerns are not being taken seriously, and/or are ignored. And it is difficult for 
them to ascertain the extent to which this is occurring in the absence of regular 
feedback. Yet at some low performing mines responses to reports are simply posted 
on a notice board, without any face-to-face feedback, and at others feedback is either 
absent, or ad hoc and periodic.  
 
6.5 Trade unions and trust  
 
The evidence from our sample is suggestive of a greater degree of mistrust at heavily 
unionised mines than at mines where the union presence is subdued or non-existent 
(four versus three, respectively). But this tentative finding may reflect only the particular 
history and culture of the coal mining industry where deeply entrenched adversarialism 
militates against the development of trust between trade unions and management. 
Such adversarialism, moreover, has been exacerbated by a concerted assault on trade 
union influence in the industry (most apparent under the Howard government and 
under Work Choices in particular26) that has seriously eroded notions of consultation, 
negotiation and joint-decision making. 
 
In other contexts and industries there is considerable evidence to suggest that trade 
unions have often made positive contributions to workplace relations. For example, 
Deery & Walsh (1999, 28) found that “team building, ad hoc committees, regular 
meetings between employers and management, joint consultative committees, 
                                                
26 See Workplace Relations Amendment Act 2005. We are indebted to an anonymous referee 
for emphasising this point. 
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suggestion schemes and grievance procedures [were] significantly more likely to be 
associated with workplaces that had stable or growing levels of unionization” (see also 
Deery et al 1999; Dedobbeleer et al 1990, 1102).  
 
And even in the coal mining sector, our interviews suggested that maintaining a 
constructive dialogue between companies and unions concerning WHS was far from 
impossible:  
 
You can get the cultures to come together – the companies, the unions and the 
inspectorate – with astounding results. Take air-born dust control … We got 
terrific cooperation on this at [the mine site] and solved the issue… We form a 
dust committee, measure the impact, get feedback from workers, post a notice 
of the outcomes of the committee, invite all parties to see the result – that 
process is never confrontational. (Manager) 
 
We have a pretty close relationship to the workforce, and we work closely with 
the union officials. …. The communication is a matter of routine. Every 
Wednesday we meet with union officials… Industrial relations and safety? We 
have no difficulty keeping them apart. The union does it, they push safety. 
(Manager) 
 
Nevertheless, we were readily able to identify other mines where management has 
actively sought to marginalise the relevant trade union, seeking to engage directly with 
the workforce on safety issues. 
 
The experience of two mines (within the same company), both higher WHS performing 
mines, illustrates the two divergent approaches. At the first mine, following a temporary 
closure, management selectively recruited from the prior workforce, excluding those 
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who were perceived to be ‘union troublemakers’ and ‘hardliners’, and also bringing in a 
substantial number of new workers. This provided an opportunity to create a new 
workplace culture, to communicate directly with the workforce and to sideline the 
relevant trade unions: 
 
We have taken safety away from the union …. If you give power to the workers, 
then unions become superfluous – it’s hard for them to hit you on safety. It is a 
huge battle to win their hearts and minds … (Manager) 
 
The second mine also went through a similar process involving selective redundancies 
that served to undermine “the heavily unionised industrial culture of the past”. 
Subsequently, however, mine management adopted an inclusive relationship with the 
unions and made a point of engaging them in consultation, notwithstanding that doing 
so risked invoking the ire of corporate management:  
 
We got into trouble with [corporate] at one point because they thought we were 
letting the unions ‘manage the pits’. But it is not them running it – it is really just 
consulting with the unions. It is all about enforcing the EBA with their 
consultation. That way, they will respect your decisions. 
 
Successful engagement with the trade unions over WHS however, remained a 
substantial challenge, given the entrenched animosities between the two sides of the 
industry. To succeed, it requires a substantial change in approach on the part of both 
protagonists:  
 
The company has to stop seeing the unions as the monster and attacking it at 
will, and we have to say, without the company, there are no jobs, no money. We 
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need to cross over but the ideologies of company executives and our executives 
to a degree need to be reshaped. (Union inspector) 
 
There was also evidence to suggest that it requires the nurturing of relationships of 
trust between senior levels of the trade union movement and senior management. For 
“just as the CEO and senior management of a company are prime influencers in setting 
the tone of a company’s commitment to safety, so union leadership must make very 
clear the expected approach to safety issues to be taken by union members and 
officials”. This should be easier than it sounds. Leading companies are now committed 
to high standards of WHS and to going beyond compliance. And trade unions, in a 
period of particular weakness in which their capacity to demonstrate their relevance on 
a variety of traditional industrial relations issues is limited, might well see particular 
benefits in promoting WHS (Barry & Loudoun 2006).  
 
Perhaps what is necessary above all, is for workers to believe that they are “are being 
treated as resources to be developed rather than commodities to be bought and sold” 
(Gaertner & Nollen 1989, 987). It will be particularly difficult for companies to convince 
workers that this is the case when they are being denied security of employment and 
traditional benefits. In such an environment, convincing workers that their employer is 
motivated by genuine concern and respect will be an uphill battle. 
 
One further issue, particularly in relationships between trade unions and management, 
concerns the extent to which the distribution of power impacts on levels of trust 
between management and workers. Our methodology does not enable us to come to 
any definitive view on this issue. However, at the very least, it was apparent that in an 
adversarial industrial relations environment, particularly when the role of unions was 
under direct threat from the Howard government’s ‘Work Choices’ legislation (which 
some mining companies had actively pushed for), trust will be particularly difficult to 
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develop.27 More broadly, the self-evident imbalance of power in worker-management 
relations is likely to constrain trust in almost all worker-management interactions, 
unless worker health and safety can be effectively divorced from the “war-torn terrain of 
industrial relations” (Carson & Henenberg 1988, 3). Yet in practice it often becomes 
ensnared within it (Creighton & Gunningham, 1985). 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
There is growing evidence that mistrust between workers and management (and 
between different layers of management) has a corrosive effect on workplace safety 
initiatives. The findings of our broader research project certainly support this 
conclusion.  
 
Such findings raise the further question: how might mistrust best be overcome? How, 
in particular, might trust be nurtured between workers and trade unions on the one 
hand and mine site and corporate management on the other, and indeed between 
different levels of management, in such a way as to improve safety outcomes?  
 
The analysis above suggests that a variety of strategies are closely connected to the 
establishment of trust and in turn with improved safety performance, and that 
management ignores these strategies at their peril.  
 
Our fieldwork suggested that mines that had achieved high safety outcomes had all or 
most of a cluster of characteristics that distinguished them from low performing mines 
and that these characteristics, which had benefits in their own right, were also closely 
                                                
27 The definitive work in this area is Fox (1974). We are indebted to an anonymous referee for 
raising the broader question of whether trust in the health and safety arena can be developed in 
the absence of contexts that are supportive of its establishment more generally. 
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associated with the presence of trust. These include corporate and mine site 
leadership, the capacity to overcome middle management inertia, flatter structures, 
devolved decision-making and rotating shifts, worker ‘buy in’ and effective 
communication, consultation and feedback. 
 
Some factors appear to be so fundamental that it is difficult to conceive of trust 
developing in their absence. This is certainly the case with senior management and 
mine management commitment, and with getting middle management ‘on board’. But 
while these may be necessary conditions for the creation of trust, they are insufficient 
in themselves. After all, as workers commonly pointed out: “managers come and go but 
we’ll still be here”. Without effective worker engagement, trust between workers and 
managers clearly cannot be achieved, and without trust, it seems that high safety 
performance will also be more difficult to achieve. Accordingly, the other criteria 
described above all form an important part of the composite picture, many components 
of which may be mutually reinforcing.  
 
While the mining sector may well be at close to one pole of the trust-mistrust 
continuum, many of the findings may be capable of generalisation to other industries, 
particularly those confronting similar adversarial workplace relations.  
 
Finally, it is important to point out that, as with many studies, our methodology enables 
us to illuminate some areas but in so doing, may inadvertently place others in the 
shade. It might be for example, that in focusing on issues of trust at mine site level, 
through the lens of worker and management perceptions, insufficient emphasis has 
been placed on the structural factors that might undermine trust. These might include 
the assault on trade union influence generally, and on consultation, negotiation and 
joint-decision making in particular under Work Choices, and the failure to engage 
workers seriously in developing and implementing WHS management systems, 
  
162 
notwithstanding that these are now a central pillar of the architecture of WHS at 
corporate and workplace level. Whether or to what extent this is the case will be for 
others to determine. What we can say with confidence is that trust demonstrably plays 
an important role in facilitating or (in the case of mistrust) constraining effective 
preventative safety initiatives and that the strategies identified above for nurturing trust, 
can and should contribute to improved WHS outcomes. 
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Chapter 7: Regulation and the role of trust: Reflections from 
the mining industry 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
published in the Journal of Law and Society (Volume 36, Issue 2, June, 2009, pages 
167-194). The relative contributions were split 50/50 between Sinclair and 
Gunningham. Sinclair contributed to the fieldwork, the processing of interview material, 
the background research and literature reviews, the preparation of initial drafts and the 
preparation and editing of the final draft.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
For over two decades, writers on regulation have acknowledged the importance of 
enforcement in achieving effective regulatory outcomes. Many have focused on the 
question of ‘regulatory style’, debating, for example, the relative benefits of an ‘advise 
and persuade’ approach that emphasises repair and results as compared to one 
concerned primarily with enforcement, sanctions and deterrence (Hawkins 1984; Hutter 
1993; Kagan 2001) Others have sought to integrate these approaches through 
strategies such as ‘responsive regulation’ under which regulators start at the bottom of 
an enforcement pyramid with a cooperative strategy assuming virtue, but gradually 
escalate to more a more punitive approach if their expectations are disappointed 
(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). 
 
This debate is by now rather long in the tooth and one might reasonably conclude that 
there is not much more to add. But one issue that is demonstrably important but has 
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rarely been studied directly is the relationship between trust and effective regulation.28 
While trust may be of questionable importance where interactions between regulator 
and regulated are infrequent and no long-term relationship can credibly be built, it may 
play a critical role where interactions are frequent and ongoing. In the latter 
circumstances, regulatory outcomes usually emerge out of discussion, dialogue, and 
negotiation, rather than from the unilateral imposition of rules by one party on another. 
More commonly than not, they are the outcomes of regulatory conversations:  
 
…. the communicative interactions that occur between all involved in the 
regulatory ‘space’ [that] can be the basis of coordinated action [or] important 
sites of conflict and contestation (Black 2002, 163). 
 
Unsurprisingly, a constructive relationship or conversation usually generates 
constructive outcomes, and vice versa and this in turn may be substantially influenced 
by the level of trust between the parties.  
 
This chapter examines the role of trust with regard to WHS regulation in the mining 
industry in New South Wales, Australia. Hazardous industries such as mining have 
traditionally been subject to a high degree of regulation and large companies, at least, 
can expect a substantial number of inspections each year.29 As we will see, such a 
high degree of regulatory scrutiny and ongoing interaction places trust at the centre of 
the relationship between regulator and regulated. 
 
The New South Wales mining industry provides a particularly illuminating case study of 
the role of trust because it enables a comparison of two very different regulatory styles 
adopted by the same regulatory agency at different points in time, and the implications 
                                                
28 For research on this issue, see Braithwaite 2007; Job 2005; Tyler & Huo 2002. 
29 For example, most sizable mines get visited about every six weeks in New South Wales 
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of each for trust and regulatory outcomes. Gunningham first studied the behaviour of 
the New South Wales mining inspectorate in the 1980s, characterising it as ‘negotiated 
non-compliance’, a strategy located at the compliance extreme of the compliance-
deterrence continuum, verging on regulatory capture (Gunningham 1987, 91). But the 
inspectorate's approach to enforcement changed dramatically following a mining 
disaster in 1996, making it possible to engage in a ‘before and after’ study of the 
relationship between the regulator and the mining industry, to track (through interviews 
with current and past stakeholders and documentary evidence), how this shift in 
enforcement style has impacted on trust, to explore the regulatory consequences of a 
breakdown of trust, and to examine how it might best be regained. 
 
7.2 Methodology and definitions 
 
The research reported in this chapter is part of a broader ongoing project that is 
concerned with identifying the causes of mistrust, understanding the ways in which the 
presence of mistrust may inhibit constructive interactions between stakeholders, and 
mapping the consequences in terms of WHS outcomes. The particular focus is on 
relationships between management and workers, between different levels of 
management, and between managers, workers, and the mines inspectorate. Only the 
last aspect is examined in this chapter. 
 
Such issues of trust cannot be addressed primarily by surveys or via the use of 
quantitative data (although both may be valuable for purposes of triangulation). Only by 
engaging in face-to-face interviews with employers, employees, trade unions, 
regulators, and others can in-depth understanding be gained of relationships of trust 
(or mistrust) and their implications for WHS actions and outcomes. Accordingly, the 
principal data for this study was gained from semi-structured interviews conducted with 
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a representative sample of corporate and mine management, trade union officials, 
inspectors and departmental officers, and miners, conducted at 13 mine sites in three 
companies. 
 
A predetermined range of topics was covered in individual interviews, but as far as 
possible, they became free-flowing conversations rather than formalised questions and 
answers since the former was more likely to yield both unexpected insights and candid 
revelations. It also allowed the interview to be more easily tailored to the circumstances 
and experiences of each interviewee. Generally, interviews lasted between 40 and 60 
minutes. Each interview was conducted in private (for the most part, on site), with 
interviewees informed in advance that all material arising out of the interviews would be 
treated confidentially, and used anonymously in any subsequent publications. 
 
A total of 151 mine site interviews have been conducted to date. Each mine site visit 
occurred over a two-day period in which a representative sample of both staff and 
workers participated. Typically, approximately twelve interviews were conducted at 
each mine, spanning senior management, middle management, line management, and 
workers. Although the precise composition varied from mine to mine, depending on 
availability, specific examples included the general or operation managers, mine 
managers, shift or process supervisors, under-mangers, safety officers, engineering 
managers (mechanical and/or electrical), crew leaders (deputies, team supervisors), 
and workers and tradesmen (including local check inspectors/site safety 
representatives). In most cases, the balance of managers to employees was split 
approximately equally. Representatives from corporate management (including chief 
executives, corporate safety managers, and operational managers) across the three 
participating coalmining companies were also interviewed. The format of the interviews 
was similar to that described above. A total of twelve corporate interviews were 
conducted.  
  
167 
Beyond mining companies themselves, a sample of 10 inspectors, including mines 
inspectors and electrical and mechanical engineering inspectors, were interviewed. 
Discussions were also held with a Chief Mines Inspector and another senior 
departmental officer. Finally, a sample of eight union officials (district check 
inspectors/industry safety representatives, industry check inspectors) were also 
interviewed, and discussions were held with a senior union official. 
 
Qualitative material generated by the interviews was supplemented by reviews of both 
the domestic and international literature, including organisational trust, safety culture, 
mine safety, and WHS regulatory and prosecution policy literatures. The three mining 
companies involved in the project also provided internal policy background and safety 
statistical information and audit data (on a confidential basis). Consistent with the 
norms of social science research and of our ethics clearance, we do not identify the 
companies or any of the individuals who participated in the research. 
 
The ‘inspectoral style’ of the Mines Inspectorate pre-Gretley was constructed from the 
evidence provided to a Parliamentary Inquiry on the asbestos mining industry and from 
secondary sources. The Parliamentary Inquiry (to which the first named author was 
WHS advisor) took extensive evidence from a wide range of stakeholders and obtained 
access to a range of confidential, sensitive, and revealing company documents 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1984). These included communications both internally 
and between the company and the inspectorate going back a considerable period and 
provided a graphic record of relationships between the company and the inspectorate. 
The findings (and an academic analysis) were published (Commonwealth of Australia 
1984; Gunningham 1987) and need only be summarised for present purposes. 
 
Efforts were made to triangulate and to use relevant statistical data, although only 
limited sources of information were available over the period necessary to make a 
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‘before and after’ comparison. Importantly, we were able to accurately measure the 
number of prosecutions both before and after the Gretley disaster, but the Mine Safety 
Performance Measures database was only developed in the aftermath of Gretley 
(Department of Primary Industries 2008), as was the Department of Primary Industry's 
(hereafter the Department) enforcement policy and accompanying measures. Prior to 
Gretley there was “no computer data bases system which records incidents and can 
produce sophisticated reports”. In any event, in the opinion of one senior regulator, 
even if previous records had been available they would have been unreliable since 
“having to record information in the data base itself has changed behaviour and 
accountability” (R Morrison, personal communication, 11 August, 2008). The difficulties 
of making ‘before and after’ statistical comparisons were exacerbated by the fact that 
there was no specialist enforcement unit prior to Gretley, a lack of audit tools, and 
insufficient level of training (particularly investigation training) of mines inspectors (R 
Morrison, personal communication, 11 August, 2008). On the other hand, the fact that 
all these developments took place in the aftermath of Gretley, in itself, provides 
evidence of the impact of that disaster, and the comparison of the prosecutions 
conducted before and after Gretley also tells a stark story.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is also important to clarify how ‘trust' is defined for present 
purposes. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the importance of this issue to improving 
WHS performance, it has been the subject of a paucity of past research and only “a 
limited number of researchers have examined the concept within the realms of safety 
research” (Cox et al 2004; Risk Analysis 2006). Those who have examined it would 
readily concede that “the exact nature of trust and its role in shaping organizational 
safety is poorly understood” (Conchie et al 2006, 1097) and that “the formation of trust 
within workplace relationships is complex and elusive” (Zeffane & Cornell 2003, 4). 
Most definitions also recognise that in the WHS context, as elsewhere, trust is both 
complex and has multiple dimensions (Risk Analysis 2006). 
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For present purposes (and in the absence of any widely accepted definition) it is helpful 
to emphasise four aspects of the concept that have proved particularly valuable in 
organisational and inter-organisational contexts. First, we define trust in terms of good 
faith commitments, or more specifically “an expectancy held by an individual or group 
that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can 
be relied upon” (Rotter 1967, 651). This we emphasise because relationships between 
the inspectorate and regulated companies involve ‘regulatory conversations’ and 
negotiation, and constructive conversations and negotiations can only take place 
where there is trust with regard to promises and statements made. 
 
Second, and, related to the above is that the person or organisation is “honest in 
whatever negotiations preceded such [good faith] commitments” (Cummings & 
Bromiley 1996, 302). This is perhaps the most conventional understanding of trust and 
is also central to the effectiveness of negotiations, particularly at industry level. More 
broadly, whether a party ‘walks the talk’ is crucial in shaping its perceptions of the bona 
fides of the other. 
 
Third, and closely related to the first two definitions is the concept of vulnerability, or 
more precisely “a willingness to accept vulnerability based upon having positive 
expectations about other people's intentions and behaviours in situations which are 
interdependent and/or risky” (Clegg et al 2002).30 Not only do relationships between the 
inspectorate and regulated companies involve interactions and interdependencies, but 
the companies are highly vulnerable if they disclose information (for example, about 
incidents, injuries or breaches of regulation), and are only likely to do so if they trust the 
                                                
30 Similarly, Mayer et al (1995, 709) have proposed that, in an organisational context, trust is 
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of 
the ability to monitor and control that other party”. 
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inspectorate not to take advantage of that disclosure to take punitive action. Put 
differently, “trust enables people to take risks” (McAllister 1995, 25) – because they are 
confident that others will not take advantage of them. 
 
Finally, as international evidence-based research has found, “people who feel they 
have been treated fairly will be more likely to trust that organization and be more 
inclined to accept its decisions and follow its directions” (Murphy 2004, 199). As we will 
see, a perceived lack of fairness lies at the heart of the industry's grievance that 
substantial penalties are now being imposed in the absence of fault. As we will see, 
when inspectors and industry respondents spoke in terms of mistrust, it was in terms of 
one (and usually, more) of the senses described above. 
 
7.3 Regulatory style, prosecution and the Gretley disaster  
 
In 1996 four miners at Gretley colliery punched into old and flooded mine workings. 
There was an inrush of water and they were drowned. An inquiry into the incident by 
former Justice James Staunton made recommendations concerning prosecution and 
charges were subsequently brought both against the two former operating companies 
and against a number of individuals (Hopkins 2006b). Commissioner Justice Patricia 
Staunton subsequently found that the corporate defendants had failed to ensure the 
health, safety and welfare of their employees, and two former mine general managers 
and a mine surveyor were “deemed to have committed the same offences as the 
corporations, having failed to satisfy the onus placed upon them” to exercise due 
diligence to protect workers (Latham & Locke 1991). Although the defendants argued 
that they were entitled to rely on old plans of the old workings supplied by the relevant 
government agency, Justice Staunton found that this:  
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…. does not excuse the defendants from their independent statutory obligation 
…. to ensure a safe system of work. Nor does it relieve the defendants of their 
obligation to satisfy themselves by way of their own research as to the accuracy 
of …. [the Dept of Minerals and Resources plans which] [o]n any considered 
view …. were seriously deficient in purporting to depict old coal workings in a 
way that one could be confident of their accuracy” (Geller 2004, 806). 
 
On appeal, the conviction against the two companies was affirmed, as was that against 
the mine manager and former mine manager. The conviction of the surveyor was 
overturned on the basis that he was not “concerned in the management” of either 
company (Sentis 2010). 
 
The decision in the Gretley case and the subsequent ramifications of the disaster itself 
sent shock waves through the New South Wales mining industry. Not only were 
individuals as well as companies successfully prosecuted, but political pressure 
resulted in the inspectorate adopting a radically different approach to enforcement. To 
appreciate what a dramatic change of inspectoral policy was involved, it is necessary 
to summarise the inspectorate's relationship with the mining industry in previous 
decades, before contrasting it with the post-Gretley approach.  
 
Before Gretley, the mines inspectorate's approach to the mining companies it was 
responsible for regulating had been conciliatory and cooperative and it had not 
engaged in prosecution to any significant extent. For example, in the seven years 
before that disaster, there had been 33 deaths in New South Wales coal mines without 
a single resulting prosecution (Dejoy 2005). And the very few prosecutions that had 
taken place in the mining industry in other circumstances (relating to metalliferous 
mines) had involved low penalties, were poorly publicised, and failed to send any 
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significant deterrent signal (Flin et al 2000).31 This led to a general perception, 
particularly within the mining trade unions, that prosecution was a ‘dead duck’ 
(Falbruch & Wilpert 1999). 
 
This seems an entirely reasonable conclusion, for the inspectorate had a history of 
resisting prosecution even in the most extreme circumstances and even when it was 
heavily criticised for its failures in this regard (Commonwealth of Australia 1984). For 
example, Gunningham's study of the inspectorate in the 1980s (focusing on the 
asbestos mine at Baryulgil, where multiple deaths resulted from asbestos-related 
disease) documented how it was not only loath to prosecute, even when faced with 
evidence of gross breaches of the asbestos regulations, but routinely warned mine 
management of prospective inspections, thereby enabling them to clean up and 
disguise many of the worst regulatory breaches. That analysis concluded that:  
 
What the Mines Inspectorate provided at Baryulgil …. fell far short of any …. 
optimum. Its approach might best be classified as . . . a complete withdrawal 
from enforcement activity, a toothless, passive and acquiescent approach which, 
however attractive to the regulatory agency and to the regulated industry, has 
tragic consequences for those whom the legislation is ostensibly intended to 
protect (Gunningham 1987, 91). 
 
Under this extreme version of an “advise and persuade” approach, trust was 
apparently rarely at issue in relations between the inspectorate and mine management. 
There is nothing to suggest, either from official documents of this earlier era or from 
interviews with inspectors or mine management who worked in the industry during the 
1990s, that trust was ever at risk. On the contrary, the inspectorate's exceptionally 
                                                
31 In the absence of any available statistics relating to this period, information was gleaned 
primarily from a former Chief Inspector responsible for prosecution decisions in those years. 
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conciliatory and consultative approach understandably met with considerable approval 
and support from the mining companies themselves. Relations between the 
inspectorate and the mining companies were commonly described as “close” and 
indeed some commentators had suggested that at times they were so close as to 
amount to regulatory capture (Gunningham 1987, 91). 
 
But following the Inquiry into the Gretley disaster, the culture of advise and persuade 
was substantially broken. As indicated above, the Gretley Inquiry called for the ‘timely 
prosecution’ of mining companies and senior officials, and two mine managers, a 
surveyor, and a number of ‘undermanagers’ were subsequently prosecuted. Moreover, 
public sympathy for the miners coupled with political pressure (especially from the main 
mining union, the CFMEU)32 on a receptive Labor government, prompted the 
establishment of an independent Investigations Unit comprised primarily of former 
police. This unit was much more inclined to treat breaches of regulation as criminal 
action warranting prosecution than previous in-house decision makers. And it was 
made clear to the inspectorate that it too was expected to become tough and 
prosecutorial and to adopt what is widely described as a ‘muscular’ approach to its 
regulatory role. 
 
It soon became apparent to the mining industry that the Gretley prosecutions were not 
a ‘one off’ and that prosecution of individual statutory duty holders was to become 
commonplace, at least in the event of death or serious injury. Another mine manager 
was successfully prosecuted following a subsequent fatality at Awaba (Morrison v 
Powercoal Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 297) this case was followed by a number of 
                                                
32 The CFMEU, had close links with the state government and that some key CFMEU officials 
had both personal and political reasons for wanting the government to take a tough stance 
against not only the individual company involved in the Gretley disasters, and its managers, but 
also the New South Wales coal industry more generally. 
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others involving death or serious injury (and a handful that did not) (see, for example, 
Morrison v Ross; Morrison v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd [2006] 
NSWIRComm 205). As at August 2008 there had been 33 successful prosecutions 
since the introduction of the DPI's Enforcement Policy in 1999 (Department of Primary 
Industries 2008), as compared to none in the seven years preceding Gretley and less 
than a handful in the decade before that. 
 
That these prosecutions are the external manifestation of a new enforcement style is 
confirmed not only by the stark contrast between the numbers of pre and post-Gretley 
prosecutions, by the flurry of other measures put in place in the wake of Gretley (the 
new Investigations Unit, Enforcement Policy, incident recording system, investigation 
training, and audit tools), but also by our interviews with the inspectorate. Inspectors 
interviewed were unanimous that Gretley had generated pressures for increased 
prosecution both of companies and of mine managers. According to one:  
 
Gretley, and the subsequent inquiry, was the catalyst to get things moving in the 
Department. The changes that were occurring, increasing litigation, were 
speeded up. This led to more prosecutions.  
 
Another inspector reported:  
 
…. there is now a recognition that you carry out investigations with a more 
formal, professional approach – although it varies from inspector to inspector, 
the end result seems to be the same …. we have gone down the road of 
prosecution. 
 
Others also talked of an increasing pressure to take a tough stance on safety, and to 
demonstrate this through a greater willingness to stop production:  
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…. decisions are made about whether we need to stop the operation. This is a 
very serious step, but we are now more willing to do it. It is a fairly regular event. 
 
Crucially (from the perspective of the mining industry) prosecutions have taken place 
not just in circumstances where there was recklessness or intent, but also where there 
was no more than negligence to the civil standard - a standard that according to 
industry associations and some independent observers is now an exceptionally 
demanding one, divorced from reasonable expectations (Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 2005, 7). 
 
A pivotal role in the post-Gretley world has been played by the Investigations Unit that 
was widely regarded, both by our inspectoral and mining company respondents, as 
having adopted a far more adversarial approach than its predecessor that had in itself 
soured its relationship with the mining companies. Some pointed out that the 
investigation unit was populated by former police officers, with a strong cultural 
preference for prosecution. Indeed one inspector was not alone in suggesting that 
there might be “political pressure for mine managers to be hung” and that it was the 
Investigations Unit's role to ensure that this objective was achieved. 
 
Another pointed out that this “makes it very difficult to build a relationship with the 
mines following an investigation – it is a major source of mistrust” and “it is not the 
most comfortable relationship with the investigation unit – they are too ready to jump 
on individuals, and not look at systems”.33 The implications for trust of the post Gretley 
regulatory style are explored below. 
                                                
33 Yet some inspectors highlighted that having a separate investigations unit can be useful to 
inspectors when mine sites do not respond to their urgings: “at one mine, there was a series of 
events of similar ilk. Despite my patience, there was reluctance by the company to address this. 
So I brought in the investigations unit – I didn't even do my own investigation”. 
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7.4 Mistrust and its consequences 
 
It is clear that Gretley was the catalyst for a dramatic shift in regulatory style away from 
the previous and long-favoured advise and persuade approach to a much more 
muscular and adversarial approach. This new approach to enforcement had a profound 
impact on the relationship between the inspectorate and the industry and exacerbated 
existing mistrust of the Department by senior corporate management and of corporate 
management by many inspectors. That mistrust is now so deep that the 2005 New 
South Wales Mine Safety Review, based on broad ranging stakeholder submissions 
and its own investigations, concluded it was a major contributor to the breakdown in 
cooperation between mining companies, unions, and the Mines Inspectorate in their 
collective attempts to improve WHS processes (Wran & McClelland 2005). A similar 
conclusion was reached by the New South Wales Minerals Council, which maintains 
that a lack of trust remains the most significant impediment to improving the safety 
climate within the mining industry (New South Wales Minerals Council 2005). 
 
Things have not always been thus. Mine managers and those who have most direct 
contact with the inspectorate commonly indicate that relations had once been cordial 
and constructive but that now they are now strained and distant. Indeed, mine 
operators and industry associations widely report that trust between themselves and 
the mining inspectorate is at an all-time low (New South Wales Minerals Council 2005).  
 
This dramatic change in relations between the inspectorate and the mining industry is 
attributed largely to a widespread perception within the industry that, subsequent to the 
Gretley disaster, not only has the inspectorate conducted itself in an adversarial 
fashion with an emphasis on prosecution but those prosecutions are taking place in 
circumstances where there is no genuine blameworthiness. That is, there is a 
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widespread and deeply held view within the mining industry that even managers whom 
are conscientious as to their WHS responsibilities are vulnerable to prosecution. As 
one manager, echoing the sentiments of many others, told us:  
 
The nature of accident investigation …. it's almost automatic that somebody's 
guilty, because management's in control of the system. And it's not a matter of 
just pure reckless, and deal with that, fair enough, but it's when very innocent, 
very hardworking and systematic people get caught out for whatever reason. So 
that breeds big mistrust.  
 
The fact that current enforcement policy is viewed as unfair by mining industry 
employers, managers, and other principal duty holders has, in itself, resulted in a 
breakdown of trust between the inspectorate and industry. Here, mistrust is intimately 
connected to a sense of unfairness and injustice (coupled with an increased sense of 
vulnerability to prosecution). Irrespective of whether this perception of unfairness is an 
objectively reasonable one or a substantial over-reaction to the inspectorate's 
prosecution policy – and there are many, including not just trade unionists but also 
academics who would take the latter view (Foster 2006a; 2006b) – it is a sociological 
truism that what is perceived to be real is real in its consequences. 
 
This perception of unfairness is closely connected with the fact that prosecutions for 
WHS offences, if not strict liability (as in some jurisdictions they are) can be undertaken 
at a relatively low point in the culpability hierarchy (a very low threshold of negligence). 
In New South Wales prior to Gretley, this was not an issue because prosecutions were 
so rare as to be virtually unheard of. But in jurisdictions where prosecutions have been 
more common, they have tended to attract only small penalties (and these usually 
against corporations not individuals). Such penalties are seen as appropriate in so far 
as they are “indicative of the inherent difficulty associated with assessing the 
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appropriate penalty …. where conviction is not the result of individual criminal 
culpability in the normally understood sense” (McCallum et al 2004, 10). That is, low 
penalties were the quid pro quo for imposing liability in circumstances where there was 
little evidence of culpability. However, such low penalties also send out the unfortunate 
signal that breaches of WHS law are ‘not really criminal’ and, for this reason, 
understandably aroused the ire of trade unions and some social reformers (Carson & 
Johnstone 1990). But they did not cause any particular angst to employers or 
managers, any more that did the effectively non-prosecution policy of the pre-Gretley 
period. 
 
However, in New South Wales, as we have seen, political pressure for increased levels 
of prosecution and higher penalties, coupled with public sympathy for the Gretley 
miners and their families, has resulted in substantial penalties being imposed both on 
the operators and owners and on an individual manager, but without insisting on a 
comparable degree of culpability, and this lies at the heart of mining industries current 
grievances, and the sense of injustice and unfairness which, almost without exception 
we found amongst members of management we interviewed.  
 
However, although the new prosecutions policy has been the principal contributor to 
mistrust between the inspectorate and the mining industry it is not the only such cause. 
Senior company representatives also pointed to the role of the Department within 
which the inspectorate is located, which they said had failed to honour commitments 
made in consultations over the implementation of new regulations. For example, 
companies believed that the Department gave assurances that the use of non-flame-
proof diesel would be approved, only to be informed subsequently that was not the 
case. Further examples of such purportedly misleading behaviour, where the 
Department had reportedly agreed (albeit informally) to changes in the regulations, 
only for them to subsequently renege, include allowing the use of aluminium, and 
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changing the definition of the hazardous zone from 100m from the entrance to be much 
closer to the mine site, notwithstanding that New South Wales mines have low gas 
levels. Similarly, some of the regional inspectors were also perceived to have 
compromised their relationship with mining companies in a variety of ways, such as by 
circulating official letters including statements previously made to them by mine site 
managers in private conversations. Thus there is a perception that commitments have 
not been made in good faith and perhaps that negotiations preceding such 
commitments were not conducted honestly. Either or both of these perceptions can 
serve to threaten or destroy trust. 
 
The mistrust of the inspectorate by senior corporate management is mirrored by the 
inspectorate's mistrust of senior management, who were particularly singled out by a 
number of our inspectoral respondents. According to one: “I wouldn't trust them as far 
as you could kick them. They have deliberately down-staffed mine sites” while another 
suggested that “some groups are making huge profits, and are covering up flaws”. 
Most inspectors had little faith in corporate WHS initiatives and most expressed 
scepticism at the value and accuracy of corporate standards, particularly internal 
auditing. Some suggested that they not infrequently found basic breaches of the 
regulations at mines that have been recently been given a ‘clean bill of health’ by 
corporate audits. Further, several inspectors suggested that the audits themselves 
were designed to look better than the reality on the ground and one claimed that 
reported improvements are ‘self-delusional’. Others suggested that that some 
companies were not sincere about their stated commitments, as evidenced by their 
failure to invest more resources in WHS. Here, mistrust is primarily a product of 
perceptions that senior management does not “walk the talk” and make commitments 
in good faith. However, not all of corporate management is seen in such a negative 
light, and some companies were acknowledged to “have fairly good attitudes, and try to 
do the right thing”. 
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Finally, an inconsistency in enforcement style between different categories of 
inspectors (namely, electrical and mechanical engineering on the one hand, and mines 
inspectors on the other) has also served to exacerbate the current climate of mistrust. 
As a result of all these factors, the relationship between the inspectorate and the 
mining companies was described by one senior corporate officer as having reached 
‘rock bottom’ – a view endorsed by many others (see, for example, Wran & McClelland 
2005). 
 
As to the consequences of mistrust in terms of regulatory effectiveness, there is 
unfortunately, no credible statistical evidence. Certainly there is no correlation between 
an increase in prosecution and improved WHS performance, but the new policy has 
been in place for only a limited period and it is plausible that there would be a time lag 
before any positive relationship became apparent (Galvin 2005). But in any event, as 
numerous commentators and reports have pointed out, neither LTIFR, nor the various 
workers compensation statistics, provide more than the crudest indication of actual 
injury rates and, even if they did, this might not be a helpful predictor of the likelihood of 
low-frequency high-consequence events (Hopkins 1995). And while the number of 
fatalities can be relied upon as a much more accurate figure, the numbers from year to 
year are too low to be relied upon in statistical terms, and for reasons indicated earlier, 
broader comparative data is not available. 
 
Turning to soft data, however, the accounts of the various stakeholders are fairly 
consistent as to the adverse consequences of mistrust. Specifically, there is a 
consensus view amongst corporate managers, and a majority view at mine sites 
visited, and amongst inspectors interviewed for this study, that a breakdown of trust 
has resulted in a dysfunctional relationship between the inspectorate and the industry 
and that this is seriously compromising the achievement of better safety outcomes. Our 
respondents suggested that there are a variety of ways in which this appears to be 
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playing out. In the following account we attempt to connect our respondents' 
descriptions with what is known from the broader regulatory literature. We also note 
that our findings in this regard are entirely consistent with those of the New South 
Wales Mine Safety Review (Wran & McClelland 2005), although we have been able to 
go into substantially more depth than that review in exploring the consequences of 
mistrust. 
 
An effective inspection and enforcement policy involves a constructive dialogue 
between duty holders and inspectors. The meaning of compliance is often ambiguous 
and there is no single accepted understanding of how regulatory requirements should 
be interpreted and applied. Such dialogue and negotiation is especially important at the 
bottom of the regulatory ‘enforcement pyramid’ where the regulator is appealing to the 
better nature of the regulated (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). Trust will be particularly 
important to such negotiation and research suggests that compliance levels are likely 
to be higher where regulators treated the regulated with trust (Braithwaite & Makkai 
1994).34 But where relations between regulator and regulated have largely broken 
down and mistrust is rife, then the sort of constructive dialogue and repeated, 
reciprocal interactions that generate shared expectations about compliance and 
improved compliance outcomes, are no longer possible (Braithwaite 2002; May 2005). 
As Braithwaite (1993, 80) has argued:  
 
We have a greater chance of efficient and effective regulation if we have a 
regulatory culture where [regulators and regulated] actually listen to each other 
and respect the concerns of the other; we have a lesser chance of cost-effective 
regulation if these two constituencies see their mission as to destroy the other, 
taking it in turns to win battles without either side winning the war. 
                                                
34 Braithwaite & Makkai (1994) suggested that this was because if those who are being 
regulated are treated as worthy of trust they will repay that trust with voluntary compliance.  
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In the case of the mining industry, Braithwaite's assertion is amply supported in a 
variety of ways. First, the two-way flow of information that is so important to effective 
communication between the inspectorate and the industry has almost completely 
broken down. For example one corporate submission to 2005 Mine Safety Review 
asserted that:  
 
…. lessons learned from fatalities in NSW are delayed for in excess of 2 years 
due to protracted prosecution ….. The litigants remain ‘tight-lipped’ throughout 
the prosecution process so little information disseminates about causal factors 
and prevention (Xstrata 2005, 50). 
 
Numerous industry respondents and inspectors made precisely the same point, 
contrasting the relatively open and honest exchanges that took place between 
inspectors and mine management pre-Gretley, in which information was freely 
exchanged, and documentation provided voluntarily, with the current reluctance of 
mine management to share information and unwillingness to consult regulators for fear 
that their disclosures will be used against them. For example, according to one 
inspector:  
 
It just makes your job harder you won't get to the true story. I say to them, just 
tell us the truth so we can fix it. Little bit, bit by bit, you can try to work it out, but 
it takes longer. And sometimes, you might not get the right outcomes because 
you don't get to the root cause. Years ago, they used to be much more open. 
 
Similarly, another told us that:  
 
Earlier, mines were open and honest with information, responded to questions 
and provided documentation. Now, after prosecutions of individuals, they are 
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guarded, and tentative to let go of information, even if the Investigation Unit is 
not involved …. Managers say they will not talk to you without a lawyer present. 
This happens 10-20 per cent of the time.  
 
Crucially, both management and inspectors are in agreement that the willingness of 
mines to provide a free and frank flow of information to the inspectorate has been 
fundamentally undermined. 
 
A second and related consequence was that fear of prosecution may also inhibit in-firm 
accident investigation, prevention and remedial action. Inspectors reported that this 
shift in approach has impacted substantially on their relationship with mine managers: 
“Mostly, managers are just guarded and frightened of where it is going to go. They 
don't trust us because that's where it could go with prosecutions”. As one manager 
reluctantly noted “you are concerned about how much you do tell the Department . . . 
even though my attitude is a fairly open attitude . . . and I don't like keeping secrets”. 
This attitude is reflected at the corporate level, where one corporate executive, voicing 
a common view, acknowledged “that the company is reluctant to engage in full 
disclosure”. Managers had reportedly become “more cautious and defensive” and this 
in turn had diminished their willingness to cooperate and learn from past experience. 
 
Third, for companies who perceive themselves as willing to comply voluntarily, or to go 
‘beyond compliance’, the fear of ‘unjust’ prosecution may also have a number of other 
unintended consequences, for example, a reluctance to report incidents:  
 
In the past …. when someone was really seriously hurt, [they] …. would come in 
and they'd do a reasonably thorough review. Nowdays, they're actually 
investigating incidents that …. haven't had a serious outcome, which is negative 
in itself, because it may stop the free reporting of those [incidents].  
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This resonates with the point that has been made by Reason (1997, 195) that 
developing a ‘reporting culture’ (to gather the right kinds of data) is an important step in 
establishing a safety culture but the former relies heavily upon the willingness of the 
workforce and managers to report incidents and near-misses and on how the issues of 
blame and punishment are handled. When members of management fear that any 
reporting of incidents and near-misses may be punished, then this will have a chilling 
effect on accident and incident investigation and reporting, and a ‘no-blame’ culture will 
be seriously threatened.35 
 
This is also consistent with evidence from other areas of regulation that suggests that 
where managers who are making good-faith attempts to comply fear that they may 
nevertheless be vulnerable to enforcement action, they become less cooperative with 
regulators (Shapiro & Rabinowitz 1997; Shapiro 1987). Lacking trust in the regulator's 
even-handedness, they refuse to do more than minimally comply, and relinquish all 
previous efforts to go beyond compliance. They may even, as Bardach & Kagan (1982) 
suggest, develop a ‘culture of regulatory resistance’ where more effort is made to 
challenge the regulator than it is to improve WHS. Indeed, Haines (1997, 219-220) 
argues that there is a risk of creating ‘chronically mistrustful corporations’ and that once 
this mistrust has become embedded in the corporate psyche as a result of the threat of 
prosecution it may become extremely difficult to rebuild trust. Like Haines, we found 
that such companies may redirect their effort to reducing their vulnerability to scrutiny 
and potential prosecution, giving priority to protecting themselves from the risk of 
possible prosecution rather than continuous improvement of WHS outcomes. Routinely 
                                                
35 Compare for example the extremely poor performance of the criminal justice system as it 
functions in the United States of America, with the impressive success of airline safety 
regulation. As John Braithwaite has pointed out, the criminal justice institutions detract from 
prevention by focusing on punishment and deterrence while the air safety institutions seek to 
foster prevention through a ‘no-blame philosophy which is committed to correcting mistakes as 
opposed to punishing failings’ (Braithwaite 2005, 283-306; Wilf-Miron et al 2003, 35-9).   
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involving corporate lawyers from the very earliest stage of an accident investigation – a 
practice that had been highly unusual prior to Gretley – was the most obvious 
manifestation among our corporate respondents of this new defensive approach. 
Fourth, individual prosecutions against statutory office holders may make it difficult to 
attract well-qualified applicants to such positions and reduce the skills base of the 
industry. According to the Mine Managers Association of Australia:  
 
The approach taken by the Department to prosecution and the impossibly high 
standard set by the application of the duty of care is negatively impacting on 
safety in the coal industry. This is causing an exodus of the more experienced 
and capable coal mine manager, together with other supervisory personnel from 
statutory positions (see Wran & McClelland 2005, Appendix 6, 45). 
 
Several corporate managers support this view in reporting increasing difficulty in 
recruiting staff to fill statutory positions. They were able to point to several specific 
instances where individuals had declined such appointments, including both new 
graduate recruits (scared off by a perceived vulnerability of statutory positions in the 
industry), and more seasoned staff, unwilling to ‘put themselves in the firing line’. 
 
Finally, the new prosecution policy has substantially changed the behavior of many 
inspectors who for the most part have now adopted a defensive, risk-averse strategy 
whereby they no longer provide advice for fear that this advice might be used as a 
defence by mining companies in future prosecutions. Thus many of the inspectors we 
interviewed were adamant that “they are not there to run the mines” and they are “not 
allowed to make recommendations” (a marked contrast to their former “advise and 
persuade” mode of operation). As one inspector pointed out: “you have to be very clear 
and concise about your instructions”. Mine managers expressed similar views about 
the ability of inspectors to impart practical advice: 
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You've only got to look these days mate at the way the inspector operates. They 
just basically take a hands-off approach now. They don't offer you any advice 
because they're fearful that you'll make a note and say yeah so and so told me 
to do this. So there's this huge dynamic there of mistrust right from the top and it 
filters all the way down.  
 
The prosecutorial approach has also changed other inspectoral practices. For 
example, with the increasing likelihood of prosecution, any interaction between the 
inspectorate and a mine site might subsequently result in formal enforcement action 
with the result that documentation has became much more important and this also 
constraints interactions between the parties. Thus formal notices are now preferred 
because “a verbal instruction is only as good as the paper it is written on” but this in 
turn is hardly conducive to an open exploration of what might have gone wrong and 
why.  
 
It may also be that a prosecution policy that is perceived to be fundamentally unfair is 
undermining the general belief in the legitimacy of regulatory requirements. Certainly 
there is evidence from other studies that if regulated enterprises mistrust the regulator 
and believe that regulations are being used strategically, with regard to purposes and 
values with which they fundamentally disagree, then they are far less motivated to 
comply with these requirements (Tyler 1990; Scholz & Lubell 1998). 
 
As Hawkins & Hutter (1993, 204) point out, many companies comply with the law not 
for instrumental reasons but rather:  
 
…. because they feel they should comply as a matter of moral principle (thus it is 
morally right that you do not, say, jeopardise your employees' health and safety); 
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or they comply in recognition of the legitimacy of the law (it is not right to violate 
a law …. whether or not you agree with that law).  
 
For such companies where regulation is perceived as unreasonable, or fundamentally 
unfair, then the law loses its legitimacy and regulated enterprises lose their moral 
commitment to compliance (Tyler & Degoey 1995, 53-92). This indeed can lead to a 
reciprocal adversarial legal posture on the part of the industry. In the New South Wales 
case, this appears to be already happening. At the time of writing, the industry is 
actively contemplating taking legal action against the inspectorate with regard to the 
use of non-flame-proof diesel in underground mines and has already launched an 
unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the criminal law jurisdiction of the New South 
Wales Industrial Commission (Powercoal Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of 
NSW (2005) 156 A Crim R 269). 
 
7.5 Where next? 
  
Given the important role of trust in nurturing compliance, and the damaging 
consequences of the sort of mistrust that currently characterises relationships between 
the regulator and regulated in New South Wales, what should be done? How in 
particular might it be possible to reduce levels of mistrust and so achieve more 
effective compliance? How might it be possible to shift from an atmosphere of fear to 
one of mutual respect and partnership? 
 
The international evidence-based research suggests that “the key to creating trust is to 
act in ways that citizens will experience to be fair” (Murphy 2004, 189; see also Lind & 
Tyler 1988; Tyler & Degoey 1995) and as indicated earlier, those who perceive that 
they have been treated fairly are more likely not only to trust the regulator but also to 
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accept its decisions and comply with its requirements. To achieve a perception of 
fairness would require a much more nuanced prosecution policy. Currently, 
prosecution against those who neither intended harm nor were reckless in their 
behaviour (epitomised in the Gretley decision) is widely perceived to be unjust, and this 
has caused the law to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of duty-holders. It has also 
generated a defensiveness on their part that results in an unwillingness to examine the 
root causes of WHS incidents for fear of being prosecuted. 
 
In the case of the mining industry, a more balanced approach requires that, rather than 
prosecuting routinely in the case of fatalities or serious injuries (irrespective of the level 
of culpability) prosecution only takes place against genuine ‘bad apples’ that are widely 
regarded as deserving of prosecution. This approach would enable the inspectorate to 
maintain a constructive dialogue with the majority of employers and achieve the large 
majority of their compliance goals without resort to prosecution and without alienating 
otherwise willing ‘volunteers’ and generating mistrust. Put differently, what is needed is 
to steer a middle path that neither rejects prosecution as an important deterrent at the 
top of the ‘Braithwaitian’ enforcement pyramid, nor uses it in circumstances where it is 
likely to do more harm than good. Achieving such a balanced approach will not be 
easy. On the one hand, the evidence suggests that the sort of extreme ‘advise and 
persuade’ policy that the New South Wales inspectorate adopted pre-Gretley will fail to 
send appropriate deterrent signals to the recalcitrant. On the other hand, the sort of 
zealous prosecution policy that New South Wales has subsequently applied to fatalities 
demonstrably will also fail in preventative terms. 
 
Elsewhere, Gunningham (2007, Chapter 8) has proposed an alternative approach to 
prosecution that: (i) focuses on risk rather than consequences; (ii) takes previous track 
record seriously (and makes escalation up an enforcement pyramid credible); and 
(iii) emphasises that prosecution should not take place in the absence of culpability 
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(Gunningham 2007, Chapter 8). For these purposes, it has been argued that culpability 
should mean a substantial falling short of reasonable expectations (a form of 
negligence), recklessness or intent. The actual decision to prosecute, it has been 
suggested, should be based on a calculus that takes account of all three of the above 
factors. This approach would ensure that prosecution takes place even where no injury 
results (exposure to risk, irrespective of consequences, being at the heart of WHS 
regulation). It would also enable the inspectorate to target failures of risk management, 
and to focus on general patterns of failure to attend to risk despite warnings, while also 
reserving the right to take action in the absence of poor past history if there was high 
culpability (intent or recklessness) coupled with a high degree of risk/potential for 
extreme consequences. Such an approach would do much to restore legitimacy to the 
prosecution process, while ensuring that serious breaches of WHS legislation, and 
those who did not give serious attention to complying with WHS law, were firmly dealt 
with.  
 
This approach does not imply a need for multiple prosecutions, because the literature 
suggests that a distinction must be made between the actual chances of detection and 
punishment, and the perceptions thereof. What is important is the belief that duty 
holders have of the likelihood and degree of punishment, even if, in actual fact, that 
belief is overstated (Simpson 2002). Even a handful of prosecutions in the course of a 
year can achieve this effect provided the ‘right’ cases are chosen. That handful of 
prosecutions will, however, play a crucially important role at the tip of an enforcement 
pyramid, for without them less coercive policies at the lower levels of the pyramid lose 
their credibility. 
 
Yet despite the difficulties of achieving such a balanced approach, there is evidence 
that some inspectors (albeit a minority), relying far more on past experience and their 
own intuition than on regulatory theory, are already practicing a form of responsive 
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regulation that approximates what is recommended above. And they are doing so, 
notwithstanding the heavy-handed edicts of their department to take a tough 
enforcement stance. Moreover, in the minority of cases where we identified this 
approach there was evidence that is was working well and that levels of trust at mine 
site level (that is, between the inspector and mine management) were relatively high. 
Thus we found a minority of mines that were remarkably positive in their description of 
dealings with the inspectorate, and who reported high levels of trust and cooperation in 
circumstances where the inspectors rejected a heavy handed enforcement role while at 
the same time being tough when they needed to be:  
 
The inspectorate? I have had very good relations with them. Despite changing 
expectations on inspectors, the one we have is very good. They are experienced 
and capable people who want to coach and counsel, and really only pull out the 
big guns if you are recalcitrant. 
 
Inspectors in this category were not enthusiastic about their new role as ‘police’, and 
resisted performing as such:  
 
I see myself as helping with the direction and networking information, to make 
sure that people comply, but in a very practical way. [I] have developed a clear 
understanding over a very long period.  
 
Another told us:  
 
I'm probably more tolerant than other inspectors. I like to offer advice. I might 
support sites to get more resources by giving them [management] a rev-up.  
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A third described himself as still “80 per cent advisor and 20 per cent policeman”. For 
inspectors in this minority group, the consensus view is that if mines are ‘up front’ with 
any transgressions, and are willing to work constructively with the inspectorate towards 
a solution, then they, as inspectors, are far less likely to resort to a punitive approach:  
 
My approach depends on how they respond. If they are cooperative, and want to 
move forward, I'll probably just issue an advice notice. If we have talked it 
through and agreed, we can fix it up and move on. If they can't or won't see the 
issues, then I will give them a directive. I generally get cooperation from senior 
mine management – not too many are blockers, but there are exceptions to the 
rule.  
 
Some inspectors in this group took the view that the best way of overcoming mistrust is 
to be ‘straight’ with the mine sites, for example: “I flag it in advance if I'm looking at a 
serious breach”. It is asserted that this approach is mostly likely to yield a reciprocal 
response although not all will do so”.  
 
In short, a minority of inspectors described conducting inspections in a manner not 
dissimilar to that advocated by responsive regulation (Ayers & Braithwaite 1992), 
where they began by advice and persuasion and only invoked prosecution when a 
softer approach proved unsuccessful. Although they acknowledged that many of their 
peers had a greater preference for prosecution, clearly this was not the case across 
the board. And the large majority of engineering inspectors in particular, seemed to 
have retained the trust of their counterparts in industry and to have maintained a 
constructive dialogue with them.36 Indeed, it seemed that the greater the relational 
                                                
36 Engineering inspectors, by and large, do not have much to do with mine managers, and 
mainly interact with their engineering counterparts, electrical or mechanical, at the mine-site 
level. They have even less to do with corporate managers. As such, engineering inspectors, 
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distance between the parties, the greater the level of mistrust was likely to be. As we 
have seen, inspectors and senior management were extremely critical of each other, 
but it was not uncommon to find a more constructive relationship between mine 
managers and the inspector who were in regular and direct contact.  
 
However, in New South Wales, as we have seen, political pressure for increased levels 
of prosecution and higher penalties has resulted in substantial penalties being imposed 
both on the operators and owners and on an individual manager, but without insisting 
on a comparable degree of culpability, and this lies at the heart of the mining industry’s 
current grievances. 
 
Finally, is there a better way to address the complex issue of the culpability than to 
prosecute even in cases of low culpability and either impose relatively trivial penalties 
or impose substantial penalties that are perceived to be grossly unfair? Arguably, a 
way around these difficulties is to provide for a special offence (for example, industrial 
manslaughter) in circumstances where there are “moral, symbolic and retributive 
[reasons for showing] society's intolerance for organisational behaviour causing 
workplace deaths” (Gunningham & Johnstone 1999, 212), or which can be justified in 
preventative terms as being so heinous that the full weight of the ‘real’ criminal law can 
be applied to them. But such an additional tier of liability for offences that are ‘really 
                                                
particularly those with extensive experience, believe they have built up a good rapport with 
mine-site engineers over time. They also claim that dealing with mine-site engineers is easier: 
‘their role is to comply with regulations and to work safely. They are more willing to talk openly. 
They don't mind sharing their experiences. This exposes their vulnerabilities — they wouldn't do 
it if they didn't trust me’. Engineering inspectors also point out that they have been able to 
nurture trust through open meetings, usually quarterly, with representatives from each mine in 
the district. Not only is attendance high (reportedly, in the order of 95–100 per cent), but the 
meetings are described as being ‘frank’ and productive. It is made clear to participants that they 
are free to raise issues without fear of prosecution and for this reason no minutes are taken at 
these meetings. 
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criminal’ would imply a requisite mental element of intent or recklessness coupled with 
serious consequences: severe injury or death. A number of jurisdictions have been 
exploring this general approach in recent years, particularly with regard to the 
introduction of a new offence of ‘industrial manslaughter’ (Hall et al 2004; Foster 2006, 
79). 
 
Consistent with this general approach, New South Wales enacted the Occupational 
Health and Safety Amendment (Workplace Deaths) Act 2005. This legislation amended 
the WHS Act 2000 (NSW), the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 
(NSW), and the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 to include a new offence with a maximum 
penalty of $1.6 million for corporations and $165,000 and/or imprisonment of 5 years 
for individuals, where a breach of safety legislation results in death at a workplace. 
According to the Minister, this targets the small minority of employers (so called ‘rogue 
employers’) who demonstrate little or no regard for the safety of their workers and are 
reckless or intentional in their behaviour (Foster 2006, 107-110). The introduction of 
this legislation however, does not (at least in principle) diminish the role of prosecution 
under the WHS Act with regard to reckless conduct in the absence of death (or injury). 
 
7.6 The political dimension 
 
While adopting the much more modulated and balanced prosecution policy advocated 
above would be a considerable step forward, it will solve only part of the problem. 
Much of the blame for the current conflict between the inspectorate and the industry 
lies not with the inspectorate but with trade union and employer groups who have 
sought to reshape government enforcement policies. 
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Trade unions and mining communities – especially following a fatality or serious injury 
have argued strongly in favour of prosecution, even against those whose culpability is 
low. After the Gretley disaster, it was the trade unions that held sway, and the 
subsequent prosecutions of individual managers owed much to trade union demands 
for retribution. And the mining unions have continued to argue for “a vigorous system of 
enforcement aimed at industry compliance with the current legislation” (Benmedjdoub 
& Kotevski 2004).  
 
This in turn has generated a strong reaction from mining companies, managers, and 
other statutory position holders who suggest that prosecution should be reserved for a 
small minority of ‘rogues’ which they equate with the reckless and wilful. This political 
campaign to weaken the existing legal provisions and to overturn the current 
prosecution policy, has been gaining considerable momentum. A number of employer 
groups have launched strong attacks on WHS laws and their enforcement. In 2007 the 
then Prime Minister, John Howard, wrote to State Premiers on the matter (WHS News 
2007; Australian Financial Review 2007) and the New South Wales government has 
set up an inquiry to examine contemplated changes to the WHS Act 2000 which would 
dilute the employers' duty of care and the obligations of company officers. In response 
the CFMEU has asserted that such changes would generate a ‘race to the bottom’ and 
accused Howard of pushing for ‘lowest common denominator’ standards (WHS News 
2007).  
 
Against this backdrop of a swinging political pendulum and acrimonious adversarialism, 
what options are available? It has been argued that responsive regulation has 
considerable virtues in nurturing trust and encouraging voluntary compliance on the 
part of the majority, while maintaining the law's punitive capacity at the tip of the 
enforcement pyramid in order to deter the recalcitrant minority. But steering a middle 
path between the competing objectives of trade unions and mining companies to 
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achieve this result is a substantial challenge, and regulators frequently find themselves 
between a rock and a hard place. Crucially, in seeking a viable way forward, regulators 
confront what has been appositely termed the “compliance trap” (Parker 2006). This 
comes about as follows. 
 
In the case of contemporary WHS law, the most credible penalty is the prosecution of 
individual managers. While fines against corporations may be insufficient to influence 
their behaviour (a few hundred thousand dollars at most, to a multi-national 
corporation, hardly breaks the bank), the prosecution of individuals is a far more 
serious matter. Even if the fine is unlikely to reach six figures, it is a traumatising and 
stigmatising matter for a manager to be hauled before a criminal tribunal or court. In 
terms of responsive regulation, managers can be viewed as ‘soft targets’ who can be 
motivated by lesser penalties (coupled with personal stigma and shaming) than ‘hard 
targets’ (such as corporations) which are far more difficult to motivate (Braithwaite 
2002). 
 
But it is the prosecution of individuals (particularly in the Gretley case) that has 
provoked such a massive reaction from the mining industry, which views such 
penalties as grossly unfair and as sending an unacceptable message about the moral 
seriousness of the offence and the ‘criminality’ of individual managers. And it has also 
promoted a political reaction: there have been demands for the dilution of WHS laws, 
especially the duty of care imposed on employers and provisions relating to the 
culpability of managers, and for a winding back of enforcement.  
 
Parker (2006) would argue that this is precisely what one would expect, and that what 
has just been described is a classic example of the ‘compliance trap’. For her:  
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…. where fulsome political and moral support for the enforcement regime is 
lacking, then the compliance trap is set. Responsive regulators find themselves 
in a dilemma: [ensure effective deterrence] by making morally tough demands 
that may not only undermine business commitment to compliance in the longer 
term (because they lack political legitimacy), but also undermine their own 
political support (because business will respond by lobbying government to 
emasculate the regulatory enforcement agency). Or avoid conflict with 
businesses by not making any difference at all …. It is a compliance trap 
because it occurs only when regulators are actively seeking to improve 
business compliance and commitment to compliance through their 
enforcement activity …. It is a trap because, in the absence of external political 
support, there is nothing the regulator can do to escape. The regulator must 
either choose weakness (no compliance impact) or have weakness thrust upon 
it (lack of legitimacy leading to emasculation) …. The compliance trap can only 
be resolved politically, external to any particular enforcement encounter. 
(Parker 2006, 593) 
 
However, while Parker identifies an important dynamic and a difficult dilemma for any 
enforcement agency, is her overall conclusion too bleak? In contrast to some other 
contexts (including Parker's own case study of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission) the mining industry and their industry associations are not the 
only means of external political support for the regulator. At times, and particularly 
following mining disasters during the tenure of state Labor governments, the trade 
unions rather than the mining companies have had the ear of government ministers at 
least to the extent of influencing enforcement prosecution policy (as in the Gretley case 
itself). 
 
  
197 
But to rely on trade unions as a counter to undue pressure from the industry would be 
a mistake. During the course of coal mining history in Australia, the pendulum of 
bargaining power has swung between management and workers largely in accordance 
with the rise and fall of coal markets. And each side has taken full advantage of its 
temporary ascendancy to impose unpalatable conditions upon the other. The cyclical 
nature of this phenomenon and the ‘tit for tat’ industrial relationship this has generated 
has itself exacerbated distrust between management and workers, and is likely to do 
so again in the future. 
 
Another, more constructive possibility, is to seek some middle ground in terms of 
prosecution policy along the lines above. Doing so would avoid the trap of signalling 
that breaches of workplace safety legislation are ‘not really criminal’ because the 
penalties imposed are trivial (Carson 1970), while at the same time avoiding 
prosecuting those whose culpability is so low as to be perceived by the industry to be 
unjust. Since many large and influential corporations have already committed 
themselves to substantial improvements in WHS and are striving to go beyond 
compliance, such a policy need not be politically unacceptable to the industry. 
 
It may well, however, be politically unacceptable to key trade unions. This takes us to 
the tension between prevention and retribution.37 While the unions demand retribution 
against middle-level managers guilty, at most, of sins of omission in circumstances 
where there is evidence that their peers, in similar circumstances, would have taken 
the same decision, then little progress seems possible. The way out of this dilemma 
                                                
37 The goal for those who seek retribution is not an instrumental concern to improve future WHS 
performance, but rather to satisfy feelings of revenge and to achieve ‘justice’ in the victim's (or 
their family's) terms (Dobbs 1989, 844). 
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may be to pursue not retribution but restorative justice,38 in all but the most egregious 
cases (as regards which industrial manslaughter prosecutions or their equivalent can 
be appropriate in both retributive and deterrence terms) (in this regard, Braithwaite 
argues with considerable empirical support that approaches to regulation that seek to 
identify important problems and fix them work better than those which focus on 
imposing the right punishment or ‘just deserts’). 
 
Although this point has not yet been reached, there are both principled and pragmatic 
reasons why the trade unions should embrace the middle ground. In terms of the 
former, prevention should have a higher priority than retribution,39 and restorative 
justice coupled with prevention will have a substantially greater benefit to their 
members than retribution. In terms of the latter, trade union power is in decline, and for 
some time ahead at least, employer groups are far more likely to have the ear of 
                                                
38 Braithwaite (1993) argues with considerable empirical support that approaches to regulation 
that seek to identify important problems and fix them work better than those which focus on 
imposing the right punishment or ‘just deserts’. For example, beyond a very limited range of 
circumstances, retribution does not ‘work well’, both because it is widely perceived to be unfair 
and because it has counter-productive consequences for prevention. Yet, at the same time, if 
prevention trumps prosecution and retribution is rejected, then the legitimate concerns of victims 
and their families for justice may be ignored. Braithwaite recognises this, and suggests that 
there is a need for others to ‘listen to the stories of our hurts’ before we can move on to solve 
the problem. In this view, restorative justice, ‘a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a 
particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the 
offence and its implications for the future’, shows us the practical paths for moving from healing 
to problem solving (Tony Marshall, quoted in Braithwaite (1993, 11)). 
39 The value position of this chapter is that the primary purpose of prosecution is preventative: to 
reduce the level of work-related injury and disease. Although it does not reject retribution in its 
entirety, it suggests that, to the extent that the two principles are in conflict, prevention should 
be given precedence. Those who believe that the principal role of the criminal law is retribution 
will likely disagree with the analysis made in the chapter. Its virtue, however, is to identify 
principles which, if followed, will send a set of signals that deter ‘bad actors’ from wrongdoing 
without inhibiting ‘good actors’ – or even those capable of becoming good actors under the right 
circumstances – from pursuing strategies conducive to improved workplace safety and health, 
and of building trust in ways that are supportive of improved workplace safety. 
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government. If the trade unions prefer the swinging pendulum to finding the middle 
ground, it may swing in a direction that they will find particularly unpalatable.  
 
Reaching this middle ground is crucial to preventative safety. As Parker (2006) points 
out, for pyramidal enforcement to ‘work’, the law must not only be just but recognised 
as just (or morally appropriate and democratically supported) in order for the pyramid 
of responsive regulation to promote compliance rather than conflict. In her view: “This 
rider should be printed in capital letters on every page of every scholarly or policy-
oriented discussion of responsive business regulation” (Parker 2006, 617). 
 
7.7 Conclusion  
 
The role of prosecution in achieving compliance with social regulation is a highly 
contentious issue. Nowhere is this more so than with regard to work-related injury and 
death in the New South Wales mining industry. Following the Gretley disaster, the 
Department abandoned its previous advise and persuade approach in 1998 in favour 
of a new muscular prosecution policy, particularly following fatalities. It has, moreover, 
chosen to prosecute not just companies but also individual mine managers and other 
statutory duty holders.  
 
Our fieldwork, consistent with other evidence, suggests that while a traditional advise 
and persuade approach can lead to a regulatory capture and a failure of enforcement, 
a muscular prosecution policy, particularly if it includes individuals with a low degree of 
culpability, can be almost equally counterproductive. Where relationships between 
inspectors and the regulated industry are frequent and ongoing, then trust is central to 
constructive relations between them, and effective inspection and enforcement 
depends far more on a dialogue between these stakeholders (and ideally with workers 
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too) than it does upon the unilateral imposition of rules by the regulator on the 
regulated. When that relationship breaks down (as it may under an inappropriate 
prosecution policy) then communication ceases, information is withheld rather than 
shared, in-firm accident investigation, prevention and remedial action are inhibited, and 
both sides retreat into a form of adversarialism that seriously impedes productive 
outcomes. Ultimately, the sort of responsive and pyramidal enforcement strategy that 
has been widely advocated becomes untenable. Thus, how law is enforced can be as 
important in damaging trust as it can be in nurturing it. Today, according to the New 
South Wales Mine Safety Review, a “debilitating mistrust between the members of the 
tripartite process” is a principal obstacle to improved WHS in the mining industry (Wran 
& McClelland 2005, 7). 
 
Trust is much easier to break down than it is to rebuild, but such rebuilding is 
nevertheless possible, but only with the adoption of a much more nuanced and 
balanced enforcement policy. Such an approach would ensure that prosecution takes 
place even where no injury results, it would enable the inspectorate to target failures of 
risk management, and it would ensure that serious breaches of WHS legislation were 
firmly dealt with. But, crucially, it would also emphasise that prosecution should not 
take place in the absence of culpability and, in doing so, it would do much to restore 
legitimacy to the prosecution process. 
 
But such a policy can only succeed with the acquiescence and ideally the active 
endorsement of key stakeholders on both sides of the industrial relations divide. Such 
agreement will not be easy to achieve, given the decades of bitterness and animosity 
that have characterised relations in the mining industry. Yet, if this middle ground is not 
achieved, the mines inspectorates face only two alternatives. Either they can continue 
to prosecute in circumstances that the industry perceives as unjust – and risk political 
emasculation. Or they can do as many regulators have done in the past, and engage in 
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little more than tokenistic enforcement, bordering on regulatory capture (sometimes 
referred to as ‘enforcement by wet lettuce’ – as contrasted with the use of the 
traditional big stick). This strategy will cause no offence to powerful employer groups, 
but nor will it succeed in protecting workers from work-related injury, disease or death. 
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Chapter 8: Organisational trust and the limits of 
management-based regulation 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
published in Law & Society Review (Volume 43, Number 4, December, 2009, pages 
865-900). The relative contributions were split 50/50 between Sinclair and 
Gunningham. Sinclair contributed to the fieldwork, the processing of interview material, 
the background research and literature reviews, the preparation of initial drafts and the 
preparation and editing of the final draft.  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
For more than a decade, private enterprise and governments in North America, 
Western Europe, and Australasia have been experimenting with an innovative 
approach to standard-setting variously termed process-based, systems-based, or 
management-based regulation (Coglianese & Lazar 2003; Gunningham & Johnstone 
1999, Chapter 2). In contrast to traditional prescriptive standards (which tell duty 
holders precisely what measures to take) or performance standards (which specify 
outcomes or the desired level of performance), this approach involves firms developing 
their own process and management system standards, and developing internal 
planning and management practices designed to achieve regulatory or corporate 
goals. Such standards, whether they are imposed by the firm on its various operations 
(internal regulation), or by governments on firms or industry associations on their 
members (external regulation), have the considerable attractions of providing flexibility 
to enterprises to devise their own least-cost solutions to social challenges, of facilitating 
their going beyond compliance with minimum legal standards, and of being applicable 
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to a broad range of circumstances and to heterogeneous enterprises. For present 
purposes, such initiatives are termed management-based regulation. 
 
In part, this new approach was made possible by the development of management 
tools designed to assist firms to focus on systemic problems rather than individual 
deficiencies. Such tools involve the assessment and control of risks and the creation of 
an in-built system of maintenance and review. As such management tools have been 
formalised (for example, through the International Organization for Standardization's 
ISO 14001 environmental management systems standard), many companies have 
seen this as an opportunity to ensure higher consistency across the organisation and 
higher standards within their various operations. Regulators too (and a small number of 
industry associations) have seen an opportunity to harness such standards in the 
development of a new form of regulation: requiring regulated entities to achieve public 
goals through planning, systems of work, or other process-based management 
techniques rather than through remedying individual deficiencies or by achieving 
particular outcomes. Management-based regulation is now to be found in a diversity of 
policy domains including environment protection, food safety, WHS, rail regulation, 
sustainable forestry, toxic chemical reduction, and trades practices (Coglianese & 
Lazar 2003; Coglianese & Nash 2006). 
 
Taken one step further, management-based regulation can become a form of ‘meta-
regulation’ or ‘meta-risk management’ in which government (or corporations seeking to 
regulate their multiple facilities), rather than regulating directly, can risk-manage the 
risk management of individual enterprises or facilities. Under such an approach, the 
role of regulation ceases to be primarily about inspectors or auditors checking 
compliance with rules and becomes more about encouraging the industry or facility to 
put in place processes and management systems that are then scrutinized by 
regulators or corporate auditors. Rather than regulating prescriptively, meta-regulation 
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seeks to stimulate modes of self-organisation within the firm in such a way as to 
encourage internal self-critical reflection about its performance (Parker 2002). 
 
From the above it will be apparent that management-based regulation (and meta-
regulation) can take a variety of forms. Following Coglianese & Nash (2006, 14), these 
can be classified in terms of: (i) government initiatives where management-based 
strategies are either mandated (as with the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points food 
safety certification program) or encouraged (as with regulatory flexibility and negotiated 
agreements); and (ii) nongovernmental approaches, which are either mandated (as in 
the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, or when an enterprise requires its 
various operations/sites to adhere to this approach) or encouraged (when individual 
operations within the enterprise are left some discretion as to how to achieve corporate 
goals). The evidence suggests that mandatory management-based regulation "appears 
to have the clearest and strongest effects" (Coglianese & Nash 2006, 251). However, 
given the paucity of empirical evidence, studies of both mandatory and discretionary 
forms must be referred to for the purpose of mapping out what is known about the 
general area. 
 
So how effective are management-based and meta-regulation? Are government 
regulators or corporate decision makers wise to put so many of their eggs into this 
basket? To the extent that this form of regulation falls short of expectations, is this 
inevitable or can its shortcomings be overcome? And what is the relationship between 
management-based regulation and organisational trust? Is it the case, as some have 
claimed, that ‘culture eats systems for breakfast’? These and related questions are 
addressed below. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section summarises what is known 
about how management-based regulation works in practice and the obstacles to its 
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effective implementation. In particular it describes the potential for an absence of 
organisational trust to thwart even the most sophisticated forms of management-based 
regulation. The empirical contribution of the chapter is contained in the third section, 
which describes two case studies of management-based regulation in practice, within 
two separate multisite Australian mining enterprises. The fourth section discusses the 
implications of the findings and suggests that the degree of trust between workers and 
management (and sometimes between other groups) may have a particularly powerful 
impact on the outcomes of such regulation and that particular workplace subcultures 
play a critical role in supporting or undermining management-based regulation. The 
final section concludes. 
 
8.2 Management-based regulation: What the literature tells us 
 
At their best, management-based initiatives have the capacity to influence the internal 
self-regulation and norms of organisations and make them more responsive (rather 
than merely reactive) to social concerns. In theory, they will encourage enterprises to 
‘build in’ regulatory considerations at every stage of the production process, to improve 
their social performance, and to achieve behavioral change (Coglianese & Nash 2006, 
250; Bennear 2006). 
 
However, to what extent these theoretical benefits will be realised in practice is a 
matter for empirical inquiry. Early evaluations have relied primarily on surveys of a wide 
range of secondary sources and tend to be cautiously positive (Bluff 2003; Coglianese 
& Lazar 2003, 724). Others have used small qualitative studies to examine the impact 
of management-based regulation developed by industry associations, such as the 
chemical industry's Responsible Care program, finding at best mixed results (Howard 
et al 1999). There have also been a small number of large N studies primarily 
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examining the impact of environmental management systems on environmental 
outcomes (Bennear 2007; Andrews et al 2003; Andrews et al 2006; Potoski & Prakash 
2005). While some of these studies have found a positive relationship between the 
introduction of management systems and environmental outcomes, others have not 
(Tyteca et al 2002; Hertin et al 2008). Small wonder that an edited collection concerned 
to understand how management-based initiatives have worked to date acknowledges 
that "we know little about the conditions in which [management-based initiatives] work" 
(Coglianese & Nash 2006, 20). 
 
There could be a variety of reasons for these mixed results, including the possibility 
that some companies have adopted such systems (which in environmental protection 
are usually voluntary) for cosmetic reasons – eg, to maintain public legitimacy – rather 
than to improve performance. If so, then the principal problem is not with the system 
itself, but with the motivations of those who adopt it. Indeed it may be that management 
systems, like other process-based tools, are just that – tools – and can only be 
effective when implemented with genuine commitment on the part of management and 
with ownership on the part of the workforce. This is broadly the conclusion of recent 
work in the area of environmental regulation. For example, Gunningham and 
colleagues have found that management style and motivation are more important in 
shaping environmental performance than the system itself, although they do not 
explore in any detail why a particular management style emerges in a particular 
corporation (Gunningham et al 2003, Chapter 5). Nevertheless, this and a number of 
studies in the broader management literature (Sharma & Vredenburg 1998; Sharma 
2000; Egri & Herman 2000), suggest that management matters far more than 
management systems or management-based strategies more broadly. 
 
And even where positive management motivation is present, it may be that lack of 
workforce commitment/ownership still thwarts management intentions. Quite how 
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workers might best be persuaded to comply with corporate edicts has been a matter of 
intense debate spanning literatures across the social sciences. Many of these 
literatures borrow concepts that were developed in broader explorations of legal 
compliance. Thus psychologist Tom Tyler's seminal work concerning why people obey 
the law has been expanded to take account of the related question of how corporations 
shape the behavior of their employees. In both areas, Tyler (2008, 804) argues that 
"people are more likely to obey rules if those rules accord with two important values: 
legitimacy and morality", and that both these values relate closely to procedural 
fairness. Further, he finds compliance is more likely when people perceive the process 
by which such rules are made and applied as being (amongst other things) fair and 
honest, if they are treated with dignity and respect, and if they have the opportunity to 
participate (Tyler 1990; Tyler & Lind 1992). Note that where such values are present, 
rule compliance is likely to be voluntary because people feel a moral obligation to 
comply. The best way to motivate rule compliance then, is by nurturing legitimacy and 
morality. 
 
This approach can be juxtaposed to the traditional rational choice deterrence model, 
which rests on the notion that people are ‘amoral calculators’ whose behavior can be 
best shaped by the fear of imminent legal penalties that exceed the cost of compliance. 
Threat and punishment are asserted to be the best way of deterring people from 
engaging in criminal behavior (Kahan 1999). Translated to an organisational context, 
this model – commonly referred to as ‘hierarchical’ or ‘command and control’ – 
assumes that employees, as rational actors, will behave instrumentally, weighing costs 
and benefits before deciding whether to adhere to company policies and rules. 
Accordingly the organisation must ensure that the latter outweighs the former, which it 
will strive to do via such techniques as surveillance, auditing, and other performance 
tracking mechanisms, coupled with incentives and sanctions. Because employees will 
only comply for extrinsic reasons, there is no possibility (in contrast to a values-based 
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approach) of relying upon intrinsic motivations and self-regulation (Malloy 2003; Tyler 
2008, 856). 
 
But both Tyler's approach and rational choice analyses are located at the level of the 
individual, with a focus on mechanisms that might influence individual persons to obey 
rules, regulations, or corporate edicts. Yet much behavior is group behavior, and in the 
context of the corporation, it is arguably more fruitful to explore compliance with rules 
(whether corporate- or state-based) at the collective rather than at the individual level. 
In this context, one factor that can have a particularly powerful impact on group 
behavior in general and on rule compliance in particular is organisational culture 
(defined as ‘the way we do things around here’, or in more formal terms, as involving 
"shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an 
organization's structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms" (Uttal 
1983, cited in Reason 1997, 192). Morgan (1986, 131), for example, argues not only 
that organisations must be understood as cultural phenomena, but also that we "must 
root our understanding of organization in the processes that produce systems of 
shared meaning". 
 
But in large complex organisations with multiple facilities, such shared meaning cannot 
be taken for granted, even where senior management wishes to cultivate it. If indeed 
organisations are "in essence socially constructed realities that rest as much in the 
heads and minds of their members as they do in concrete sets of rules and relations" 
(Morgan 1986, 131) then scholars may need to know much more about how those 
social constructions evolve and what their consequences may be. It may be for 
example, that attitudes of workers to rules and corporate edicts are rooted in a past 
history of industrial relations conflict and create a counterculture, or that an 
organisation, far from being made up of a single homogeneous culture, comprises a 
number of interdependent subcultures based on such factors as professional affiliation, 
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geographical location, and position in the management hierarchy (Sinclair 1991). How 
these various subcultures interpret rules, their levels of compliance, and thus the extent 
of the gap between ‘the rules in books and the rules in action’ may vary substantially. 
 
Management-based regulation does not ignore the challenges of engaging with group 
behavior. Indeed, its proponents assert that the capacity to achieve cultural change is 
one of its attributes (Welford 1997). But whether, to what extent, or in what 
circumstances this is the case remains a matter of conjecture. Certainly, changing 
cultures is no easy matter, and it may well be far more difficult for senior management 
to manipulate than many organisational theorists assume (Morgan 1986, 139). Yet 
without cultural commitment on the part of those who are expected to implement the 
system, edicts from regulators or (in the case of internal regulation) from senior 
management may be met with creative compliance (McBarnet & Whelan 1999), 
resistance, ‘ritualism’ (Merton 1968; Braithwaite 2008, 140-56), or various other forms 
of tokenism. 
 
One aspect of culture that is often of great significance, particularly in areas of social 
regulation such as environment or WHS, is trust. According to the literature, for 
example, effective worker participation is crucial to improved WHS, but such 
participation is unlikely to be effective in the absence of constructive dialogue between 
the two sides of industry (Gallagher 1997, 6.1; Hale & Hovden 1998, 147-8). And that 
constructive dialogue, in turn, is unlikely to take place in the absence of trust. Indeed, 
trust is often referred to as the lubricant for open and frequent safety communication 
(Reason 1997) and as enhancing cooperation (Morgan & Hunt 1994), promoting the 
acceptance of decisions (Tyler 2003), improving knowledge-sharing (Dirks & Ferrin 
2002), supporting all aspects of organisational functioning (Bijlsma-Frankema & 
Koopman 2003), and resulting in enhanced safety performance (Barling & Hutchinson 
2000, 77). 
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In practice the lack of trust may be a (and sometimes the) key impediment to improved 
WHS. This is particularly the case where the regulated entity has considerable 
discretion in how it discharges its regulatory obligations. It is one thing to impose a 
prescriptive standard requiring, for example, guardrails to be of a specified height, and 
this can be readily measured and policed irrespective of whether the regulated entity is 
trustworthy or not. It is quite another to police elements of a safety management 
system that can legitimately be subject to multiple interpretations and necessarily 
involves considerable discretion in its implementation. 
 
Thus trust can become a central issue for social regulation in areas such as WHS. 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the crucial importance of this issue to improving WHS 
performance, "[t]he exact nature of trust and its role in shaping organisational safety is 
poorly understood" (Conchie et al 2006, 1097), and "the formation of trust within 
workplace relationships is complex and elusive" (Zeffane & Connell 2003, 4). 
 
For present purposes (and in the absence of any widely accepted definition) we define 
‘trust’ in terms of four interconnected elements that have proved particularly valuable in 
organizational and inter-organisational contexts. First, there is good faith commitment, 
or more specifically "an expectancy held by an individual or group that the word, 
promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon" 
(Rotter 1967, 651). Second, a person or organisation is "honest in whatever 
negotiations preceded such [good faith] commitments" (Cummings & Bromiley 1996, 
302). Third is the concept of vulnerability, or more precisely "a willingness to accept 
vulnerability based upon having positive expectations about other people's intentions 
and behaviours in situations which are interdependent and/or risky" (Clegg et al 2002, 
409). Finally – returning to the themes of values and procedural fairness – international 
research has found that "people who feel they have been treated fairly will be more 
likely to trust that organization and be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow 
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its directions" (Murphy 2004, 199; Tyler 2003). 
 
The above literatures raise issues that go to the heart of these questions: To what 
extent can management-based regulation achieve business or regulatory goals? Are 
policymakers, trade associations, and individual corporations mistaken in their belief 
that those who are encouraged or required to develop and implement plans, systems, 
and other management-based strategies will as a result improve their performance? Is 
reliance on monitoring, measuring, accountability, and extrinsic motivation misplaced? 
Might it be that management commitment or culture (or specific culture-related issues 
such as trust) are far more important than management-based initiatives in and of 
themselves? Going further, it may be that management commitment and/or culture 
must itself be broken down and researched at different levels. Management 
commitment, for example, might exist at the corporate management level but not at the 
level of the corporation's individual facilities. And the related issue of culture (and 
subculture) too is something that might best be understood at individual sites, again 
with the possibility that different facilities, or even different groups within them, have 
different subcultures and that overcoming cultural differences (or particular issues such 
as mistrust that is prevalent in certain subcultures) is far more important than simply 
imposing a unitary management-based strategy at facility level. 
 
Of those limited evaluations of management-based regulation that have taken place, 
none has focused on two closely related and potentially critical aspects of their 
implementation: 
1. the gap between the intentions of enterprises or regulators to achieve social goals 
through management-based initiatives, and their implementation at site level (and, 
as a corollary, the gap between [management-based] regulation in theory and in 
practice); and 
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2. the extent to which management-based initiatives successfully engage with or 
overcome particular cultural impediments such as mistrust, especially at site level. 
 
These implementation issues are crucially important because management-based 
regulation (whether internal or external) is designed for large rather than small 
organisations, and most large organisations operate at a number of different sites, 
often in different jurisdictions. While those who study management-based initiatives 
would claim to be going inside the ‘black box’ of the corporation, they have so far only 
done so to a limited extent, and they have rarely recognised that management-based 
initiatives must gain the commitment not only of corporate management, but also of a 
firm's often far-flung facilities. 
 
This chapter’s overarching thesis is that the efficacy of management-based regulation 
may be undermined by the absence of organisational trust, and that without identifying 
and addressing the underlying workplace characteristics that give rise to this mistrust, 
companies are likely to confront a substantial gap between the theory and practice of 
such internal regulation. In order to test this thesis, we take one area of public policy 
where management-based regulation has been heavily relied upon, in terms of both 
external and internal regulation – mining WHS – and examines the reasons for what 
appears to be substantial and widespread implementation failure in two mining 
company case studies. It examines this failure at two related levels: in terms of a 
‘disconnect’ between corporate management initiatives and site-level behavior, and in 
terms of the failure of those initiatives to engage successfully with issues of trust and 
mistrust, worker and management commitment, divided loyalties, and related issues at 
site level. 
 
There are of course limits to a case study approach and dangers in seeking to 
generalise from specific cases drawn from particular contexts. But such studies may 
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provide substantial insights and address questions that quantitative studies are ill-
equipped to answer. In any event, at the present time there are no large N studies 
addressing the two questions that are the central concerns of this chapter. Accordingly, 
there is considerable virtue in conducting individual case studies and studies of a small 
number of firms or facilities. Both can provide in-depth qualitative analysis of firm or 
facility-level behavior, of corporate and managerial motivations, and of the connection 
between motivations and management-based strategies. There may be particular 
value in studying behavior at different facilities within the same company, as this 
approach enables one to hold constant a number of variables (as where the company 
seeks to impose the same form of management-based regulation on all its facilities) 
while enabling variation in others (such as differences in levels of trust at site level) to 
form the focus of study. The following sections report the results of one such study. 
 
8.3 Mine safety in Australia: Management-based regulation and its 
consequences 
 
Mining is one of Australia's most dangerous industries, with a fatality rate more than 
twice the national average (Australian Safety and Compensation Council 2005), albeit 
substantially lower than that of comparable countries such as the United States (Ural & 
Dermirkol 2008). Mining faces many WHS problems. Both high consequence/low 
frequency events (explosions, water incursion) and low consequence/high frequency 
events (slips, strains, and falls) contribute to the industry's high rate of injuries and 
fatalities. 
 
Although the mining industry confronts a number of serious WHS challenges, since the 
1990s, statistics (including fatality statistics that are unlikely to be vulnerable to 
manipulation) suggest that the Australian mining sector has achieved substantial 
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improvements in safety (Galvin 2005). This has coincided with an increased corporate 
focus on management-based initiatives as the central means of improving WHS, with a 
heavy emphasis on sophisticated systems, auditing, and other process-based 
mechanisms. Indeed, such systems are now a regulatory requirement in two of the 
three Australian mining jurisdictions (Gunningham 2007, Chapter 2). 
 
Senior management in many of the largest companies now regards excellent WHS 
performance as a priority, for which, in managerial jargon, there is a compelling 
‘business case’ (Health and Safety Executive 2005b). Mining injuries can cause 
serious disruption of the production process, escalate already punitively high workers 
compensation costs, increase staff absences, increase reputation risk, and threaten 
the company's social license to operate. Those with poor reputations may be refused 
access to new mining areas and made subject to increasingly intrusive and costly 
environmental controls on their operations. 
 
In the following sections we consider the experiences of two mining companies that, for 
various reasons, have relied substantially upon management-based regulation to 
achieve improvements in their WHS performance or to meet regulatory requirements. 
Before doing so, however, we describe our methodology. 
 
The research was conducted with the full cooperation of the companies in question. 
Consistent with the norms of social science research and of our ethics clearance, we 
do not identify the companies or any of the individuals who participated in the research. 
The 13 mines we studied included both open cut and underground, although the latter 
were the dominant grouping. Mine sites were selected in consultation with the 
participating companies, with the intention of including both leading and laggard mine 
sites to provide a broad range of experiences. Each mine site visit occurred over a two-
day period in which a representative sample of both staff and workers participated in 
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semi-structured interviews (151 in total). A typical sample of 12 interviewees from each 
mine included the general or operation manager, mine manager, shift or process 
supervisors, under-manager, safety officer, engineering (mechanical and/or electrical) 
managers, crew leaders (deputy under-managers, team supervisors), mine workers 
(the ‘crew’, including local check inspectors/ site safety representatives), and trades-
people. In most cases, the balance of managers to employees was split approximately 
evenly. 
 
Each interview was conducted in private, with interviewees informed in advance that all 
material arising out of the interviews would be treated confidentially and used 
anonymously in any subsequent publications. In addition to the mine site interviewees, 
12 representatives from corporate management, including chief executives, safety 
managers, and operational managers, were interviewed. 
 
Questions took the form of a series of prompts, with only those questions that elicited a 
substantive response being explored in greater detail. This approach ensured that a 
diversity of perspectives was explored and that respondents were not constrained to 
address only particular preconceived issues. Qualitative material generated by the 
interviews was supplemented by reviews of both the domestic and international 
literature, including the organisational trust and culture, mine safety, and WHS and 
broader regulatory literatures. The two mining companies involved in the project also 
provided internal policy background and safety statistical information and audit data (on 
a confidential basis). 
 
8.4 Minerals Inc: Corporate interventionists 
 
Minerals Inc is a multinational mining company that has grown substantially over the 
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last 15 years, largely by acquiring existing mine sites. The company prides itself on its 
‘lean’ corporate management structure and devolves much decision-making to the 
mine sites. However, approximately seven years ago, in the face of disappointing WHS 
outcomes, corporate management put in place an ambitious WHS management 
strategy, the cornerstone of which is a comprehensive set of corporate WHS 
standards. These standards are achieved substantially through the mechanism of a 
WHS management system implemented at each mine site and underpinned by 
corporate-wide audit and reporting programs, an interactive WHS electronic database, 
and a BBS observation program. 
 
Minerals Inc perceives itself to be well ‘beyond compliance’ with external regulatory 
standards and is more concerned to protect its social license to operate (Gunningham 
et al 2003) than to meet regulatory requirements. As one senior manager, repeating a 
common refrain, put it: "We don't worry too much about legislation. Our internal 
processes are far more rigorous, including meeting community expectations." This 
approach has also received strong support from Minerals Inc's international board of 
directors. Management appears to be convinced that "it's good for business to go 
beyond compliance" (senior corporate manager). 
 
The evidence to date suggests that this corporate management standards and systems 
approach has had some significant success. Minerals Inc has improved its safety 
record to the extent that it is now seen as an industry leader, with particular mine sites 
winning industry WHS awards, and it has had steady reductions in recordable 
incidents. However, this success has not been achieved across the board. Based on a 
quantitative ranking of internal audit results and safety statistics from a sample of five 
mine sites, we found a wide spread of WHS performance (based on the full range of 
available statistics, only some of which are vulnerable to manipulation). The lowest-
performing mine, for example, was found to perform twice as badly as the highest-
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performing mine.40 This was a remarkable finding given the presence of uniform 
corporate-wide WHS standards and audits.41 Clearly, some explanation for this 
divergence is required. Qualitative fieldwork revealed three factors, in particular, that 
substantially limited the effectiveness of management-based regulation at the lower 
performing mine sites: workforce resistance and the absence of trust, the reluctance 
and/ or inability of deputies to take responsibility for WHS management system 
implementation, and a lack of WHS commitment and inertia on the part of middle 
management. 
 
8.4.1 The presence of mistrust 
 
The issue that had the greatest impact in derailing internal management-based 
regulation at Minerals Inc – as it did at mines we studied at another company – was 
mistrust between management and workers, both collectively and individually. The 
three low-WHS-ranked mines (in marked contrast to the two high-ranking mines) all 
had very high levels of worker mistrust directed at both the motives and abilities of 
mine management. 
 
The link between mistrust and poor WHS performance is perhaps unsurprising given 
the negative impact that mistrust can have on the operation of even the most 
sophisticated management-based regulation and safety management systems. For 
example, workers were less likely to report incidents for fear that they might "get nailed 
                                                
40 In order to calculate this ranking, the authors were provided with internal safety statistics, 
namely LTIs and TRIs, and numerical corporate-wide audit data, over a five-year period. These 
data were weighted (1 to 5) to give the most recent years' results greater priority and were then 
aggregated to give a single numerical score to each mine. 
41 This quantitative ranking was supported by both informal rankings on the part of senior 
management and a subsequent comprehensive audit program conducted by Minerals Inc's 
international headquarters. 
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for something" (crew member), and they might resist the use of intrusive behavior-
based programs such as safety observations when they felt threatened or did not trust 
management motivations behind them. Or workers might choose not to follow WHS 
procedures because they resented management telling them how to do their job, 
because they had little trust in management's ability to develop appropriate 
procedures, or because they believed such procedures were really there to "protect 
management more than workers" (crew member). Finally, mistrustful workers were 
much more reluctant to engage with managers to discuss safety matters. 
 
In part, the origins of this mistrust lie in the bloody history of the Australian mining 
industry. For many decades, each side has ruthlessly pursued its economic interests at 
the expense of the other, and that history is littered with strikes, lockouts, and mine 
disasters involving multiple fatalities for which employers were, historically, hardly 
blameless (Hargraves 1993). In consequence, relations between the relevant trade 
unions and mining companies have often been acrimonious, and they deteriorated 
even further as a result of industrial relations ‘reforms’ introduced in the last decade 
that have substantially de-collectivized workplaces (Gunningham 2008). Not 
coincidentally, trade unions have been seriously weakened, particularly in previously 
union-dominated sectors such as mining. Enterprises such as Minerals Inc have 
exploited this situation to replace collective agreements with individual contracts of 
employment that serve to further marginalise the trade unions (Gunningham 2008). 
 
Of course, all mines (including those in our sample with good WHS records) bore the 
scars of this brutal industrial relations history, but some have managed to largely heal 
past wounds, to overcome mistrust, and to build a fresh and more constructive 
relationship. We return to the question of how they did so in the fourth section of this 
chapter. In the present section, we emphasise that although the industrial relations 
history of the mining industry is one salient factor, a variety of other mine-specific 
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factors have also played important roles in nurturing mistrust. 
 
Past incidents at individual mines, in particular, have often taken on an almost mythical 
quality, so that as they are passed on from one generation of miners to the next, they 
come to encapsulate the inherent untrustworthiness of management. Such incidents 
thus serve as a negative prism through which all subsequent management actions are 
interpreted. This made it much more likely that workers at these mines would spurn 
management safety initiatives as a matter of course, irrespective of whether such 
initiatives were genuine and in the best interests of workers themselves. 
 
This culture of mistrust is exacerbated at those mine sites that are geographically 
isolated (as are the local communities from which they draw their workforce) and where 
many miners spend their entire working lives at a single mine, generating a particularly 
parochial, inward-looking culture. At such mines cultural myths are easily perpetuated 
and reinforced, and a militant older workforce entrenched in its view that ‘all managers 
are shit’ (a phrase used by numerous crew members in interviews) can readily instill a 
similar view into younger miners without fear of challenge. For example, one of the 
worst Minerals Inc WHS performers was described by its manager as follows: 
 
[It] has a very sheltered culture and workforce. You have to look at the "you're 
full of shit" barrier, which is an attitude many workers take towards management. 
They have had an impact on 70 percent of the workforce, and there is still a hard 
core of resistance. Culture and attitude is the key [to safety]. 
 
These problems were compounded by the fact that mines where 
management/workforce relationships were particularly poor were also the mines with 
the highest management turnover (perhaps because these were so difficult to manage 
and managers suffered a high degree of verbal abuse from the workforce, or because 
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each new manager failed to turn the situation around and so was replaced by another 
who might do better). 
 
8.4.2 Deputy under-manager reluctance/inability 
 
A second obstacle to the effective implementation of management-based regulation (at 
least in underground mines) was the necessarily heavy reliance on the lowest level of 
management, deputy under-managers (hereafter ‘deputies’), who for various reasons 
felt unwilling or unable to discharge such responsibilities. A distinctive characteristic of 
underground mining is that miners work largely independently of direct management 
supervision. This degree of isolation is compounded by the presence of multiple shifts, 
with the result that only day shift workers are likely to encounter any but the rarest 
visits from senior/mine managers. Consequently, "it's hard for the mine manager to 
know what is really going on in the mine" (deputy), and the ‘eyes and ears’ of 
management are, by default, effectively transferred to the deputies. 
 
Deputies not only have prime management responsibility for the safety of crews in 
terms of day-to-day operations, but they also act as ‘gatekeepers’ between 
management's WHS systems and their effective implementation on the ground – 
without the active support of deputies it is virtually impossible for management-based 
regulation to operate effectively. 
 
The position of deputy is problematic in a number of ways. Deputies in most mines 
experience considerable ambiguity about their roles, feeling unsure about whether they 
are really workers or management. Deputies are drawn from the ranks of workers, and 
when they are promoted to this position they are anxious about severing their previous 
ties of ‘mateship’ with the crews. Moreover, deputies spend virtually their entire working 
day in the presence of their crews, largely detached from the rest of the management. 
  
221 
As a result they experience pressure to be ‘one of the crew’, to get their hands dirty, 
and to work side by side with the team. As one mine manager, reflecting a widely held 
view, pointed out, overcoming these cultural tensions and ambiguities is no easy task: 
 
It is the front line, the deputies, and their relationship to under-managers and 
supervisors, that is the most difficult relationship to manage. Both groups are 
right at the front end of installing corporate policies. Everything has to be geared 
to driving that relationship. The deputies are the weakest link in the management 
chain. 
 
Although all the mines from Minerals Inc experienced difficulties with deputies, these 
problems were particularly pronounced at the lower-ranked mines. Senior management 
at one such mine, for example, forcefully and repeatedly expressed the view that 
"better deputy leadership was essential" and that this required better training and 
recruitment. Our fieldwork provided further evidence of the cultural factors inhibiting 
deputies from fulfilling their managerial WHS responsibilities. As one mine engineer put 
it: 
Deputies – these are the front line guys. They have the greatest potential 
conflict, and it's potent …. They struggle with divided loyalties to be part of the 
crew and part of management. They need a very high degree of moral courage 
to do the right thing especially given they come from the ranks. They have to 
have the courage to back their own decisions against peer pressure. If they don't 
have that courage, then they won't do their job properly, they will be hung out to 
dry. 
 
As if these tensions were not enough, deputies are also commonly afforded little 
support or backup from their immediate supervisors when they do make decisions for 
safety reasons, especially where those decisions adversely impact on production. 
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Several reported the deep humiliation they felt having been ‘dressed down’ by a 
supervisor for making just such a decision: "I had the rug pulled form under me on one 
occasion – I can tell you I won't let that happen again". 
 
These various tensions and ambiguities impinged substantially on the willingness of 
deputies to implement safety management systems. Aware that if they took 
responsibility for implementing such systems they might be criticised, either from above 
or from below, a safer course of action was not to engage with them at all, or to engage 
at most, in token implementation. This attitude was reinforced by the fact that most 
deputies could see little benefit in systems that in any event added additional time-
consuming obligations. One mine manager, reflecting a common view, acknowledged: 
 
We have not achieved a 100 percent acceptance of our preferred safety culture 
…. There are always some who can't be bothered – when no one is watching, 
they will still cut corners. There is definite lack of maturity in the underground 
deputies. They don't see the benefit of safety systems. (emphasis added) 
 
Although those mines ranked higher in safety performance also encountered problems 
with their deputies, they had made a far more concerted effort to change cultural 
attitudes and behavior, to better train deputies, and to give them more responsibility 
and managerial support. 
 
8.4.3 Middle management inertia 
 
Middle managers (including shift or process supervisors, engineers, and under-
managers) also had the potential to block the effective implementation of WHS 
management systems. At this level our interviews suggested that middle management 
inertia (and occasionally resistance) were significant problems at the lowest- ranking 
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mines. For example, workers reported that WHS initiatives "are not being pushed, and 
are not taken seriously" by middle management. As a result, workers claimed that 
lower levels of management simply did not follow them. 
 
Understandably, several safety managers spoke of their frustration in failing to 
convince middle managers of the value of safety management systems and of how 
middle management often obstructed implementation through their unwillingness to 
change the way they allocated work orders, updated SWPs, conducted safety audits, 
and followed up on accident and incident reports. The fundamental failure in their view 
was usually the inability to get middle management commitment, without which: 
 
You don't get good leadership and systems. This requires a holistic 
management approach. Basically, safety should be integrated with the rest of 
the business. (Safety manager) 
 
But this begs the question: Why were such commitment and ownership lacking? Our 
interviews suggested that while there was no single explanation, a number of 
circumstances often combined to generate either inertia or resistance. 
 
Some middle managers simply did not see the value of management systems, and 
several saw them as just ‘paper shuffling’ that had limited relevance to the coalface – 
they were "forced to do things, without seeing the benefits", one mine manager 
complained. Similarly, some only had limited commitment to BBS, again because they 
did not understand their purpose. The additional workload imposed in implementing 
management-based regulation was another reason why many middle managers 
resented them. As one told us: 
 
Historically, corporate has been seen as being interfering and setting too high 
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expectations. The building and putting in place of so many new systems created 
a lot of work. 
 
Overall, they did not view the implementation of safety systems as part of their core 
management responsibilities, which in their view related principally to production. 
 
Finally, some middle managers did not take the issuing of safety actions (a crucial part 
of the ‘doing/checking’ part of a systems approach) seriously, with overdue actions in 
many cases accumulating to very high levels. Here there was active resistance, with 
some middle managers refusing to report safety actions because they perceived them 
not just as an added form of accountability but also (as one under-manager put it) as "a 
malicious attempt by management to control their behavior". Equally, they objected to 
substantive reporting requirements, exhaustive auditing commitments, and growing 
middle management accountability that not only increased their workload but also 
threatened their traditional autonomy. Some middle managers actively resisted 
corporate and/or mine management directives as a means of retaining their power 
within the organisational structure. As one mine manager described it: 
 
Middle management [are] acting as a blocking point. There is not a lot of 
information getting through to the under-managers. Not a lot of information 
getting through this layer – they soak the stuff up, and it goes no further …. 
Why? They think that having that knowledge is having power. 
 
In short, at Minerals Inc at least, there was a strong correlation between a strong 
management commitment (or ‘buy in’) in particular among middle managers, and the 
rankings of high and low WHS performance at mine site level. Commitment, it would 
appear, is a ‘motivational posture’ (Braithwaite, V 2008) that has a crucial influence on 
WHS outcomes. 
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8.5 Coal Company: Reluctant converts 
 
Over the last decade, Coal Company has expanded rapidly through a series of 
acquisitions. Until very recently, however, no attempt was made to impose a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach to WHS management. On the contrary, and consistent with the 
general philosophy of the company, there was a strong preference for a ‘hands off’ 
approach, intended to maximise site autonomy and flexibility in WHS as in many other 
matters. One senior corporate manager described this approach as follows: 
 
The [Coal Company] ‘way’ is to have less bureaucracy, greater autonomy of 
individual mine sites which are expected to act as autonomous business units 
that have to stand on their own two feet. This gives an open door, democratic 
style. 
 
Not surprisingly, this approach has resulted in substantial variation in WHS 
management style at different sites. A common refrain from managers and workers at 
mines that Coal Company has bought was ‘how little things had changed’ under the 
new corporate ownership, with none of the manifestations of corporate oversight and 
control (corporate-wide WHS standards, systems, and audits) that are to be found in 
the structures of most of its competitors. 
 
In recent years, however, Coal Company experienced a number of pressures to take a 
more interventionist stance to WHS management. First, Coal Company's rapid 
expansion had reached the point where the ‘small company’ corporate management 
style was no longer viable. Treating more than a dozen individual mine sites as 
individual fiefdoms did not allow for economies of scale or the degree of consistency 
and cooperation between the mine sites necessary to facilitate effective or efficient 
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management. Second, a process of institutional isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio 
1991) saw a convergence in WHS management practices across companies, placing 
considerable peer pressure on Coal Company to ‘keep up’ with industry trends. And 
third, the advent of new government regulations with their emphasis on internal WHS 
management systems and hazard controls (coupled with a recent trend to prosecute 
individual managers) made Coal Company's reliance on individual and ad hoc 
approaches to WHS management across its sites increasingly untenable. 
 
As a result of these various pressures, corporate management has somewhat 
reluctantly assumed greater responsibility for site-level WHS and has taken steps to 
ensure greater uniformity in WHS management across all its operations. The most 
tangible manifestation of this new approach is that while individual sites will still be able 
to develop their own WHS management systems, these will be required to conform to 
new overarching corporate-wide WHS standards. Other developments include the 
creation of ‘positive performance indicators’ and a corporate-wide commitment to BBS 
programs (that focus on monitoring of and feedback as mechanisms to change worker 
behavior). These initiatives have been coupled with the introduction of regular, whole-
of-mine site third-party WHS audits, which will eventually be aligned with the new 
corporate WHS standards. 
 
This initiative is still in its early stages, and the level of corporate commitment remains 
unclear, particularly to the many mine managers who, during interviews, expressed 
doubts as to whether corporate management possessed the necessary skills, 
expertise, and commitment to achieve corporate-wide WHS management or to ‘change 
its spots’. Our interviews at corporate management suggested that there was some 
substance in these concerns. For example, one corporate leader admitted that he 
lacked the commitment and perhaps the capacity to engage with systems in any depth. 
In his words: 
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I do not have a head for safety management systems, and I quickly lose interest 
when reading through systems charts. 
 
Many mine managers bemoaned the lack of direction and support they had received 
from corporate management and the unnecessary duplication this had caused, and 
corporate management's lack of expertise, resources, and capacity to engage with 
WHS management systems. Several mine managers were scathing in their 
assessment of corporate management's ability to deliver on the promised corporate-
wide WHS standards: 
 
I have no faith in their ability whatsoever. It has been a complete cock-up. These 
guys are on a different planet. They have no idea what we are doing. We have 
to respond to the new regulations. We are just going to press ahead and do 
what we have to do. The corporate standards won't have any impact on what we 
do at this mine. 
 
In summary, the disconnect between corporate and mine management at Coal 
Company was of a very different kind than that experienced at Minerals Inc. At Coal 
Company, it was corporate management (not mine site management and workers) that 
was viewed as a serious impediment to the effective implementation of WHS 
management strategies and systems. 
 
The suspicion that corporate management were reluctant converts rather than true 
believers impacted negatively on the ability of mine sites to implement safety 
management systems across Coal Company, irrespective of the merits or otherwise of 
the systems in question. At some mines, management viewed themselves as largely 
separate from – and more professional and proficient than – either other mines in Coal 
Company or corporate management itself. Management at these mines lacked faith in 
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corporate management's capabilities and not only took a dim view of the safety 
performance of other mines in the company but also feared being dragged down to 
their level. At other mines a lack of confidence in corporate management manifested 
itself in resistance to corporate intervention and a preference for maintaining their own 
safety initiatives, which they believed to be far superior. A third group of mines, whilst 
welcoming in principle the prospect of corporate systems and standards, also had 
serious concerns about how corporate proposed to implement such initiatives. 
 
Turning to the WHS performance of individual mine sites within Coal Company, there 
was a striking divergence of WHS outcomes between mine sites. As with Minerals Inc, 
we conducted a WHS ranking exercise of the eight Coal Company mine sites –this 
revealed a very similar spread of WHS outcomes. In particular, the best-performing 
mine was ranked approximately twice as highly as the worst-performing mine. Overall, 
there were bands of three clear WHS leaders, two laggards, and three middle-ranking 
mines. Senior managers' subjective ranking generated broad agreement as to who 
were the best and worst performers, but there was much less consistency with regard 
to the middle rankings. 
 
There were other similarities with Minerals Inc. Deputies at Coal Company felt 
ambivalent as to whether they were part of ‘management’ or really just workers with 
supervisory responsibilities. Deputies at lower-ranked mines were especially wary of 
too closely aligning themselves with management for fear of being ostracised, 
ridiculed, or even victimised by crews, suggesting that peer group pressures were 
more powerful influences on behavior than senior management edicts. 
 
The presence of mistrust between management and workers was also a feature of 
most, if not all, lower-ranked mines. This was often the consequence of a catalytic 
event, creating a simmering and lingering mistrust that persisted for many years and 
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made it very difficult for management to introduce new safety initiatives. For example, a 
rich vein of mistrust was generated at one mine by an attempted (and subsequently 
abandoned) downsizing. The workers involved engaged in a deliberate policy of 
isolating those managers perceived to be responsible for the downsizing in the hope of 
forcing their eventual removal. At another mine, a disastrous decision to realign a 
longwall led workers to doubt the competency of management decision-making 
processes. 
 
Middle management inertia was also a common theme at lower-ranked mines. At these 
mines there were reports of middle managers not being familiar with systems, not 
issuing SWPs as part of work orders, and of safety systems ‘gathering dust’ on the 
shelf. Many middle managers considered that safety management systems had little 
impact on day-to-day management decisions, and (at one mine) that such systems 
were really about ‘covering people's arses’. In short, it was not the systems themselves 
that were the problem, but lack of commitment to their implementation. 
 
In addition to these points of commonality, however, in several areas the experiences 
of the lower-performing mines at Coal Company diverged from their lowly ranked 
equivalents at Minerals Inc. For example, at Coal Company low performers were 
distinctive in the extent to which they emphasised production at the expense of safety, 
notwithstanding an ostensible corporate commitment to ‘safety first’. The most 
commonly cited example of such behavior involved management exhorting workers to 
‘put safety first’, while placing greater pressure on them to achieve production targets 
(these two goals commonly being in tension). For example at one mine, workers were 
required to complete a written job safety analysis card at the start of each shift and 
when starting a new job. However, many workers told us that management had not 
provided adequate training nor allocated time to complete the cards. Instead, they 
reported that if they actually took the time out to complete a card each time they 
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engaged in a new work procedure, they would incur the wrath of management for 
wasting time. In short, there was a strong ‘production comes first’ message 
undermining the value of the program: "You can't have it both ways. They are always at 
you to improve production, but expect you to fill out the forms" (crew member). 
 
Finally, a defining characteristic of the lower-ranked Coal Company mines was the 
presence of serious and destructive divisions between and within key groups (in 
addition to the conventional worker and management ‘us and them’ divide permeating 
most mine sites). One striking example of this was the division between middle 
management and senior management. At one mine, several middle managers felt that 
they had ‘been left out on a limb’ or were ‘taking the flak’ for incidents for which senior 
management were responsible, with an adverse effect on morale. At another lowly 
ranked mine, there was a serious breakdown in the relationship between middle 
management and the mine manager as a result of "poor attitudes, poor 
communication, poor consultation", the relationship being described as "somewhere 
between abysmal and non-existent" (middle manager). This produced unusual 
loyalties, with workers and middle managers united against senior management and a 
dysfunctional relationship with senior management that made the implementation of 
safety management all but impossible. 
 
A different example of internal division occurred at a newly created longwall mine, 
which failed to meet initial high performance expectations. A key factor here was the 
division within the workforce itself, which was split into two distinct camps, on the basis 
of previous management hiring policies that had offered positions to one group first 
before belatedly hiring workers from the other group. This led to a profound, bitter, and 
lasting division in the workforce, with workers refusing to talk to workers from the other 
group: "It just split the workforce instantly, mate and mate never talked to each other" 
(crew member). It is not difficult to imagine the impact of such a destructive cultural 
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divide on the implementation of safety management systems. At another mine, a spill 
of worker positions led to a schism between those workers who were ostensibly rehired 
and those who were rejected. As it transpired, the latter were also subsequently 
retained and therefore had to work together in the same workplace as the former. The 
two groups rapidly became polarised, forming two distinct camps: those who were not 
offered a position, and those who were. This created a very difficult work environment, 
with different groups refusing to work, acknowledge, or speak to each other. 
 
It is difficult to operate a mine when one group of workers will not speak to another 
group and communication, about WHS as with other matters, becomes a major 
challenge. Overall, such divisions generated a corrosive mistrust and adversarial 
relationships between different groups of workers. In some circumstances, effective 
communication, a vital component of any successful WHS system, was almost 
impossible, either because one group became closed to the views of others or, in 
extreme cases, because they refused to interact with them. 
 
8.6 Discussion 
 
Although the two case studies concern different companies with different histories and 
management philosophies, there are a number of similarities in how they sought to 
address WHS and in the outcomes they achieved. Because they were driven either by 
corporate concerns to improve WHS (Minerals Inc) or by a combination of growing 
pains, peer pressure, and government regulation (Coal Company), they relied heavily 
on a range of management tools to achieve their objectives. In the language of this 
chapter, they relied substantially upon either internally or externally driven 
management-based regulation with a particular emphasis on WHS management 
systems, standards, and audits. Yet notwithstanding the virtues of this approach, in 
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practice they both struggled, often unsuccessfully, to implement management-based 
regulation, and through it, to improve WHS outcomes. 
 
A lack of organisational trust was certainly one of the most important problems, for 
without trust, our evidence shows that the effectiveness of management-based 
regulation may be severely and sometimes fatally compromised. The most striking lack 
of trust at Minerals Inc was between workers and management. At their worst-
performing mines, such mistrust was deep-seated and long-standing, for reasons that 
often related indirectly to the adversarial and bitter history of the mining industry and 
directly to site-specific past incidents in which workers felt betrayed by management. 
Geographic isolation, parochialism, and high management turnover sometimes 
exacerbated these problems. But as the Coal Company study reveals, a lack of trust 
between other groups was sometimes equally if not more important. We described the 
corrosive effects of mistrust variously between corporate and mine site management, 
between workers and middle management on the one hand and senior mine 
management on the other, between one group of workers and another, and between 
middle management and the mine manager. We also found that even corporate 
management can have its own distinctive culture. Locked into past practices and 
beliefs, and seemingly incapable of adjusting to the needs of managing an increasingly 
complex organisation, it was corporate management at Coal Company who had lost 
the trust of mine management. 
 
All this suggests that trust – one important manifestation of workplace culture – needs 
to be understood not at company level, and often not even at mine site level (although 
in some respects different mines do have distinctive cultures), but rather at the level of 
subcultures (and sometimes countercultures) that manifest themselves within different 
groupings within individual mines. It is these that are likely to contain the most deep-
seated values and norms, that are most likely to shape behavior in general and the 
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effectiveness of management-based regulation in particular. 
 
These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that "creating a unitary cohesive 
culture around core moral values" at corporate level is the solution, and they are 
consistent with the views of those who argue "that organizations are nothing more than 
shifting coalitions of sub-cultures" (Sinclair 1993, 63) and that those subcultures may 
hold values that are substantially different from those that corporate management 
seeks to nurture and disseminate across the corporation as a whole. 
 
While most of those subcultures were found to exist within individual mine sites, the 
Coal Company case reminds us that corporate management too can have its own 
distinctive culture, quite distinct from those of individual mines. While mine site 
management members were acutely aware of the need for a more centralised 
approach and for management-based regulation, they lacked faith in the commitment 
and capacity of corporate management to provide it. And corporate management, 
having failed to come to terms with the needs of managing what was now a much 
larger and more complex organisation, lacked both the vision and the skills necessary 
to bring about effective management-based regulation. This was a marked contrast to 
Minerals Inc, where a corporate management committed to a systems-based approach 
had great difficulty persuading some mines to incorporate it effectively into their 
operations. 
 
At both companies, organisational trust was generated not just by local factors (such 
as how workers were treated by mine management) but also by broader factors (such 
as the adversarial history of mining). These factors commonly interacted, generating 
perceptions that often amplified mistrust and shaped behavior. For example, where 
there was a history of mistrust, all management action on WHS (however genuine) was 
likely to be dismissed by the workforce as insincere, resulting in a lack of commitment 
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to management WHS initiatives: a classic illustration of American sociologist William 
Thomas's dictum that what is perceived to be real is real in its consequences. 
 
An overlapping but distinctive theme was the conflict of loyalties experienced by 
different levels of management within the mine site hierarchy. This was most 
graphically illustrated by the experience of deputies, who in both companies felt torn 
between their obligations as members of management and their loyalties to their crew 
‘mates’. But to a lesser extent other levels of management sometimes experienced the 
same tension, as for example where middle management sided with the workforce 
against the mine manager, or where mine managers, while conscious of their 
obligations to corporate management, nevertheless felt acutely the needs of their own 
mine and of their own management team and workforce. This too had a negative 
influence on the effectiveness of management-based regulation. 
 
A further theme was that a failure to obtain commitment from and engagement of 
middle management and the workforce was detrimental to the implementation of 
management-based initiatives. This too was related to trust, though more so with 
workers than with middle managers. Our interviews suggested that lack of engagement 
was a particular problem with regard to the latter, who, already burdened with a range 
of duties and demands on their time, commonly viewed the additional requirements of 
applying management-based regulation as yet one more imposition for which they 
could not see the need, or for which there were ulterior motives, and which they 
resented complying with. For some, there was an additional layer of resentment, and 
resistance, since these requirements were viewed as imposing an additional layer of 
accountability and as a threat to their autonomy. Historically, mine site crews have 
operated with often-minimal direct supervision, certainly from middle and senior 
management, and minimal administrative and/or reporting obligations. 
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Many middle managers, required to apply the WHS management systems and to 
document what they had done, and subject to subsequent internal and external audits, 
felt both vulnerable and resentful. Yet without middle management commitment, 
management-based regulation could not be effectively implemented. As Jackall (1998, 
20-21) pointed out two decades ago: 
 
[t]he pushing down of details creates great pressure on middle managers not 
only to transmit good news but, precisely because they know the details, to act 
to protect their corporations, their bosses, and themselves in the process. They 
become …. the potential ‘fall guys’ when things go wrong. 
 
Finally, and closely related to the previous themes, there was the issue of unequal 
power. Workers, no longer effectively supported by trade unions capable of acting as a 
countervailing force, and increasingly pressured into individual contracts of 
employment, often felt vulnerable and threatened by management initiatives. Middle 
managers too feared that management-based regulation might be a means of placing 
them under greater senior management scrutiny and control. Deputies, whose 
allegiance often remained with the crew from which they had come, and who were at 
the lowest level of the management hierarchy, felt uncertain whether any safety 
initiatives they undertook would be supported by higher management or whether they 
would be ‘hung out to dry’. In an industry with such an acrimonious history, such issues 
were never far from the surface and, as we discuss further, were particularly prone to 
arise in the situations where the tension between ‘safety and profit’ was most stark: 
deciding whether to halt production on safety grounds. 
 
Although qualitative research methods do not lend themselves to precise statements 
about the relative importance of the above themes, our interviews indicated a 
particularly strong link between mistrust at mine site level and poor WHS outcomes, as 
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too was lack of middle management commitment (which was often closely related to 
trust). Conflict of loyalties was a major issue in relation to deputies at all mines that 
performed poorly in WHS terms, but conflict of loyalties at other levels often varied 
substantially even within the subgroup of poorly performing mines. Power imbalances, 
as indicated above, often lurked under the surface but only manifested themselves 
when particular circumstances arose, and their impact was less predictable than the 
other factors identified above. 
 
Other themes were also occasionally manifested, but none substantially shaped 
behavior or outcomes. For example, Tyler has emphasised the importance of moral 
values in general and of procedural justice in particular, and of legitimacy, in 
organisational settings (Tyler 1990, 2008). Certainly, we found circumstances where 
procedural justice took on occasional importance, as where mine managers gained 
esteem by taking worker complaints seriously and investigating them, even if they 
ultimately took no action (see further below). Conversely, we found that managers lost 
credibility by failing to consult workers over costly matters such as which way to cut the 
coal seam. But our respondents provided no other examples that fell readily into this 
category. Again, it might be argued that the corporations in our study lacked legitimacy 
in the eyes of the workforce, in large part as a consequence of a bitter history of 
industrial acrimony. But this was insufficient to explain why some mines in our sample 
nevertheless manifested high trust and good WHS outcomes, and why more important 
were factors that shaped behavior at individual mines. And as will be evident from our 
previous discussion, even incidents that might broadly be viewed as involving issues of 
procedural justice or legitimacy could be better explained in terms of a breakdown of 
organisational trust. We do not believe our findings to be unrepresentative in this 
regard. Reason, in his seminal work on safety culture, identifies a ‘just culture’ as one 
of the key variables, but rather than explaining this in terms of procedural justice he 
describes it as constituting an atmosphere of trust (Reason 1997). 
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The most common response to mistrust, divided loyalties, and/ or lack of commitment 
(the three characteristics often being related), and a perception of powerlessness was 
ritualism – going the through the motions without any conviction that this would achieve 
anything of substance. This was the predominant response of both workers and middle 
management. For example at one mine, miners are required to complete a written JSA 
card at the start of each shift and when starting a new job. In practice, miners readily 
admitted that it was common to take a week's worth of the cards home and fill them in 
advance of the actual jobs – a practice that clearly defeats the entire purpose of having 
the cards. Mistrustful workers similarly took little interest in reporting near misses, 
engaging in BBS programs, or participating in sophisticated electronic monitoring 
systems. We also found many examples of ritualistic responses on the part of middle 
management. However, this sometimes morphed into active resistance to 
management-based regulation, particularly where middle management felt that this 
was being used as a means to scrutinize their behavior and make them more 
accountable. Both of these responses served to stymie the effectiveness of 
management-based regulation. 
 
Indeed, the behavior of workers and sometimes middle management in the above 
circumstances suggests that the gap between corporate rules in ‘the books’ and ‘in 
action’ was often a chasm. As Tyler (2000, 824) points out, managers in organisations 
‘typically have considerable discretion in the manner they implement decision-making 
procedures’, but this is especially so in the case of management-based regulation. 
Unlike prescriptive standards (eg, the guardrail must be a precise height) or 
performance-based standards (eg, no more than two millimeters of dust per cubic 
centimeter per time-weighed eight-hour day), management-based regulation is 
necessarily vague, as in implementing the classic ‘plan, do, check, act’ approach, or in 
requiring certain risk-based procedures to be undertaken before a job commences. Put 
differently, a WHS management system is a social system and heavily dependent for 
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its effectiveness upon the willingness of employees to commit to and engage with it. 
And this, in turn, so our findings demonstrate, depends on culture (or more usually 
subculture) in general and trust in particular. Crucially, we found that that where 
mistrust was not overcome, workers treated almost all management safety initiatives 
with suspicion and refused to commit to them. For example, BBS programs were 
perfunctory (particularly those based on supervisor/subordinate observations), incident 
reporting was trivialised or ignored, systems were more honored in the breach, and 
sophisticated electronic monitoring systems were sidetracked, safety observations fell 
short of stated requirements, action tasks were allowed to accumulate, and audit 
recommendations were not followed up on. 
 
It will be apparent that ritualism and resistance are unlikely to be overcome – or 
management-based regulation to succeed – in the absence of engagement with the 
culture, or more accurately, the various subcultures identified above. Such 
engagement implies not just achieving improved levels of organisational trust but also 
mitigating divided loyalties and achieving greater middle management and worker 
engagement, commitment, and ownership. And these latter in turn cannot be achieved 
without devolving if not power, at least a degree of ownership of safety initiatives to 
workers and their immediate supervisors (see further below). 
 
But cultural change is never easy to achieve. Indeed, some organisational theorists 
have argued that an organisation may be incapable of shaping its own culture (Schein 
1983), while others argue that that "you only meddle with organisational culture if 
you've got little choice, lots of resources and lots of time" (Sinclair 1993, 68). However, 
we disagree with these pessimistic conclusions. In our case studies, the top-WHS-
ranking mine sites of both enterprises shared a cluster of characteristics – largely as a 
result of strategic management intervention. While not all these characteristics were 
present at all these mines, the more of these characteristics were present, the more 
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likely a mine was to have minimised mistrust, overcome divided loyalties and a lack of 
buy, and achieved a high WHS performance. Accordingly, our findings are consistent 
with the general approach of Reason, who suggests not only that safety culture is 
actually a product of various interdependent subcultures, but also that these, to a 
significant extent, can be socially engineered (Reason 1997). 
 
The clusters we identified included a high level of communication and consultation 
between workers and management on WHS, a willingness by mine management to 
respond promptly to complaints and suggestions (even where no action was taken), 
devolving WHS decision-making power down the management hierarchy, emphasising 
much greater worker ownership of WHS management, and leadership (in terms of 
demonstrated commitment and ‘walking the talk’) especially by the mine manager. 
Additional characteristics were flexible and/or rotating shifts, flatter management 
structures, and the provision of appropriate resources and adequate training as to how 
to discharge WHS responsibilities. And of course many of these characteristics are 
connected. For example, deputies, who in low-trust, low-performing mines commonly 
experienced a lack of support from more senior management and considerable 
ambivalence about their position, tended to respond better in mines where there was a 
flatter management structure, where they were given the appropriate skills, were 
empowered to take the initiative on safety issues, and were backed up by the next 
layers of management. While space precludes a full discussion (see further 
Gunningham & Sinclair 2011), four issues merit further elaboration. 
 
First, there was strong evidence that organisational trust was greatly influenced by the 
extent to which the mine manager (the visible manifestation of ‘the corporation’ at site 
level) was genuinely committed to WHS improvement. This seemed to be a particularly 
important indicator of managerial leadership. At one high-ranking mine, for example, 
workers and middle managers spoke highly of the mine manager's leadership role, 
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especially his engagement with the workforce, the fact that he did "lots of things to be 
seen around the workforce – and chases up all the complaints" (crew member), and 
crucially, that he was willing to place WHS ahead of production, to the extent of 
shutting down the mine (at great expense) to address a safety issue. By contrast, at 
low-performance, low-trust mines, there were widespread complaints concerning 
management's willingness to cut corners and sacrifice safety to maximise production. 
As one crew member told us, in heated terms: 
 
I don't trust management. Everyone. The whole lot of them …. say you are going 
to do [a job] the safe way, so you need this, and you need that. They snap …. 
but if the way you are going to do it is not the safe way, they'll turn their back. 
 
Second, a common refrain, which resonates with Tyler's (2003) work on the importance 
of procedural fairness, was the preference that workers had for a mine manager who 
"gives it to us straight" (as one crew member put it). As long as workers' complaints 
had been heard and investigated, and they had received feedback (even when being 
told that no further action would be taken), then their level of acceptance and trust was 
high. Workers (and deputies) at many lower-performing mines, however, expressed 
their frustration with what they perceived as conflicting messages and the inconsistent 
responses and attitudes of different managers. 
 
Third, workers seemed far more likely to ‘take on board’ and implement WHS initiatives 
if they had a high degree of ownership of them. This was achieved by managers 
engaging them in the creation of these initiatives, or in the case of corporate initiatives, 
by involving them in how these policies were interpreted and adopted at individual mine 
sites. Perhaps the best illustration concerned an attempt by management to introduce 
BBS observations – usually resisted by the workforce because such programs are 
seen as a ‘blame the worker’ approach. Yet such an initiative was enthusiastically 
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adopted at one mine, primarily be- cause a high-status and influential group of miners 
was engaged at an early stage and came to feel that it was ‘their’ initiative. 
 
Finally, it is striking that the strategies that corporate management relied upon under 
management-based regulation (namely an emphasis on accountability mechanisms 
that made it difficult for managers to avoid their WHS responsibility, coupled with 
surveillance, various performance tracking devices, and auditing to ensure 
transparency) were antithetical to measures that our findings suggested had a positive 
impact on WHS. The former approach was encapsulated in the attitude of one senior 
and influential senior manager at Minerals Inc who told us: 
 
You can't always change attitudes at first, you need to focus on behaviors …. 
You have got to set the expectation, help them to achieve it, hold them 
accountable, educate where necessary, and discipline. 
 
But as we discussed earlier, in imposing stringent oversight and control, accountability, 
and disciplining, corporate management risks a number of counterproductive 
consequences. For example, the use of surveillance systems "has deleterious effects 
on the social climate of groups. The use of surveillance implies distrust which 
decreases people's ability to feel positive about themselves, their groups and the 
system itself" (Tyler 2008, 810). This in turn lowers motivation, creates an adversarial 
relationship, and encourages the sort of resistance and ritualism described earlier. 
Indeed, as Power has argued, rather than solving the problem of mistrust, ‘models of 
accountability’ merely displace it – over-reliance upon such procedures and upon 
‘rituals of audit’ serve, in his view, only to generate mistrust (Power 1997). 
 
Those who are subjected to this approach may respond to it with ritualism or 
resistance, with the result that systems and audits become ‘rituals of comfort’ that fail 
  
242 
to engage with the fundamental problem of mistrust, and may even serve to foster and 
increase it (Power 1997). This indeed was precisely the response of many middle 
managers who resented and felt threatened by mechanisms that they perceived as 
intended to limit their autonomy, or to be little more than senior management buck-
passing. 
 
What made a difference, in the best WHS performing mines in our sample, were 
various mechanisms that provided workers and site management with more rather than 
less autonomy and discretion. These served to gain worker or middle management 
commitment and trust through greater ownership of and participation in WHS 
initiatives, better communication and feedback, and more training, mentoring and 
managerial support (albeit not control) for deputies and middle management. The key 
is to ensure that informal systems "support the formal system by enhancing cohesion, 
initiative and morale" (Selznick 1992, 235). Only in this manner may the gap between 
formal regulation and informal and local norms be successfully bridged. 
 
These findings suggest that management-based regulation may have its limits. As 
Bardach & Kagan (1982, 321) pointed out many years ago42: 
 
The risk of [pushing] accountability requirements into the farthest reaches and 
deeper recesses of social life is that, in the long run, everyone will be 
accountable for everything, but no one will take responsibility for anything. Thus 
the social responsibility of regulators, in the end, must be not simply to impose 
controls, but to activate and draw upon the conscience and the talents of those 
they seek to regulate. 
                                                
42 Bardach & Kagan (1982) were referring to government regulation, but the point is equally 
applicable to internal regulation within companies. 
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Indeed, if socio-legal research has taught scholars anything, it is that coercion (whether 
by the state or by the corporation) is expensive and difficult. Neither government nor 
corporate regulation can hope to be meaningful and effective without the cooperation, 
indeed the normative accord, of the vast majority of populations it hopes to control. 
What this means is that the day-to-day effectiveness of rules depends substantially on 
the motivation of the corporate employees. For socio-legal scholars, therefore, the key 
theoretical and empirical issues have come to involve the relationships between 
regulatory norms and organisational behavior. What factors, legal and non-legal, 
influence the incidence of compliance and noncompliance? 
 
In answering these questions we have argued that trust and a number of related 
factors are vital in obtaining the consent and support of managers and workers and in 
winning their ‘intrinsic motivation’. Once these groups accept and take ownership of the 
rules, regard them as reasonable and their purpose laudable, then compliance 
becomes a matter of voluntary cooperation. People follow not just the letter, but also 
the spirit of management-based regulation, and external monitoring costs become low. 
Workers and managers become "active participants in creating and maintaining 
conditions of social order" (Tyler 2008, 873) largely irrespective of surveillance and 
other external controls. In Reason's terminology, it becomes possible to build in a 
culture of ‘mindfulness’ (Reason 1997). This is not to imply that management-based 
regulation has no value. It remains an important technology of governance, but one 
that can only work effectively in tandem with a supportive workplace culture built 
around trust, engagement, and commitment. 
 
Finally, we must briefly address two alternative explanations of the findings described 
earlier. First, it might be argued that management-based regulation is failing not 
because of any inherent limitations but simply because it is being badly implemented. If 
so, then these case studies tell relatively little of interest as regards the strengths or 
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limitations of this particular form of regulation. However, while it is true that at Coal 
Company a lack of capability and commitment at corporate level was partly responsible 
for the failure of management-based regulation, this was demonstrably not the case at 
Minerals Inc, where considerable resources had been invested by a proficient 
corporate management in the development of a sophisticated form of management-
based regulation. Yet this latter system, while successful in improving WHS at some 
mine sites (those with positive WHS cultures), was manifestly unsuccessful at others 
(where trust was low and WHS culture poor). This, not managerial incompetence at 
corporate level, is the puzzle that needs to be addressed. 
 
Second, it might be suggested that the findings reveal nothing more than that 
decentralised approaches (including management-based regulation) have an inherent 
weakness, namely, that they necessarily provide considerable discretion in 
implementation, and in doing so they enable poorly run mines to engage in resistance 
or ritualism. If so, then the solution is to revert to a centralised, hierarchical (and by 
implication rule-based and bureaucratic) approach that substantially curbs such 
discretion.43 But as organisational and other management theory has long recognised, 
centralised hierarchical control has severe limitations – the capacity to deal with 
complex organisations through detailed rules alone is extremely limited (Teubner 1983, 
239), which is why proponents of meta-regulation argue for responsive regulation that 
devolves responsibility to those who have the specialised skills and knowledge to self-
regulate (in this case mine sites themselves), subject to external oversight (Parker 
2002, 283). This is especially the case when it is difficult to measure performance and 
the target group is made up of heterogeneous facilities facing heterogeneous 
conditions (Coglianese & Lazar 2003). In short, whatever the shortcomings of 
management-based regulation, it is far better suited to engaging with the WHS 
                                                
43 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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challenges of diverse individual mine sites than to a centralised, rule-based approach. 
In substantial part it is for these reasons that management-based regulation has 
proliferated so rapidly over the last decade. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
Many regulators and corporations have concluded that management-based regulation 
has considerable promise in encouraging enterprises to take greater responsibility for 
developing their own systemic approaches to regulatory or business challenges and 
their own best means of identifying and managing risks. Nevertheless, to what extent 
or in what circumstances this promise will be realised in practice, particularly when it 
comes to applying management-based regulation to the multiple facilities of large 
corporations, remains largely an open question. 
 
Our case studies suggest that, in the mining industry at least, this approach was 
vulnerable to failure for a variety of often-interrelated reasons. At Minerals Inc, a form 
of management-based regulation was applied across the corporate portfolio but proved 
far more effective at mines where levels of trust between workers and management 
were higher. Moreover, this approach was sometimes unable to overcome a 
combination of mine management resistance, middle management inertia, and the 
unwillingness of deputies to take managerial responsibility and implement 
management systems at the mine site. At Coal Company, the attempt to shift from a 
flexible discretionary approach to uniform mandatory management standards applied 
across the board failed not only because some mine managers remained unconvinced 
of corporate management's commitment or capability and due to an absence of mine 
site ownership, but also because of a lack of understanding of what was required to 
make management-based regulation work at corporate level, coupled with a 
  
246 
organisational history and management philosophy in which a belief in the virtues of 
decentralisation was deeply embedded. This was added to high levels of mistrust 
between workers and management at some mines. 
 
On the basis of this study at least, it would appear that corporate systems and other 
tools of management-based regulation only work well when WHS is institutionalised 
and when it gets into the ‘bloodstream’ of the organisation at site level. Only when the 
formal systems (audits, reporting, monitoring, etc.) are supported by informal systems 
(trust, commitment, engagement, means of overcoming conflicting loyalties, etc.) will 
they be fully effective. 
 
These findings have important implications for regulatory theory and suggest that the 
claim that management-based regulation – or meta-regulation more broadly – can 
overcome many of the traditional challenges of regulating complex organisations is 
overstated. On the contrary, this study suggests that management-based regulation (or 
indeed meta-regulation) confronts much of the same challenges as other forms of 
regulation (albeit on a different scale), with the result that management-based (or 
meta-regulation) may simply relocate the problems (from outside to inside the firm), 
rather than solving them. Whether the mining industry, with its distinctive history of 
conflict and polarisation, is unrepresentative in this respect, we have insufficient 
evidence to say. But in this industry at least, management-based regulation is 
substantially constrained by low organisational trust, minimal mine site commitment, 
and divided loyalties. 
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Chapter 9: Regulation by stealth: Codes of practice under 
harmonised work health and safety legislation 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of an article by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
published in a forthcoming volume of the Australian Journal of Labour Law. The 
relative contributions were split 50/50 between Sinclair and Gunningham. Sinclair 
contributed to the fieldwork, the processing of interview material, the background 
research and literature reviews, the preparation of initial drafts and the preparation and 
editing of the final draft.  
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The process to reform general WHS regulatory regimes across all nine Australian 
jurisdictions has now been substantially advanced.44 This was orchestrated by the 
Council of Australian Governments, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental 
Agreement for Regulatory and Operational Reform in Occupational Health and Safety. 
It sought to achieve harmonisation through the adoption by the jurisdictions of a model 
WHS Bill, regulations and codes of practice (hereafter ‘codes’), developed following an 
extensive National Review into the structure and content of WHS laws. The aim: 
 
… is to provide equitable standards for protecting Australian workers, reduce the 
regulatory burden for businesses and undertakings operating in more than one 
jurisdiction, and create efficiencies for governments in regulating WHS. A further 
objective is to achieve significant and continual reductions in work-related 
deaths, injuries and disease, although these reductions will not necessarily 
                                                
44 For a more detailed description and analysis of the harmonisation process and the obstacles 
it confronts see Bluff & Gunningham (2012).  
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follow from harmonisation since they depend upon the provisions of WHS Acts, 
regulations and codes, and their implementation in workplaces, rather than on 
harmonisation in and of itself (Bluff & Gunningham 2012, 2).  
 
Codes of practice are central to preventative WHS legislation as it has evolved in 
Australia, and it is timely to consider how they fared under the harmonisation process. 
It is important to note, however, that this process is far from complete. At the time of 
writing Victoria and Western Australia have yet to sign onto the model WHS Bill and 
enact legislation and regulations to bring it into effect. A number of generic model 
codes have also been formally approved, as have various industry specific codes. In 
the case of the mining industry, ‘core’ codes are intended to apply to mining in all the 
participating jurisdictions, while more specialist ‘non-core’ codes are still being 
developed exclusively for the ‘mining states’ (Safe Work Australia 2011, 4; Access 
Economics 2011). 
 
To understand why codes are a fundamentally important part of the WHS regulatory 
regime a brief description of the harmonised legislation is necessary. The model WHS 
Bill involves three tiers:  
(i) a set of general duties of care (for example, to do what is “reasonably practicable” to 
ensure health and safety);  
(ii) more detailed standards laid down in regulations; and 
(iii) codes of practice which set out one way of achieving and demonstrating compliance 
with relevant provisions of the Act and regulations but are not mandatory.45  
 
                                                
45 The legal source of these three tiers is: general duties laid down in Acts, regulations made 
under delegate authority but still amounting to ‘law’, and ‘codes’ approved by Ministers under s 
274 of the Model Act but not formal ‘law’. 
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It is the third tier that does much of the ‘heavy lifting’ under the WHS regulatory regime. 
This is because the number of circumstances lending themselves to ‘second tier’ 
solutions through regulation is limited46, and the ‘first tier’ general duties are so broadly 
based that they provide little practical guidance as to what is required in particular 
circumstances. In consequence, codes have a critically important role in providing 
authoritative guidance to duty holders as to ways in which the general duties and 
regulations could be discharged. 
 
While the principal focus of this chapter is on codes it is important to recognise that one 
of the functions of regulators under the WHS Bill is to provide advice and information 
on WHS that they may do through guidelines, guides, fact sheets, hazard alerts and 
other forms of guidance materials. Since codes and ‘advice and information’ are 
closely connected (particularly in New South Wales, where Mine Design Guidelines 
(MDGs) play an important role), explicit reference will be made to the interconnections 
between the two types of instruments.  
 
The chapter considers the merits of a sector specific approach through an empirical 
analysis of the coal-mining industry in the two ‘mining states’ of New South Wales and 
Queensland, where WHS has a high profile and where there have been considerable 
advances in WHS outcomes over the last two decades (Gunningham & Sinclair 2012). 
In this regard, the disinclination of the inspectorate to follow the intent of the legislation 
is also considered. In so doing, multiple industry stakeholders were interviewed47 to 
ascertain their experience not just regarding the strengths and weaknesses of codes in 
principle, but equally, in terms of how they are interpreted, implemented and enforced 
                                                
46 These may be confined to minimising significant risks, especially those that can be life 
threatening or cause serious disability, and where there are recognised solutions that are known 
to control the risk effectively (such as particular technologies). See Bluff & Gunningham (2012). 
47 Snowball sampling was the principle means of selection while ensuring that all stakeholder 
groups were adequately represented. 
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in the real world. In total 64 interviews were conducted, encompassing mining 
company executives (at both site and corporate levels), trade union officials, and the 
mines inspectorates both at head office and field officer levels in the two ‘coal mining 
states’, as well as with Commonwealth and State officials responsible for the 
development of codes. This enabled us to explore in depth, the experience of New 
South Wales with mining specific codes of practice and of Queensland with the 
comparable instrument of recognised standards (Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 
1999 (Qld); Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 (Qld)). Since data 
collection was confined to these two states we have make no direct comment on 
whether or to what extent similar patterns are to be found in other states such as 
Victoria, where Part 5.3 of the OHS Regulations 2007 applies to mines and the 
regulator is a generalist WHS regulator.48  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 describes the scope, characteristics 
and legal status of codes under the new WHS regime, their role in achieving 
compliance, and their relationship with standards and guidance material. Section 9.3 
examines potential flaws in code development and review, their consequences and 
how they might best be overcome. Section 9.4 describes the various types of 
standards that codes might incorporate, including circumstances that impact on code 
effectiveness. Section 9.5 examines how codes are implemented, including, in the 
case of coal mining, possible gaps between theory and practice, and possible 
remedies. Section 9.6 concludes. 
 
                                                
48 Part 5.3 has been the subject of detailed consideration in the public inquiry into the 
Hazelwood Coal Mine Fire which burnt for 5 weeks from 9/2/14. While the inquiry had not 
reported at the time of publication, media releases suggest that not all of this chapter’s findings 
are necessarily applicable in Victoria. See generally hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/ accessed 3 
August 2014. 
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9.2 Approved codes of practice under the new regime 
 
9.2.1 Scope, characteristics and legal status of codes of practice 
 
The National Review Into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws (hereafter 
‘Review Panel’) recognised that codes play an important role in assisting duty holders 
to meet the required standard of WHS practices at work, and that it was important that 
they be provided with a legal status that would maximise that role (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2009, 48.1). So what should that role be, in what circumstances should they 
appropriately be used, and what precisely should be their legal status?  
 
In addressing the first and second of these questions, the Review Panel quoted with 
approval the views of Bluff & Gunningham (2008, 3) who had argued that:  
 
In the continuum of quasi-legal and purely advisory instruments, we suggest 
the principal basis for selecting a quasi-legal instrument over a purely advisory 
one is the need for unequivocal, authoritative advice. An ‘approved’ code of 
practice is a more appropriate choice when it is important to provide clarity and 
certainty about an acceptable way(s) to comply with the OHS statute or 
regulations, and it needs to be clear and unambiguous that the instrument has 
legal status and/or can be used as evidence in proceedings. A statutory 
guideline is appropriate if there is a need to provide definitive interpretation of a 
particular provision of an OHS statute or regulation. In other circumstances, 
where the principal aim is to provide practical advice and solutions, guidance 
materials (in various forms) are appropriate. 
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This position, according to the extensive evidence provided in the above report, was 
also representative of regulatory ‘best practice’. The Review Panel concluded that 
codes play an important role in explaining the requirements of the Act and regulations 
and setting out practical ways to meet the required standard of WHS practices at work. 
 
As to the third question, the Review Panel noted that in the past, the legal status of 
codes, compliance codes and comparable instruments had varied substantially between 
jurisdictions. For example, there were approved codes with a rebuttable presumption of 
non-compliance, approved codes that were ‘deemed to comply’ and approved codes 
that were evidentiary but had no ‘rebuttable presumption’ or deemed to comply status 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Table 76). There were also ‘recognised standards’ in 
Queensland that looked remarkably like codes by another name.49  
 
In determining their legal status, the Review Panel emphasised that, while approved 
codes are documents of legislative character, which legislation provides can be used in 
court proceedings, nevertheless: 
 
There is no requirement that codes of practice be complied with. They are 
meant to guide duty holders in how to meet their obligations. It is not appropriate 
that they have a binding or prescriptive character. They may not be directly 
applicable to each business or workplace. If a person can otherwise show 
compliance with the duties under the Act, then compliance with a code of 
practice is not normally expected or required. Codes of practice do, however, 
represent evidence of knowledge of risk and risk control. They are evidence of 
                                                
49 Although there was no obligation to follow the methods contained in recognised standards, if 
they were not followed, the onus was on the operator to demonstrate that they adopted an 
alternative method that managed risk equally well or better than the way suggested under the 
standard or guideline. See Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) s 37(3). 
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what would be reasonably practicable in the circumstances (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2009, 48.26).  
 
The Review Panel illustrated their view of how codes should apply (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2009, 48.28) (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Application of codes 
 
 
Accordingly, the Review Panel recommended that: 
• The model WHS Bill provide that a code is to be taken by a court to represent what 
is known about specific hazards, risks and risk controls. That evidence, along with 
other evidence, may assist the court in determining what was reasonably 
practicable in the circumstances (Commonwealth of Australia 2009, 
recommendation 230).  
• The model WHS Bill should make clear that a duty holder may achieve and 
demonstrate compliance with relevant provisions and regulations by ways other 
than the ways set out by an approved code of practice recommendation 231). 
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Consistent with these recommendations Section 275 of the model WHS Bill 2009 
provides:  
(1) This section applies in a proceeding for an offence against this Act. 
(2) An approved code of practice is admissible in the proceeding as evidence of 
whether or not a duty or obligation under this Act has been complied with. 
(3) The court may: 
(a) have on regard to the code as evidence of what is known about a hazard or risk, 
risk assessment or risk control to which the code relates; and 
(b) rely on	 the	 code	 in	 determining	 what	 is	 reasonably	 practicable	 in	 the	
circumstances	to	which	the	code relates. 
 
The ‘evidentiary’ status of Approved Codes of Practice (ACOPs) under this provision 
(meaning that they can used as evidence in proceedings) is particularly important. For 
example, in New South Wales, this overcomes obstacles that would otherwise be 
presented by the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and the rules of evidence, which would 
otherwise prevent the use of documents as evidence unless backed by an independent 
expert witness. 
 
Importantly, s 275 does not give ACOPs ‘deemed to comply’ status. Rather, there still 
needs to be an assessment that the code covers what needs to be dealt with to 
achieve what is ‘reasonably practicable’. That is, while for the most part, following an 
ACOP would achieve compliance with the health and safety duties in the WHS Act, it 
must be remembered that “codes of practice deal with particular issues and do not 
cover all hazards or risks which may arise. The health and safety duties require duty 
holders to consider all risks associated with work, not only those for which regulations 
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and codes of practice exist” (Safe Work Australia 2012). This is appropriate given that 
many codes under the new WHS regime are of a generic nature.50 
 
9.2.2 The roles of ACOPs in achieving compliance 
 
Inspectors may use a variety of different strategies to achieve compliance with WHS 
legislation, ranging from facilitating voluntary action through advice and persuasion, 
through direction via improvement and prohibition notices, to prosecution and other 
enforcement action (Gunningham 2007, Chapters 6-7). ACOPs have greatest influence 
in terms of the first two of these strategies and as we will see, far less with regard to 
the third.  
 
First, ACOPs are commonly used by inspectors as part of a co-operative advise and 
persuade approach to provide practical guidance to duty holders. This is a legitimate 
means of drawing attention to improved WHS practices and is consistent with their 
statutory purpose.  
 
Second, although failure to implement an ACOP is not in itself an offence, a failure to 
comply with an ACOP may be used as evidence of failure to discharge a general duty 
or to comply with a regulation. Codes do therefore have enforcement implications and 
it is not uncommon for inspectors to cite them in an Improvement Notice or Prohibition 
Notice.51 This is legitimate provided it is not implied that the duty holder must comply 
                                                
50 For a general discussion of the role of codes of practice under the harmonised WHS regime 
see Johnstone, Bluff & Clayton (2012, Chapter 6). See also, Johnstone & Tooma (2012, 26-27 
and 35-36).  
51In principle, such a notice would need to cite mandatory requirements of the relevant WHS Act 
or regulations, since ACOPs are not mandatory instruments. However, it would be entirely 
  
256 
with the ACOP in order to discharge their legal responsibility. On the other hand, if the 
duty holder neither complies with the relevant ACOP, nor develops an alternative 
approach at least as good, then they will have failed to comply with the relevant notice. 
We return to the problem of inspectors treating ACOPs as de facto mandatory at 
Section 9.5 below.  
 
Finally, ACOPs might be used in evidence in prosecutions for breaches of WHS 
statutes or regulations. Yet in practice, codes seem to be referred to only exceptionally 
in judicial proceedings and relevant judicial commentary is scant. A search for cases 
involving codes of practice through LexisNexis revealed little more than a handful of 
cases in which ACOPs were referred to, and mostly only in passing. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that in principle, ACOPs may be used in evidence in a prosecution. As such, they 
have greater legal standing than standards and guidance material (see further Section 
9.2.3 below), as has been confirmed in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(Inspector Mulder) v Arbor Products International (Australia) Pty Ltd [2001] 
NSWIRComm 50; (2001) 105 IR 81. Having said this, it appears that in some 
jurisdictions the courts also seem prepared to take account of the latter (including 
Australian Standards) in determining whether risks are foreseeable, and whether 
mitigation is reasonably practicable (Bluff & Gunningham 2008).52 
 
                                                
legitimate for a notice to refer to a code of practice (or indeed to guidance material) to draw 
attention to relevant provisions and to provide information about one way of complying. 
52 Note also the provision with regard to due diligence in clause 27 (1) of the model WHS Bill, 
which is designed to ensure that officers take proactive steps to eliminate or reduce hazards or 
risks within the workplace that a person in control of a business or undertaking is responsible 
for. It would appear that if a particular code becomes outdated (as will not be uncommon) and 
ceases to incorporate what is understood to be contemporary good/best practice then the due 
diligence requirement would not have been satisfied. 
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9.2.3 Relationship between codes, standards and guidance material 
 
The model WHS Bill provides that ACOPs can expressly apply, adopt or incorporate 
other documents, in whole or in part. Specifically, section 274 (3) provides that “a code 
of practice may apply, adopt or incorporate any matter contained in a document 
formulated, issued or published by a person or body whether:(a) with or without 
modification; or (b) as in force at a particular time or from time to time”. 
 
In the coal mining industry, technical standards are provided for by a number of 
standards setting bodies. Of particular note is the International Labour Organisation 
code on safety and health in underground mining. Similarly, a code might adopt 
‘exposure standards’ with regard to hazardous chemicals or standards developed by 
national and international standards bodies, including Standards Australia.53 Notable 
government developed standards are the MDGs compiled by the Mine Safety 
Operations Branch of Industry & Investment, New South Wales. 
 
An attraction of standards such as the above is that these can be incorporated ‘as 
amended from time to time’ in ACOPs to enable the most updated and current version 
of the standard to be applicable (although this does serve to bypass tripartite scrutiny 
of any such revisions) (Johnstone et al 2012, 6.155). Such an approach has been 
taken with regard to the model Regulations (see regulation 13). Should the drafters of 
ACOPs adopt a similar approach it will have the advantage of helping to keep them up 
to date (to the extent that they rely on a standard), given that it may not be practicable 
to revisit and revise the code in its entirety for some considerable time ahead. 
 
                                                
53 Standards Australia is recognised by the Australian Government as the peak non-government 
Standards body in Australia. See: <http://www.standards.org.au/Pages/default.aspx>. 
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While this approach has merit, it does not guarantee that ACOPs will reflect the 
contemporary state of knowledge about particular hazards or risks, nor the available 
and suitable ways to eliminate or minimise them. For example, standards themselves 
become outdated. This is certainly the case with Australian Standards, particularly 
given limited funding for regular revision. The result is that while some standards may 
reflect contemporary knowledge, others do not.   
 
9.3 Flaws in code development and review 
  
The harmonisation process has put great pressure on members of the tripartite 
process who are charged with developing new instruments within a very short period. 
There was almost unanimous agreement amongst our respondents that in the case of 
ACOPs, the development process has been extremely rushed, with insufficient 
resources – the ambition to get ‘new codes out of the door’ resulted in short cuts being 
taken, to the detriment of code quality. This was compounded by the fact that the 
Review Panel itself did not devote sufficient attention to the details of how ACOPs (or 
guidance material) should be developed and deployed. In a number of respects, then, 
code development has been seriously deficient.  
 
First, insufficient attention has been paid to priority setting, with decisions to develop a 
particular ACOP based on ad hoc criteria, rather than on strategic considerations54. 
This can lead to inconsistency and a misuse of scarce resources. Some respondents 
likened this to a ‘shotgun approach’, where officials reactively responded, particularly 
when there is ‘blood on the floor’. As such, WHS regulators (in consultation with 
industry and unions) should develop a set of criteria for ACOP development to prioritise 
                                                
54 While no systematic study has been conducted, a number of respondents involved in the 
development of ACOPs asserted that they were commonly a response to a particular incident 
rather than part of a coherent process of reform. 
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the greatest hazards, including the capacity to evolve in response to changing 
technologies (soft and hard) as well as incidents ‘on-the-ground’.  
 
Second, ACOPs must be developed efficiently to be less resource intensive and time 
consuming. Industry stakeholders, in particular, complain that they cannot participate 
meaningfully under the current approach, given the volume of material involved. An 
efficient and systematic approach to code development is desirable,55 emphasising the 
importance of clear objectives, engaging with relevant industry stakeholders, identifying 
a range of possible solutions and testing these out with interested parties, before 
proceeding to the drafting stage. 
 
Third, effective consultation in code development is essential to the legitimacy of the 
tripartite process and to the quality of new codes. The model WHS Bill provides for a 
tripartite process of code development but does not specify what this should involve or 
how, if at all, appropriate expertise should be harnessed. An apparent failure to engage 
sufficiently with either of these concerns indicates the need for early involvement of 
stakeholders including technical experts, and, where appropriate, designers and 
manufacturers of plant or equipment. 
 
Fourth, the model WHS Bill is imprecise as to when and how any review of ACOPs 
should take place. This is unfortunate since they can become outdated and potentially 
counterproductive or redundant (some MDG’s in New South Wales, for example, have 
not been updated since the mid 1990s). It is important that procedures are developed 
for updating existing codes (and guides), recognising that those with prescriptive 
components may need more regular review. Such reviews should ask: does the code 
provide an unambiguous guide to one way of complying for specific activities? Is the 
                                                
55 The draft Protocols for Developing Codes etc, developed under the NMSF may be a helpful 
step in this direction. 
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code up to date and does it properly reflect changes in technology? Is the code 
presented in the most appropriate way for the intended audience? Does the code refer 
to current technical standards?56  
 
Finally, there is the question of whether ACOPs (and guides) should be generic or 
sector specific. Since few hazards lend themselves to one or two control measures that 
can be effectively adopted in every workplace, many generic codes are too broad to be 
of practical help, as numerous respondents pointed out. While generic codes are 
appropriate in a limited range of circumstances (for example appropriate consultation 
procedures between management and workers), for the most part, sector specific codes 
have greater value for their intended audience.  
 
9.4 Code design: How best to influence corporate behaviour 
 
ACOPs may incorporate a number of different types of standards. This section argues: 
(i) that which types of codes are invoked will be fundamentally important to code 
effectiveness and WHS outcomes; and (ii) that their design should take account of the 
characteristics of their target audience and of how best to influence their behaviour.  
 
9.4.1 Standards and their application 
 
To address these issues it is first important to identify the different standards types. 
Consistent with Bluff & Gunningham’s (2004) typology, ACOPs may contain:  
(i) principle-based standards that set a general objective or standard without specifying 
the means of achieving that standard;  
(ii) prescriptive provisions (also known as specification standards57) that specify the 
                                                
56 This list is drawn from Löfstedt (2011, 56).  
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particular measures that may be taken by duty holders (but are not mandatory);  
(iii) process-based standards which set out a course of action (consultation, processes 
to manage risks, management systems);  
(iv) performance-based standards which describe an outcome but leave it to the duty 
holder to determine the concrete measures to achieve that outcome; or  
(v) documentation provisions such as records of action taken.  
 
There are examples of each of these types of standard amongst the currently released 
national model codes (or in jurisdiction-specific codes that remain in force under the 
transitional provisions applying to the new WHS regime). Further, many codes contain 
elements of more than one of these types of standard. 
 
Principles-based standards are epitomised by the general duties stated in the WHS Bill 
but are rare in codes, which aim to elaborate on such principles rather than replicate 
them. An exception is the prohibition on energised electrical work (Safe Work Australia 
2012).58 
 
There are a number of examples of ACOPs that contain prescriptive requirements, 
though entirely prescriptive codes are rare. For example, How to Safely Remove 
Asbestos (Safe Work Australia 2011b) specifies that the ‘wet method’ must be used to 
                                                
57 The term ‘prescriptive’ in the above context is unfortunate since all standards (including 
thoses which are performance and process based) are prescriptive insofar as they direct duty 
holder to behave in some particular way. The term specification standard should be preferred. 
See Gunningham & Bluff (2012). However, since all respondents and the industry more 
generally, refer to prescriptive standards in the above context, that language is maintained for 
the purposes of this chapter. 
58 This provision specifies that energised electrical work must not be carried out unless the 
safety risk to those persons directly affected by a supply interruption is higher than the risk to 
the licensed or registered electrical workers proposed to carry out the energised electrical work. 
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removal asbestos where reasonably practicable, but in most other respects is risk-
based. Greater prescription can, however, be found in some of the jurisdiction specific 
codes, each of which will remain in force until a comparable replacement model ACOP 
is approved. For example, in Queensland some recognised standards involve 
numerous highly detailed and prescriptive provisions,59 exemplified by Recognised 
Standard 5 (on stonedusting) (Department of Natural Resources and Mines 2003), as 
too do many MDGs in New South Wales.60 
 
A substantial number of other ACOPs, in contrast, are primarily process-based. How 
To Manage Work Health And Safety Risks (Safe Work Australia 2011c) is a typical in 
that it emphasises the importance of risk management and how this can be achieved 
through the four steps elaborated in the code: identify hazards; assess risks if 
necessary; control risks; and review control measures to ensure they are working as 
planned. In terms of mining the draft Work Health and Safety Management Systems in 
Mining code (Safe Work Australia 2011d) is also essentially process-based, involving: 
an effective WHS management system; the identification and control of risks; the 
identification of all principal mining hazards; and the preparation of management 
control plans.  
 
The quintessential example of a performance-based ACOP is Managing Noise And 
Preventing Hearing Loss At Work (Safe Work Australia 2011e) that provides for the 
maintenance of workplace noise at decibel levels that are safe for human ears (while 
also utilising process standards). How to Safely Remove Asbestos (Safe Work 
Australia 2011b) also contains performance-based elements, providing that what action 
a licensed asbestos removalist should take will depend on the ‘respirable fibre level’, 
                                                
59 See generally the listing at Department of Natural Resources and Mines (2013). 
60 For the most part, MDGs do not have any formal legal status. The exception is those MDGs 
in New South Wales that have been gazetted and which have the same legal status as codes. 
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and, in terms of mining, the draft Ventilation of Underground Mines code states: “the 
mine ventilation system must provide air at sufficient volume and velocity to all places 
where people travel or work to maintain a safe level of Oxygen, between 19.5% and 
23.5% by volume” (Safe Work Australia 2011f, 2.1). 
 
Finally there are some examples within the ACOP of ‘documentation standards’, the 
most obvious being Labelling of Workplace Hazardous Chemicals (Safe Work Australia 
2011g). The related approved code on Preparation of Safety Data Sheets for 
Hazardous Chemicals (Safe Work Australia 2011h) also falls within this category. In 
the case of mining, the draft Mine Record Code of Practice (Safe Work Australia 2011i) 
also falls within this category.  
 
9.4.2 How appropriate is the current mix? 
 
No guidelines have been developed for which type of standard might be desirable, in 
which particular circumstances, or whether a combination of standards (and if so which 
particular combination) might best promote WHS. This is unfortunate and can result in 
incoherence in ACOP development, with the risk that some codes, at least, are not well 
suited to achieving their WHS objectives or are counter-productive.  
 
So how should ACOPs be designed? More particularly, which of the above type of 
standards or indeed combination of standards is best suited to achieving WHS 
effectively and efficiently? To address this question we first distil the findings of the 
literature61 and respondent views before seeking to elaborate some principles for code 
design. 
 
                                                
61 See in particular Gunningham & Johnstone (1999, Chapter 2); Bluff & Gunningham (2012). 
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While the literature recognises that principles-based standards can play an important 
role – especially given their all-encompassing character – such attributes are rarely 
desirable in codes. The very essence of most codes is to provide practical guidance 
and to flesh out the principles-based general duties contained on WHS law. With very 
few exceptions, restating such duties or making other statements of a general nature 
would serve no useful purpose. Perhaps for this reason, respondents had very little to 
say about such standards.  
 
The literature suggests that performance-based standards, while valuable, can only be 
applied in few circumstances. For example, while in some circumstances it may be 
possible to state a maximum permissible level of exposure to noise, or to a hazardous 
substance, often there is insufficient scientific evidence to justify such an approach, or 
no plausible performance-based measure is identifiable. This was consistent with 
respondent views, who saw value in such standards but only in the particular 
circumstances where there was clear scientific evidence to support the setting of a 
specified limit. A similar view was expressed about documentation-based standards: 
while evoking no criticism, they were seen as playing a very modest role.  
 
Similarly, there was little support, either in the literature, or from respondents, for the 
use of prescription-based standards; and many industry respondents were highly 
critical of them. According to the literature, such ‘bright line’ standards do have the 
virtue of clearly identifying what preventive measures must be implemented by the duty 
holder and thereby enable duty holders and inspectors to readily ascertain compliance. 
However, they do not facilitate least cost solutions and accordingly are unlikely to be 
cost-effective in the majority of circumstances (Bluff & Gunningham 2012). As such, a 
common industry respondent view was that prescription inhibits innovation and does 
not encourage best practice: 
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You have to achieve a balance that allows the industry to evolve, and still 
maintain best practice. If you make it prescriptive you constrain the evolution of 
best practice … The problem is – how do you prove your way is better and who 
is going to go to the effort of proving it, and risk getting an inspector offside. We 
want continuous improvement whereas a prescriptive standard says – if you do 
it this way, that’s enough. 
 
Further, where enterprises and WHS challenges are not homogeneous then 
prescription is often inappropriate and counterproductive because ‘one size does not fit 
all’. A mining executive encapsulated this view as follows: 
 
With prescription it’s difficult with things that vary from mine to mine – for 
example the ventilation system. It’s different at every mine site and there are 
different levels of gas and different conditions. 
 
Similarly with ‘strata failure’, it was claimed that: 
 
You can’t prescribe by regulation. But you can say, you must have appropriate 
roof support. [performance] but you can’t say have these cables, those bolts 
and this mesh – because there are many different permutations and it’s all 
circumstantial, so you can guide but you can’t prescribe.  
 
Others were particularly fearful that prescriptive codes would proliferate in the future 
and be applied in circumstances where they were manifestly inappropriate: 
 
It’s all over prescribed. In Queensland the CFMEU want 30 recognised 
standards to be put into codes. But that doesn’t consider the uniqueness of risks 
at individual sites.  
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Finally, since to be effective they must be detailed, prescription-based standards tend 
to result in a mass of law that is difficult to comprehend and keep up to date (Bluff & 
Gunningham 2012, 18-19).  
 
On the other hand, several respondents, principally those with ‘hands on’ WHS 
responsibilities (including engineers), saw some attraction in prescriptive codes 
because they provided practical advice and solutions to achieve compliance. The virtue 
of such an approach, it was claimed, “is it gives the SSE [Senior Site Executive] the 
confidence that if I do it this way my arse is protected”. Many inspectors and the 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) also support this approach, 
largely because it enables them to be more confident in identifying breaches. Some 
industry respondents attributed other motives to the latter, suggesting for example, 
that: “in Queensland, if the CFMEU can’t get prescriptive legislation they try to get the 
same result through a recognised standard [the equivalent of a code]. They want 
prescription so they can catch people out”.  
 
Turning to process-based standards, the literature suggests that these are valuable in 
encouraging enterprises to take greater responsibility for developing systemic 
approaches to regulatory requirements, including identifying and managing risks. 
Indeed, advances in mining industry safety are widely attributed to the development of 
structured risk management and WHS management systems. Regulators, in turn, have 
tried to harness this in the form of management-based regulation (Coglianese & Lazer 
2003). Whether or to what extent they have been successful is however a matter of 
ongoing debate (Gunningham & Sinclair 2012).  
 
Respondent views on this issue were largely a mirror image of their opinions on 
prescriptive standards. Most senior mining executives extolled the virtues of process-
based standards, while recognising that there were considerable challenges in making 
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this approach work in practice.  A common view was that: “if you have got the right 
systems, the general risk management approach is the way to go”. Many, for example, 
saw the virtue of “giving the end user the ability to understand the process and where 
the risk lies and to show them how to mitigate it”. However, some also identified 
considerable difficulties in making a risk-based approach work internally, across mine 
sites. Extending such an approach to contractors was a particular challenge: “[I] don’t 
find the existing guidelines [to a risk based approach] very useful – we can’t even 
agree amongst ourselves about how it should be done”.  
 
For these reasons, some saw a particular place for explanations and/or training of 
hazard/risk management principles, suggesting a need for clearer risk management 
guidance within codes and guides. Were such codes to be developed, then, as the 
CFMEU pointed out, they should indicate a series of specific processes and checks 
that need to be completed, as well as involving the workforce directly in the risk 
management process. Some in industry suggested that the inspectorate itself should 
provide assistance in hazard identification and risk assessment, whilst bemoaning their 
reluctance to do so. 
 
Other stakeholders were much more critical of process-based standards, although their 
reasons varied according to their position. For example, some industry respondents 
expressed reservations about relying on a risk-based approach because “some people 
will push the envelope”, and, when they do, such standards will be harder for the 
inspectorate to enforce than bright line prescriptions. Managers at the ‘front line’ also 
opposed them because it is harder to demonstrate compliance. As one industry 
respondent stated: 
 
Some engineers like to sleep easy – they have a compliance mentality that waits 
for the inspectors to tell them what to do. They are not interested in managing 
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risk – the whole thing is an arse covering exercise. But the intent of OHS is to 
provide a safe system of work. This can be difficult for some engineering 
managers to accept. 
 
Several inspectors, as indicated above, also expressed a preference for prescription 
because it makes their job easier in enforcing compliance. The CFMEU was also 
strongly supportive, arguing that the mining industry is not sufficiently mature for risk-
based regulation to be a credible option. 
 
To summarise, both the international literature and many respondents suggest that 
different types of standards or different combinations of standards are appropriate in 
different types of circumstances. While there was little support for principles-based 
codes, most saw benefits in performance and documentation-based standards but 
recognised that these would only be suited to a very limited range of circumstances.  
 
Opinion was much more divided with regard to the role of prescriptive and process-
based standards. Senior executives within industry, who could perhaps afford to take a 
more dispassionate view than their ‘hands on’ colleagues, were generally in favour of 
process-based (and especially a risk-based) standards. In contrast, those ‘in the firing 
line’ in terms of demonstrating that they had discharged obligations under WHS 
legislation, wanted the security of prescription. Since prescription and process are often 
antithetical, this suggests an ambivalence concerning what sort of codes they really 
want – one mining executive encapsulated this as follows:   
 
The reason some things are prescriptive is because the SSEs [Senior Site 
Executives] want it. With a high consequence event they want to be able to say 
risk based is great but just tell me what to do and I’ll do it- especially if they think 
there is a risk of going to jail. With every recognised standard in Queensland it’s 
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because they have asked for it. We are half pregnant. Either we want risk based 
or we don’t. We talk about risk and managing it but it’s having a code that gives 
you security.  
 
Mining engineers were often less ambivalent, expressing a strong preference for 
detailed prescriptive standards, especially in relation to the design and manufacture of 
mining equipment by external suppliers. 
 
Field officers (as distinct from senior inspectors at HQ), and the trade union, were also 
supportive of prescription over process, largely because it provided for certainty and 
ease of enforcement. Engineering inspectors in particular, were seen as likely to be 
“quite rigid with their approach to codes and guidelines” and much more so than 
generalist mines inspectors, some at least of whom were much more attuned to a risk 
assessment methodology. The senior inspectorate, at least in New South Wales, also 
saw some virtue in shifting away from prescription (and acknowledged that some of the 
inspectorate, however, particularly more ‘traditional’ inspectors, were still operating 
within a prescriptive ‘compliance mindset’), but they did not want to lose the 
‘accumulated industry wisdom’ that they saw as often contained in prescriptive 
standards. 
 
In the following section we provide our own analysis of how the tension between 
prescriptive and process based codes should be resolved. 
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9.4.3 Completing the journey: Towards a process-based approach 
 
How ACOPs are best framed will depend in large part on the particular characteristics 
of the industry sector at which they are targeted. A sector specific approach has virtue 
in resolving the tension between prescription and process-based standards, and in 
determining which of these types of standards should be preferred and in what 
circumstances. 
 
The coal mining industry is distinctive in a number of respects. It comprises almost 
entirely large sophisticated companies – there are no small and medium sized (SMEs) 
in the two ‘coal mining jurisdictions’ of New South Wales and Queensland (although 
ancillary service providers vary in size). It also involves high risk operations which vary 
substantially according to: the mining environment (and therefore appropriate 
ventilation controls); the method of mining; the geotechnical environment (and 
therefore the necessary forms of strata control); whether they are ‘gassy’ or non-gassy, 
whether they are underground or open cut, and so on.  
 
Moreover, for a variety of reasons (Gunningham & Sinclair 2012, Chapter 1), the 
Australian coal industry has invested substantial resources in improving WHS over the 
last two decades and indeed, according to both injury and fatality statistics, has made 
good progress in so doing.62 In short, even with substantial variation between mine 
sites and companies, the coal mining industry has, more than most other high risk 
                                                
62 See Poplin et al (2008). However, note that the above analysis relies heavily on LTIFRs 
which have been widely criticised for their vulnerability to manipulation. For a more recent 
triangulated analysis, see Gunningham & Sinclair (2012, Chapter 2). 
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industry sectors,63 demonstrated a commitment to, and realisation of, improved WHS 
performance. 
 
Finally, these improvements are widely attributed to the application of management 
tools that focus on systemic problems rather than individual deficiencies, in particular, 
the identification, assessment and control of risks, with an in-built system of 
maintenance and review. Poplin et al (2008), for example, noting the marked decrease 
in LTIs in the Australian coal mining as compared to the USA, suggest that that a risk 
management approach had a valuable role “in assisting with planning and managing 
operations, as well as helping some equipment manufacturers supply safer machines”. 
Joy & Terrey (2006, 11), documenting advances made by the Australian coal industry 
since the early 1990s with structured risk management concepts, tools and systems 
approaches, noted the profound impact of an approach whereby “the company and site 
are empowered to apply site systematic risk management approaches, decide on 
appropriate controls and interact with the regulatory about process quality” (while 
recognising that it is still a work in progress). 
 
So how should the above characteristics of the coal mining industry serve to shape 
code design? As regards principles-based standards (which are only very exceptionally 
relevant), performance standards (which are valuable but have very limited application) 
and documentation standards (which again are only exceptionally relevant) the answer 
is: not at all. For these types of standards by their nature lend themselves to a generic 
approach. But as regards the two types of standards between which it will be 
                                                
63 In 2005–06, the industries recording the highest injury rates were Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing (109 per 1,000 employed), Manufacturing (87 per 1,000), and Construction (86 per 
1,000). Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4102.0 - Australian Social Trends, Work Related Injuries 
(7 August 2007) at: 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/63ED457234C2F22DCA25732C002080A7?opend
ocument> (accessed 8 August 2013). 
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necessary to choose in the large majority of circumstances – prescriptive and process-
based standards – the sector specific characteristics of the industry will be crucially 
important, for a number of reasons. 
 
First, prescription is most popular with SMEs. Lacking sophistication and resources, 
they almost invariably invoke the mantra: “just tell us exactly what to do and we’ll do it”. 
This has been the finding of almost every investigation of the behaviour of SMEs, both 
in Australia and internationally.64 But there are no SMEs in the coal mining industry 
(unlike for example, opal mining), so their needs are of no concern in this context. 
While there is no justification for complacency, and a considerable distance to the 
achievement of ‘zero harm’, nevertheless coal mining companies have for the most 
part demonstrated a commitment to improved WHS, have achieved a substantial 
reduction in injuries and fatalities, and are well equipped to devise their own best 
practice ways of addressing particular hazards. As such, they are far less in need of 
prescriptive standards than SMEs.  
 
Second, given the considerable variation between the circumstances of different coal 
mines, prescription-based standards are likely not just to be unnecessary, but may 
indeed be inappropriate or counterproductive. This is because, as indicated earlier, 
prescription is best suited to homogenous industries where one size fits all. Where 
there is substantial variation between the circumstances confronted by different 
companies or different mine sites within the same company, while a prescriptive 
standard may be tailored to the circumstances of some, it will inevitably be unsuited to 
others. For example, while explosion protection requirements are appropriate for any 
diesel used underground in gassy mines, it is doubtful whether they should be imposed 
in non-gassy mines. 
                                                
64 See, for example, Gunningham & Johnstone (1999, Chapter 2) and Gunningham & Sinclair 
(2002). 
  
273 
Third, while prescription-based standards may be valuable in creating a level playing 
field and establishing clear rules in a highly competitive industry with multiple small 
players and incentives to ‘cut corners’ (such as construction), again, this is not the case 
with mining. In the former, there is likely to be a ‘race to the bottom’ in safety 
performance in the absence of clearly defined and clearly enforced standards. But in 
the mining industry where the relevant drivers (risk management and social license), 
are to go ‘beyond compliance’, and where the statistics suggest that aspirations are 
backed up by action, not just rhetoric, a very different approach may be appropriate: 
one that facilitates companies doing more than the minimum and which encourages 
industry innovation and initiative.  
 
Prescription, in contrast, can inhibit innovation. This was a view of both industry and of 
senior regulator respondents. For example, according to one senior Queensland 
inspector, prescriptive codes inhibit continuous improvement:  
 
Once something is in a code that will become the standard. Ninety eight percent 
of people will choose to follow the code. The code will be a set of rules. People 
need something to bite on. But the code becomes all that’s ever done.  
 
A mining industry executive expressed a similar concern as follows: 
 
If there is an in-rush code, I do my damndest to meet it. I’d do everything I can, 
and then they can’t touch me. But it’s pedantic. They find a technical detail that’s 
missed. If they could say my risk wasn’t managed then fair go, but they will issue 
a directive based on a micro level thing. The code doesn’t distinguish between a 
big thing and a little thing. The inspectors don’t draw a line between major and 
minor. What use is a risk management procedure if the code is minutely written 
and detailed and specific? It detracts from a risk-based approach. It makes a 
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risk-based approach redundant (emphasis added). 
 
These problems are serious particularly in the context of codes providing a minimum 
baseline of performance for the industry, not necessarily best practice. As one senior 
industry respondent put it: “Codes are not the highest level of performance. They are a 
minimal level of compliance. That’s how they should be”. This makes it even more 
important to encourage and facilitate beyond compliance behavior on the part of 
industry. 
 
Fourth, and crucially, the WHS architecture that has evolved in the mining sector is 
predominantly process-based (and quintessentially risk and system-based). This is 
increasingly sophisticated and appears to have achieved considerable reductions in 
injuries and fatalities (Gunningham & Sinclair 2012, Chapter 2; Joy & Terrey 2006, 12-
13). It is also the essential architecture of mine safety legislation that has evolved over 
the last decade (emphasising as it does, general duties, WHS management systems 
and hazard management plans). In this context, the introduction of prescription-based 
standards, far from complementing process-based standards, commonly serves to 
undermine them, producing outcomes that are likely to be detrimental to the overall 
cause of WHS. This can occur in a variety of ways, as a number of our industry 
respondents pointed out. For example, prescriptive codes can serve to constrain 
effective risk management, as occurs where an inspector insists on a duty holder 
following a prescriptive code notwithstanding that this will detract from auditing and risk 
management: 
 
The inspectorate focused on stone dusting and on whether we were following 
the recognised standard [broadly comparable to a code of practice65]. And this 
                                                
65 Recognised standards are not mandatory, but when followed they provide a way of meeting 
safety and health obligations. A person may adopt another way of managing a risk, but in the 
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is pages of detail. But really we should be auditing our mine site OHS 
management systems – is that system appropriate to manage the risk – but the 
only way the inspectorate knows how to test [if we are performing safely] is to 
do it with the recognised standards. So it gets down to whether we have done 
the petty things, not the important ones.   
 
Similarly, another respondent reported:  
 
You get a code but it’s not the holy grail. You get things written in the most 
minute detail but it’s not the only way to achieve the same result. And it’s not 
always applicable to your circumstances, but if it’s written into the standard you 
are stuck with it even if it does not quite relate to your major hazard analysis.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that, according to the literature, prescriptive standards “are 
most appropriately reserved for addressing WHS problems where effective solutions 
are known and where alternative course of action are not desirable, because of the 
need to control specific and significant risks in a particular way” (Bluff & Gunningham 
2012, 19). But while this is uncontentious as a general statement about the appropriate 
roles of different types of standard, it suggests that the best place for prescription is in 
regulations, whose purpose is precisely to make mandatory, requirements in these 
circumstances. However, codes clearly contemplate the appropriateness of ‘alternative 
courses of action’ (this is why the code simply specifies one acceptable means of 
compliance) and so are clearly excluded from the scenario contemplated above.  
 
From the above analysis it would appear that the coal mining industry, given its profile, 
the heterogeneous nature of the hazards at individual mines, its level of sophistication 
                                                
event of an incident the person may be required to show that the method adopted was at least 
equivalent to the method in the recognised standard. 
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and commitment to improving WHS, and its history of ‘internal control’ through WHS 
management systems and risk management, is particularly well suited to the 
application of process-based standards in codes. Especially those that focus on 
refining management systems and sharpening risk management practices so as to 
underpin systematic efforts to address the hazards/risks arising in their operations. It is 
also the case that superimposing prescription-based standards on this risk-based 
approach will be counterproductive, and can be anticipated to have a negative impact 
on the overall level of WHS. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a risk that removing prescriptive material from codes may, as 
some senior regulators suggest, result in the loss of standards that “encapsulate the 
wisdom and experience from within the industry”. Although this is a powerful argument, 
the need to preserve such wisdom can be satisfied by incorporating such material in 
sector specific guidelines as per the New South Wales MDGs. It should be noted that 
one particular advantage of relying on guidelines rather than codes, is that the former 
are less likely to be regarded (albeit erroneously) as de facto regulations. In this way, 
the accumulated wisdom that in the past has sometimes been contained in prescriptive 
codes would not be lost, but would be preserved in a different form.  
 
For all the above, in the many circumstances where there is a tension between the 
application of process-based (primarily risk-based) codes and prescription-based 
codes, the former should be preferred, and that prescriptive material previously 
contained in codes, where it still encapsulates valuable information, should be 
transferred to guidance material. 
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9.5 Implementation and interpretation: Regulation by stealth? 
 
While the form and content of codes is important, it is how they are interpreted and 
implemented by the inspectorate and industry that in large part determines their overall 
efficacy.  
 
9.5.1 Are codes and guidance material being used as de facto regulation? 
 
As described earlier, section 275 of the model WHS Bill makes it clear that it is not 
mandatory to comply with an ACOP, that it simply describes one acceptable way to 
satisfy the general duty to do what is ‘reasonably practicable’. As such, codes do not, 
and should not, have a binding or prescriptive character (Commonwealth of Australia 
2009, 48.26). Moreover, as noted in the previous section, a prescriptive interpretation 
would be antithetical to the risk-based approach to regulation which has facilitated the 
Australian coal mining industry in achieving substantial improvements in WHS 
outcomes, and which also reflects the underlying philosophy of the principal mine 
safety legislation, which is built around the central pillars of general duties, 
management systems and major hazard management plans.  
 
But codes not only provide guidance to duty holders, they also assist inspectors in 
interpreting and implementing WHS legislation. For example, an inspector may refer to 
an ACOP when issuing an improvement or prohibition notice, or in determining whether 
a prosecution was justified. And it is here that a substantial tension appears between 
the risk-based nature of the legislation and of the WHS management practices of the 
major companies on the one hand, and the interpretation of codes as prescribing 
particular behaviour, by the inspectorate on the other. 
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Many industry respondents cited instances where in practice inspectors had treated 
codes as if they were mandatory standards. That is, inspectors have frequently taken 
such a rigid and prescriptive approach to codes, that each code becomes, not just one 
acceptable means of discharging the general duty requirements, but the only way. As 
one industry respondent complained, “the regulators say they want to give you … 
increased freedom, but they give you a bunch of prescriptions”. This occurs either 
because “even where the operator does demonstrate a better way to do it the inspector 
still insists that they comply with the code”, or because, notwithstanding that an 
inspector does not explicitly demand compliance with a code, they are unwilling in 
practice to approve any alternative approach. One industry manager put it this way: 
 
If you want to go down your own route the inspectors will look very hard at what 
you are doing … If they were asked to approve an alternative route, they would 
not do this if it were a formal process. They wouldn’t put their nuts on the line. 
 
The result is that it is, at best, a rare exception for industry to choose the route of 
equivalence (that is, exercising its discretion find an alternative approach that achieves 
at least the same degree of safety as the code) rather than simply adhering to an 
ACOP: 
 
There are a lot of powerful reasons pushing both inspectors and miners towards 
the codes. It is the exception that mines will go against codes or MDGs. It would 
involve a risk assessment, designing a regime, signing off by mine manager and 
general manager – it only happens once or twice a year. 
 
This rigid and inappropriate interpretation of the role of codes, common among field 
inspectors, was recognised to be a problem not just by the mining industry, but also by 
the senior inspectorate, as the following comments attest: 
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Inspectors should not be doing it [treating codes as mandatory]. They just don’t 
seem to be able to help themselves… they just say, this [the code] is best 
practice so why aren’t you doing it? (senior inspector) 
 
These concerns were particularly prevalent in New South Wales where codes have 
been part of the regulatory landscape for many years, but they also resonated in 
Queensland where recognised standards perform similar functions. Indeed, 
Queensland respondents had little difficulty anticipating some of the likely 
consequences of the new regime, including the impact of codes on their operations. As 
one Queensland industry respondent put it:  
 
Who determines if you have done something equally safe or better? If I’m not 
following a code I should be able to ask the inspector – is this ok? The inspector 
should say whether my alternative approach is OK or not – but they won’t 
because if they get it wrong they would be in the poo. So they aren’t going to 
approve my alternative method. Particularly if they have the CFMEU (trade 
union] in their ear, whispering, ‘you’ve got it wrong’.  
 
As will be apparent, this rigid approach to ACOPs, like the preference for prescription 
over risk-based standards, has the unfortunate consequence of inhibiting innovation 
and constraining efforts to go beyond compliance. But notwithstanding its unfortunate 
consequences, this approach still has its adherents who, who unsurprisingly, are 
essentially the same groups which endorse prescription over risk management. These 
are, once again, many middle managers who are in the firing line if something goes 
wrong, and who ‘just want to be told what to do, and do it’, and, also, some field 
inspectors, particularly those who have been in their positions for many years. For both 
these groups: 
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The easiest thing to do is to comply with codes; it is the path of least resistance. 
Everyone is most comfortable with this approach, both miners and inspectors 
(senior mining engineer). 
 
Importantly, this is not only the case with codes but also with guidance material, 
particularly in New South Wales, where both inspectors and industry rely upon MDGs, 
many of them highly prescriptive and detailed, to ‘tell them what to do’. That is, 
inspectors not only use MDGs as detailed sources of guidance when it comes to 
technical issues, but many of them regard compliance with them as the only way of 
discharging the duty holder’s general duty responsibility (to do what is reasonably 
practicable) in circumstances where they are applicable. As one industry respondent 
lamented: it is “putting a sophisticated tool into the hand of someone who is used to 
using a blunt instrument”. Another stated: 
 
The general thrust of [WHS legislation] is to be less prescriptive at a high level, 
but you get creeping prescription at the operational level – this goes against the 
thrust of enabling legislation. Even though they say they can’t be prescriptive, 
they really are. You end up treating guidelines as though they are legislation.  
 
Many inspectors, too, acknowledge the potential for MDGs to be used prescriptively, 
and conceded that ‘old school traditionalists’ in particular, were inclined to cite a failure 
to meet an applicable standard set out in a MDG66 as the reason for the issue of a 
notice. 
 
                                                
66For further details of MDGs see the MDG Index at: NSW Trade and Investment (Resources 
and Energy), NSW Mining Design Guidelines, at: 
<http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/minerals/safety/publications/mdg> (accessed 8 August 2013). 
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In summary, inspectors and industry alike agree that there is a substantial gap 
between policy intent and implementation practice, and whether this gap is seen as 
desirable or not, depends very much on where individuals sit within the hierarchy of 
their own organisation, with senior industry management and the senior inspectorate, 
tending to line up on one side, and most middle managers and some field inspectors 
on the other (especially the ‘old guard’ who ‘grew up’ with a traditional prescriptive 
regulatory model). Overall, it is often the views of the latter that prevail, with the result 
that in many cases codes and guidance material are being applied as if they were 
mandatory rather than simply offering one possible means of discharging the duty 
holder’s statutory obligations. The result is that even though senior managers 
emphasise that “if you have got the right systems, the general risk management 
approach is the way to go”, the on-site use of codes and guidance material often falls 
short of this expectation.  
 
9.5.2 Reforming implementation: Codes as authoritative guidance 
 
As we saw in the previous section, ACOPs, and sometimes guidelines, are being 
treated by many inspectors as de facto regulations. This is not only inconsistent with 
section 275 of the model WHS Bill and antithetical to the aspirations of mine safety 
legislation in the coal mining jurisdictions but also serves to inhibit innovation and 
continuous improvement, constrains risk based WHS initiatives and impedes other 
efforts to go ‘beyond compliance’. In short, it is not only contrary to the intent of the 
legislation but is antithetical to achieving best WHS outcomes. 
 
But what action should be taken to ensure that codes are indeed implemented as 
intended: as authoritative guidance rather than as de facto regulation? In this section, 
we propose five mechanisms designed to ensure that the widely perceived benefits of 
codes of practice are preserved while mitigating the counterproductive consequences of 
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the inspectorates’ current rigid approach.  
 
The first and obvious means of ensuring that codes are interpreted as the legislation 
intended, is to change the behaviour of the inspectorates. Senior regulators in both New 
South Wales and Queensland recognised the desirability of doing so: 
 
You should train inspectors so they clearly understand a code is a good starting 
point. You have to draw a line in the sand. But we must not take away their [the 
operator’s] creativity. They have to know that they have an option (Queensland).  
 
At the very least, the intended functions of codes and the inappropriateness of treating 
them as if they were regulations must be made clear to inspectors in formal training, 
refresher courses and through written directions from the Chief Inspector. But while this 
is an essential starting point, it may not be enough in and of itself, given that some 
inspectors appear to have been misconceived their powers with regard to ACOPs for 
some considerable time and are deeply wedded to their current approach. A second 
and related response would be to work through the HSWA, to develop mechanisms that 
will achieve consistent and appropriate use of inspectors’ powers. The issue of how 
inspectors interpret ACOPs is already one of a number of matters being taken up by the 
HSWA through the Regulators Harmonisation Project, which aims to establish a 
framework for harmonising WHS regulators’ approach to the administration of the model 
WHS Bill. This project has to date developed a range of policies, procedures and 
operating documents to assist inspectors to implement national laws consistently within 
and across jurisdictions, particularly through the work groups addressing Procedures for 
Inspector Powers and Functions and Training. However, it has not addressed mining 
specific issues that are deemed to be the responsibility of the NMSF, nor has it 
addressed codes (although it has developed some guidance material for inspectors, for 
example, guidance on procedures to deal with the entry of permit holders). Historically, 
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the behaviour of the Mines Inspectorates has been less shaped by HSWA activities 
than that of the ‘generalist’ inspectors, and it remains unclear to what extent they would 
be influenced by initiatives under the Regulators Harmonisation Project. 
 
A third avenue, consistent with Section 9.4 above, involves the progressive redesign of 
codes and guidance material such that the large majority of codes emphasise process 
and performance-based approaches over prescription (while recognising that in limited 
circumstances, more technical and detailed standards may be required). This would 
have the further benefit of minimising the opportunity for inspectors to interpret codes 
in ‘black and white’ terms because risk-based codes do not provide bright lines or lend 
themselves to such a narrow interpretation.  
 
A fourth approach would be to provide a clear pathway for industry to demonstrate 
equivalence to a code or guideline, thereby overcoming the present uncertainty that 
makes industry reluctant to risk developing an alternative approach in-house for fear 
that this will leave them vulnerable to enforcement action, particularly when their 
operations are subjected to particular scrutiny following an incident or injury. If a clear 
step-by-step guide were developed as to how equivalence could be demonstrated, in 
conjunction with a mechanism whereby inspectors were able to formally approve 
‘equivalence demonstration’, this would do much to dispel the current reluctance of 
industry to innovate. Arguably, for such a mechanism to be viable, inspectors, too, 
would need some formal protection in the event that such a decision, reasonably 
arrived at, proved to be erroneous. 
 
A final mechanism, which is beyond the ambit of this chapter but which we have 
addressed elsewhere (Gunningham & Sinclair 2012, Chapter 8), is nurturing cultural 
change within companies themselves, without which many of their own personnel will 
not be ready, willing and able to effectively implement a risk-based (or a process-
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based) approach. In essence, the evidence suggests that corporate WHS systems, risk 
management and other tools of management-based regulation only work well when 
WHS is institutionalised, and when it gets into the ‘bloodstream’ of the organisation at 
site level. In short, only when the formal systems (audits, reporting, monitoring) are 
supported by informal systems (trust, commitment, engagement) will they be fully 
effective, and these latter in turn, imply the need for supportive WHS culture at site 
level. 
  
9.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored how codes might best be designed and implemented to 
realise their potential to do much of the ‘heavy lifting’ under WHS legislation. While we 
have identified various deficiencies in the design and implementation of codes under 
Australia’s newly harmonising WHS legislation, two in particular stand out: a failure to 
design codes of a type or types that are best suited to their industry specific context; 
and a failure on the part of the mines inspectorates to implement codes appropriately. 
 
In terms of the former, no guidelines have been developed as regards which type of 
standard might best be suited to particular circumstances. The result is considerable 
incoherence in the development of standards, some of which are ill suited to achieving 
their WHS objectives. For the most part, policy makers will need to choose between the 
development of prescription and process-based codes, since these two types of 
standard are often incompatible. As we have argued, the coal mining industry, given its 
profile, the heterogeneous nature of the hazards confronting individual mines, its level 
of sophistication and its history of ‘internal control’ through WHS management systems 
and risk management, is particularly well suited to the application of process-based 
codes. As such, codes that provide a structured way of addressing risk management 
can make a particular contribution in this regard. Many prescriptive codes, in contrast, 
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can be anticipated to have a negative impact on the overall level of WHS, since they 
often detract not only from risk management but from innovation, continuous 
improvement and beyond compliance initiatives more broadly.  
  
In terms of implementation and enforcement, the propensity of individual inspectors to 
interpret codes as if they were mandatory is legally indefensible, inhibits preventative 
WHS innovations and damages relations between the inspectorate and operators. It 
might be argued that in this regard our findings are unrepresentative, that only an 
exceptional inspectorate would behave in such a fashion. Sadly, the evidence is to the 
contrary. Inquires in Western Australia, Queensland and New Zealand all suggest that 
the pathologies we have identified within the mining inspectorates are typical, not 
exceptional (Ritter 2004; Gunningham & Neal 2011; Queensland Ombudsman 2008). 
 
Strong measures are required to ensure that inspectors interpret codes appropriately: 
emphasising that their role in providing authoritative guidance while at the same time 
preserving opportunities for innovation and risk management. The latter is a process 
that the Australian coal mining industry has increasingly embraced over the last two 
decades, during which time the level of deaths and injuries has dropped significantly 
(Joy & Terrey 2006). The role of good regulation is to nurture that process, which is 
precisely what process-based codes, interpreted flexibly, can do. In contrast, a 
compliance mentality on the part of inspectors (and some parts of industry) that 
countenances no alternative than strict adherence to ACOPs, is a form of regulation by 
stealth that discourages risk management, constrains initiative and inhibits innovation.  
 
These findings have important implications for the ongoing development of codes under 
the harmonised WHS legislation, and will also feed into the more specific debate being 
conducted under the auspices of the NMSF concerning how to develop and implement 
best practice coal mining regulation. Australian mine safety regulation, with its central 
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pillars of broad-based general duties, WHS management systems and principal hazard 
management plans (Gunningham 2007, Chapter 2), is widely seen to be world leading. 
How unfortunate that implementation and enforcement, on the contrary, fall so far 
behind international best practice. It is only when this gap has been closed, and when 
codes are no longer regulation by stealth, that Australian mining WHS regulation will 
truly approach international best practice.  
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Chapter 10: Refined list of competencies that should exist 
within the ‘ideal’ inspectorate 
 
This chapter is a reproduction of Stage 1 of a two-stage report (Capability analysis of 
mining inspectorates) by Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair in 2009 prepared for 
the NMSF, Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism. Sinclair 
was wholly responsible for writing this stage of the report. 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The NMSF, an initiative of the Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
(MCMPR), aims to achieve a nationally consistent WHS regime in the mining industry. 
One of its seven strategies is competency development, with a goal of competency 
support: to encourage and promote continuous skills development and consistent 
levels of competency nationwide, for both the regulator and the industry. The NMSF 
Implementation Report sets out a three-stage process for the regulator component of 
the strategy: 
• Stage 1: Refine the list of competencies that should exist within the ‘ideal’ 
inspectorate. 
• Stage 2: Undertake an independent capability analysis of the inspectorate, based 
on the above list. 
• Stage 3: Develop and/or deliver training to improve competency where it is needed 
most.  
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The chapter relates to the first of these stages.67 
 
A list of competencies of the ideal inspectorate was developed at the Role of the 
Regulator Workshop, held by the Steering Group in February 2008. The identified 
competencies, for both the individual inspector and the inspectorate as a whole (i.e. as 
an organisation) were summarised into three main categories: (i) technical (e.g. mining 
engineering, electrical engineering, ergonomics); (ii) management and support (e.g. 
mine management, communication and consultation, policy development); and (iii) 
enforcement and investigation (e.g. understanding legislation, inspection, accident and 
incident investigation). However, the competencies identified at the workshop were 
regarded as only the first stage in the development of this strategy.  
 
The brief with regard to this first stage of the consultancy was to further refine this 
competency list, utilising existing competency resources. For this purpose the most 
useful sources were found to be the Competency Model for Mine Safety 
Inspector/Specialist developed by the United States Department of Labor Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (2003) and the United Kingdom Health and Safety 
Executive’s core competence frameworks, core regulatory framework and Health and 
Safety Core Regulators’ Development Needs Analysis Tool, all of which were piloted in 
2008 and are being ‘rolled out’ in 2009. We also drew on a number of other sources, 
including the United States Federal Railroad Administration’s Railroad Safety Inspector 
Competencies, the Behavioural Core Competency Profile of the Canadian Association 
of Administrators of Labour Legislation OHS Committee, the Nuclear Safety Regulators 
– National Occupational Standards Development Research Report 2008, the Skills 
                                                
67 The larger Gunningham & Sinclair report to the NMSF encompassed Stages 1 and 2, but not 
Stage 3. 
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Australia Public Sector Training Package (PSP04 Version 3), and the NOHSCEP 
(2008).68  
 
Based on these and other sources, and on a perusal of the broader regulatory 
literature, the list of competencies identified by the ‘Role of the Regulator’ workshop 
was refined as follows, seeking to identify the competencies that an ‘ideal’ inspectorate 
should possess. This process began by identifying the overall objectives of a mining 
inspectorate and by identifying five key outcomes that are essential to achieve these 
objectives. Objectives and outcomes were not addressed at the Role of the Regulator 
workshop but in our view competencies (collective or individual) can only sensibly be 
identified in the context of what they are intended to achieve.  
 
In terms of objectives, there is no dispute that a mining inspectorate’s core concern is 
to ensure compliance with applicable WHS law, policies and agreed practice (and by 
so doing, to minimise work related death, disease and injury). However, there is 
increasing recognition that a further role is to encourage, reward and facilitate ‘beyond 
compliance’ behaviour, at least by industry leaders. Certainly some inspectorates are 
expanding their role from purely legislative compliance to become workplace agents of 
change. The Victorian WorkCover Authority for example, seeks to recruit “multi-skilled 
adaptable health and safety professionals who can help workplaces create the 
solutions that will produce sustainable change”. 
 
                                                
68 The NOHSCEP is a principles-based document endorsed by each HWSA jurisdiction. It is 
interim in nature, pending the development and jurisdictional implementation of model national 
OHS laws. It is intended to ensure consistency in outcomes and that common approaches are 
taken by workplace health and safety authorities to the laws they administer. Each workplace 
health and safety authority will customise its policies to reflect its particular legislative and 
administrative framework and the national policy: 
(see http://www.hwsa.org.au/files/documents/Compliance_and_Enforcement_policy.pdf).  
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At the next level of analysis, we identified five outcomes that must be achieved for a 
mining inspectorate to achieve its objectives efficiently, effectively and equitably: 
 
(i) Risks and hazards. Mining is an industry where hazards are large, risks are inherent 
and change is continual. Successful management of risks associated with mining thus 
requires a systematic approach. It is essential that inspectors can identify those 
hazards with the greatest potential for adverse WHS outcomes and have an 
understanding of the general risk-management approaches, plans and systems best 
able to address them. 
 
(ii) Persuasion and enforcement. Inspecting, investigating, advising, influencing and 
enforcing are core inspectoral activities and how they are discharged will fundamentally 
affect the behaviour or regulated entities and the achievement of desired WHS 
outcomes. The primary emphasis should be on assisting industry to comply through 
building industry capability to properly manage workplace risks, while also maintaining 
an effective mix of positive motivators and effective deterrents. 
 
(iii) Consistency and proportionality. A mine operator is entitled to expect that the 
similar circumstances will produce a similar response from inspectors and that 
inspectors' actions will be proportionate to the extent of identified hazards, 
consequential risk of work-related injury or illness, the seriousness of any deficiency in 
the measures taken by relevant duty-holders and the operator's compliance record. 
Consistency, both in terms of process and outcomes, is necessary to ensure fairness 
in the treatment of different regulated entities and to maintain the credibility of the 
inspectorate. Such consistency is desirable within jurisdictions as well as across them.  
 
(iv) Relationships. Developing and maintaining a good professional relationship with 
mines sites and other stakeholders, based on trust and mutual respect, is essential to 
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achieving desired WHS outcomes. Regulatory outcomes usually emerge out of 
consultation, dialogue and negotiation. Unsurprisingly, a constructive relationship 
usually generates positive outcomes, and vice versa. 
 
(v) Improvement and integration. Many large mining companies have developed a 
sophisticated range of management tools intended to minimise work-related injury and 
disease. Some of these companies aim to go beyond compliance with existing 
legislation. Inspectoral practices need to be integrated with, and to complement and 
enhance corporate systems and controls, in order to encourage and facilitate 
continuous improvement.  
 
Most of the above five outcomes relate primarily to ensuring compliance (and in the 
case of persuasion and enforcement, exclusively so) but ‘improvement and integration’ 
and many of the competencies within it is concerned explicitly with encouraging and 
facilitating beyond compliance and with continuous improvement. 
 
In terms of the next level, the distinction made at the Role of the Regulator workshop 
between collective and individual competencies is retained, but both categories have 
been added to significantly, and adapted some of the competencies identified at that 
workshop in the light of capabilities identified in the various documents referred to 
above. We then endeavoured to map the various competencies into one of the five 
outcome categories (however it should be noted in this context that there will inevitably 
be some overlap of competencies among them). 
 
It should also be noted that not all inspectors could be expected to possess all 
competencies. There is a role for both generalists and specialists (and indeed for 
teams involving both, as noted in previous NMSF documents). For example, the type 
and level of training required by inspectors will vary depending upon whether one is 
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addressing general or technical competencies, with core mining technical skills central 
to the latter.  
  
For ease of access the competencies have been summarised in tabular form, followed 
by a more detailed elaboration below. For those who prefer a diagrammatic 
representation building on the Role of the Regulator workshop model, a modified 
version is also below at Table 7. 
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Table 7: Inspectoral competencies 
 
OBJECTIVE 
Ensuring Compliance to Encouraging ‘Beyond Compliance’ Behaviour 
OUTCOMES 
Risks and 
Hazards 
Persuasion and 
Enforcement 
Consistency and 
proportionality  
Relationships  Improvement and 
Integration 
COMPETENCIES 
Collective 
competencies 
Knowledge and 
review of risk and 
hazard 
management 
Abreast of 
technological 
developments 
Range of technical 
specialists 
Data analysis 
Capacity to address 
non-traditional risks 
Capacity to draw on 
multiple indicators 
Collective 
competencies 
Graduated compliance 
and enforcement 
response 
Range of accident and 
investigation skills 
Targeted compliance 
Responsive sanctioning 
Collective 
competencies 
Organisational 
management 
Line management 
Peer exchange 
Mentoring and training  
Collective 
competencies 
Leadership 
Professional standards 
Information exchange 
(and communication 
more generally) 
 
 
Collective 
competencies 
Leadership 
Engagement with mining 
companies 
WHS management 
expertise 
Tracking relative mine-site 
performance 
WHS policy for beyond 
compliance 
Range of policy options 
Continuous learning 
Individual 
competencies 
Review hazard 
identification and 
management 
Review risk analysis 
and management 
One or more 
technical skills 
Industry experience 
Investigative skills 
 
 
 
Individual 
competencies 
Knowledge of /familiarity 
with WHS law 
Inspect and identify 
breaches 
Accident and 
investigation 
Encourage compliance  
Flexible and responsive 
approach  
Mix of positive motivators 
and strong deterrents 
Knowledge of 
prosecution procedures 
Individual 
competencies 
Organisational knowledge 
Partnering and networking 
Tool selection 
Self-management 
Planning and evaluation  
Individual 
competencies 
Integrity 
Communication (oral, 
written and 
technological) 
Interpersonal skills 
Responsiveness 
 
Individual 
competencies 
Knowledge of mine-site 
systems, standards and 
procedures 
Knowledge of best-
practice WHS policy and 
practices 
Audit skills 
Problem solving and 
initiative 
Influence and negotiation 
Guidance and assistance 
Continuous improvement 
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10.2 Objective 
Ensuring compliance and encouraging ‘beyond compliance’ behaviour. 
 
10.2.1 Outcome 1: Risks and hazards 
• Ensure the identification of hazards with the greatest potential for adverse WHS 
outcomes. 
• Ensure the effective management risks and hazards. 
 
10.2.1.1 Collective competencies 
• Detailed knowledge of WHS issues in the mining industry and capacity to review, 
assess and challenge operator’s ability to identify hazards, understand risks and put 
in place controls (steering group members in disagreement over whether it is role of 
inspector to identify hazards, or assess operator’s ability to identify hazards). 
• Capacity to keep abreast of technological and safety advancements in terms of 
management and reduction of associated risks.  
• Provide a range of technical specialists within an inspectorate, including those with 
direct industry experience, (steering group members in disagreement over “direct 
industry experience) covering: 
o Operational management methods. 
o Engineering (mining, electrical, civil, mechanical, ventilation, geo-technical). 
o Occupational hygiene. 
o Mining-related expertise (e.g. geo-mechanical). 
o Mining operator experience, ergonomics. 
o Safe handling of explosives and dangerous goods. 
o Risk management. 
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• Training with regard to review of major risks and hazards (and mining technical 
skills). 
• Data analysis – particularly in order to identify safety risks and trends. 
• Capacity to review and assess management health risks in additional to safety risks. 
• Capture multiple indictors of risk and hazard management, including inspectoral 
insights, data analysis, and management, worker and union input. 
 
10.2.1.2 Individual competencies 
• Hazard identification and management (review, assess and challenge): 
o Recognise high-risk hazards. 
o Review procedures and processes to mitigate hazards to acceptable levels. 
o Familiarity with risk-management systems. 
• Risk analysis and management (review, assess and challenge): 
o Assess management risks of projects, processes and work tasks. 
o Review procedures to mitigate and control risks. 
o Familiarity with safe systems of work. 
• One or more of the above specialised technical competencies (including relevant 
technical/tertiary qualifications (eg 1st Class Ticket) – steering group members in 
disagreement over inclusion of the bracketed section on qualifications. 
• Industry experience – mining related experience/expertise in one or more fields 
(and/or in an allied industry) steering group members in disagreement over industry 
experience – alternative wording suggested “industry operating experience (mining 
related is an added benefit)” 
• Investigative skills – capacity to draw on multiple sources of information of risks and 
hazards (eg knowledge of industry, data, and management and worker and union 
input). 
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10.2.2 Outcome 2: Persuasion and enforcement 
• Select appropriate enforcement option(s) and apply graduated enforcement 
response to WHS non-compliance. 
• Investigate contributing factors/causes in the event of major WHS incidents, in 
particular serious injuries/fatalities, and investigate complaints. 
• Assist industry to comply through building capability to properly manage risks, while 
also maintaining an effective mix of positive motivators and effective deterrents (up 
to and including closing mine sites until problems are adequately addressed). 
 
10.2.2.1 Collective competencies 
• Able to deliver graduated compliance and enforcement response – consistent with 
the NOHSCEP, including: 
o Ensure duty-holders are knowledgeable about WHS laws and can achieve 
compliance (e.g. via safe systems approaches to effectively managing 
risks). 
o Ensure duty-holders comply with WHS laws or are held to account. 
o Deal immediately with serious risks. 
• Possess specialised accident and investigation skills. 
• Implement a targeted compliance and enforcement actions that address areas of 
greatest risk to health and safety. 
• Responsive sanctioning consistent with the NOHSCEP. 
10.2.2.2 Individual competencies 
• Knowledge of/familiarity with WHS law – including applicable regulations, required 
roles and responsibilities of duty-holders (and others) and available (and 
proportionate) sanctions. 
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• Capacity to inspect and identify breaches of general duty of care provisions (e.g. 
arising from inadequate processes or safety systems) as well as of specific 
regulations. 
• Encourage duty-holders to comply while ensuring that there are fair and timely 
consequences for those who do not. 
• Adopt a flexible and responsive approach consistent with the NOHSCEP. 
• Able to apply an effective mix of positive motivators and effective deterrents 
• Good working knowledge of prosecution procedures – and ability to recognise 
when to call on additional expertise. 
 
10.2.3 Outcome 3: Consistency and proportionality 
• Achieve consistency across companies/mine-sites and inspectors within a 
jurisdiction (as well as across jurisdictions), and proportionality (relating enforcement 
action to the seriousness of the matter). 
 
10.2.3.1 Collective competencies 
• Organisational management – foster consistency and proportionality of enforcement 
actions across the inspectorate, including through development of policies and 
procedures and internal quality control (ie self-review). 
• Line management – provide resource, technical and moral support to line inspectors. 
• Peer exchange – facilitate opportunities for inspectors to exchange information, 
experiences and approaches. 
• Mentoring and training – provides regular, one-on-one guidance, and training aimed 
at fostering consistency and proportionality (eg via nationally recognised 
qualifications). 
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10.2.3.2 Individual competencies  
• Organisational knowledge – coordinates with other parts of the organisation, 
knowledge of, and follows, inspectoral compliance and enforcement policy and 
guidelines, seeks advice and support where necessary.   
• Partnering/networking – works with others, shares ideas, information and best 
practice with other inspectors, workers and unions. 
• Ability to choose the appropriate regulatory tool for particular circumstances.  
• Self-management skills: 
o Works consistently even without direct supervision. 
o Time management. 
o Motivated to succeed and demonstrate responsible/consistent behaviour. 
• Planning and evaluation – organises work, sets priorities, determines resource 
requirements, formulates long- and short-term goals/strategies and monitors 
progress. 
  
10.2.4 Outcome 4: Relationships  
• Maintain constructive professional working relationship with mining companies and 
those working at individual mines sites (including managers and workers), based on 
trust, mutual respect and knowledge of WHS issues in the industry, and good 
communication (aligned with Global Code of Integrity for Labour Inspection). 
• Improved dialogue between management and workers. 
• Maintain the respect and support of peers, supervisors and subordinates across the 
inspectorate (and with key government organisations). 
• Maintain open dialogue with other key stakeholders (including workers, unions, 
suppliers and contractors). 
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10.2.4.1 Collective competencies 
• Leadership – demonstrably set the standard for quality relationships within and 
without the inspectorate. 
• Professional standards – establish and communicate clear behavioural benchmarks 
for inspectors. 
• Information and communication technology – use a variety of vehicles/media to 
communicate effectively and in a timely manner. 
• Ability to assess and, where appropriate, make suggestions to improve dialogue 
between workers and management. 
 
10.2.4.2 Individual competencies 
• Integrity – trustworthy, ethical, independent and honest in dealing with all 
stakeholders (including managers, workers, unions, contractors and suppliers). 
• Communication:  
o Oral communication skills (explains complex ideas, including legal and policy 
requirements, listens to others and comprehend operator issues). 
o Written communication skills (including information technology skills). 
o Ability to assess how well concerns, instructions and aspirations are 
conveyed at the workplace, and identify possible improvements. 
• Interpersonal skills: 
o Ability to consult internally and externally. 
o Cooperative and courteous. 
o Self confident and assertive (when necessary) – drawing on a sound 
knowledge of the industry, core mining skills, and major risks and hazards. 
o Capable of handling situations involving tension, stress or hostility. 
o Ability to engage with all levels at mine sites, from managers to workers. 
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• Responsiveness – follows up, takes personal responsibility and pursues appropriate 
action. 
 
10.2.5 Outcome 5: Improvement and integration 
• Complement and enhance internal mining company WHS management standards, 
systems and procedures. 
• Distinguish between ‘living and applied’ and ‘presentational and shelf-bound’ mining 
company WHS standards and systems.  
• Deliver regulatory outcomes appropriate to the size, sophistication and type of 
mining operation. 
• Reinforce mine-site safety culture. 
• Identify and help companies achieve beyond compliance WHS outcomes. 
 
10.2.5.1 Collective competencies 
• Leadership – encourage integration of regulatory and company WHS objectives and 
processes. 
• Engagement with mining companies – particularly at the corporate, senior manager 
and industry association level. 
• WHS management expertise – including international best practice, and the 
limitations of paper systems lacking management/worker commitment to them. 
• Statistical data analysis and performance assessment – within and between 
companies. 
• Policy on general WHS principles and practices – including achievement of beyond 
compliance. 
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• Range of policy options tailored to operator size, sophistication and/or type – 
including simplified WHS management systems for smaller mining companies/sites. 
• Continuous learning across all five outcomes, and ongoing improvement of 
inspectoral skills. 
  
10.2.5.2 Individual competencies 
• General knowledge of corporate approaches to operator standards, systems and 
procedures – including capacity to integrate with external regulatory process and 
performance standards, and their potential shortcomings (eg the use of short-cuts, 
lack of middle management commitment). 
• Knowledge of best practice WHS principles and practices within organisations, 
including change management – in particular opportunities to achieve and sustain 
beyond compliance outcomes, and the dangers of over-reliance on paper systems. 
• Knowledge of BBS programs. 
• Advise, guide and teach: 
o Help others to learn through informal and formal means. 
o Identify training needs. 
o Constructive feedback and suggestions. 
• Audit skills – standards, systems, procedures and worker competencies. 
• Problem solving and initiative – identify problems, evaluate alternatives, prepare 
improvement strategies, and make (and keep records of) recommendations. 
• Influence and negotiation – persuade mine sites (and supervisors) to cooperate and 
accept recommendations, and exploit opportunities for improvement. 
• Ability to tailor recommendations to operator size, sophistication and/or type – 
requires a good knowledge of the mining industry and, in particular, the needs, 
circumstances and constraints of smaller mine companies/sites. 
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• Knowledge of strategies to facilitate operator continuous improvement (eg by 
improving functioning of risk management tools and WHS management systems). 
 
10.3 Competencies diagram 
 
Below is a diagrammatic representation of the competencies list. This builds on the 
diagrammatic model of the Role of the Regulatory Workshop, to incorporate the 
additional competencies identified in this project. It should be noted, however, that the 
diagram does not correspond precisely to the competencies in this current draft, as they 
have been undergoing ongoing refinement. Obviously, the final diagram would be 
updated to reflect the final list of competencies. 
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Figure 2: Competencies list 
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Chapter 11: National enforcement guidelines for mining 
inspectorates  
 
This chapter is a reproduction of Stage 1 of a larger two-stage report by Neil 
Gunningham and Darren Sinclair in 2010, prepared for the NMSF, Commonwealth 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism. Sinclair was wholly responsible for 
writing this stage of the report. 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
The Stage 1 Report drew on the national and international literature (and in particular 
official reports and legislative instruments) to identify best practice principles with 
regard to: (i) stating the purpose of national enforcement implementation guidelines; (ii) 
key principles underpinning guidelines; and (iii) enforcement criteria, enforcement 
measures, principles with regard to the application of sanctions, investigation, and 
prosecution. Best practice for these purposes means policy mechanisms that are 
effective (in terms of achieving best results) and efficient (in doing so at least cost to 
both duty holders and the regulator), while also maintaining community confidence. 
The Stage 1 recommendations are reproduced in the box below.  
 
Stage 1 Recommendations 
1. Each jurisdiction should adopt the proposed National Enforcement Implementation 
Guidelines. The guidelines should be published, both on the regulatory agency’s 
website, and in hard copy.  
2. The Guidelines should state that their purposes include achieving WHS outcomes 
that are effective (in terms of reducing the incidence of work related injury and disease) 
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and efficient (in doing so at least cost to both duty holders and the regulator), while 
also maintaining community confidence. 
3. The Guidelines should be worded so as to provide duty holders with a clear 
understanding of the regulator’s approach. In particular, they should set out the basis 
and criteria by which the regulator decides upon the degree and form of regulatory 
control that it believes should be put in place for addressing occupational hazards.  
4. The Guidelines should be based on the principles of proportionality, accountability, 
consistency, transparency, targeting, cost-effectiveness, equity, due process and 
natural justice, responsiveness and flexibility. 
5. In making the decision to take enforcement action (which may fall short of 
prosecution) best practice criteria are: adverse effect, culpability, compliance history 
and attitude of the offender; impact of enforcement on encouragement or deterrence; 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the likelihood of the offence being repeated; 
whether the offence involves an immediate risk to the health and safety of a person at 
work; and whether the safety issue can be rectified in the presence of an inspector.  
6. In terms of enforcement, best practice implies a balanced approach of positive 
motivators and strong deterrents. To the extent that the inspectorate has the authority 
to give advice under current legal arrangements (and under the model WHS Bill it will 
have), then best practice would involve stating this role in the Guidelines 
7. In terms of enforcement strategy (ie how regulators should go about the 
enforcement task) best practice involves both risk based and responsive regulation. 
The enforcement pyramid is a valuable tool to use in determining which regulatory tool 
to employ in a given instance (that is, in deciding at what point in the pyramid to 
intervene and which instrument to select, given the characteristics of the regulated 
entity and the degree of risk or type of breach). 
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8. In designing an appropriate sanctioning regime for regulatory non-compliance, 
regulators should have regard to five Penalties Principles. A sanction should: (i) aim to 
change the behaviour of the offender; (ii) aim to eliminate any financial gain or benefit 
from non-compliance; (iii) be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm 
caused; (iv) aim to restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where 
appropriate; and (v) aim to deter future non-compliance.  
9. Best practice with regard to investigations is represented by the relevant provisions 
of the Health and Safety Executive Enforcement Policy Statement which specifies how 
regulators should use discretion in deciding whether incidents, cases of ill health, or 
complaints should be investigated, the importance of maintaining a proportional 
response and particular factors to be taken account of in deciding the level of response 
to be used.  
10. It is desirable to adopt the Prosecution Guidelines of the Australian Directors of 
Public Prosecutions and the public interest tests that apply. However, there is some 
variation between the criteria used to define public interest in different jurisdictions. As 
a minimum, the Guidelines should include the core criteria of adverse effect, culpability, 
compliance history and attitude of the offender; impact of enforcement on 
encouragement or deterrence; and mitigating or aggravating circumstances, 
11. In exercising their discretion with regard to prosecution, decision-makers should: (i) 
focus on risk rather than consequences; (ii) take previous track record seriously (which 
makes escalation up an enforcement pyramid credible); and (iii) emphasise that 
prosecution should not take place in the absence of culpability. For these purposes, 
culpability should mean a substantial falling short of reasonable expectations (a form of 
negligence), recklessness or intent. The actual decision to prosecute should be based 
on a calculus that takes account of all three of the above factors. 
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Based on the principles identified at Stage 1, the objective of Stage 2 is to develop a 
set of national enforcement implementation guidelines. These guidelines are intended: 
• To provide practical guidance to mines inspectors in their compliance and 
enforcement decisions. 
• Through more effective enforcement, to reduce the risk and incidence of incidents, 
injuries and disease.  
• To increase the consistency of enforcement policies and practices within and 
between jurisdictions. 
• To increase the efficient allocation of regulatory (and duty-holder) resources.  
• To enhance WHS capacity and compliance amongst duty-holders. 
• To improve enforcement transparency and provide duty-holders with a better 
understanding of enforcement decision-making processes. 
 
Previously, a draft model Guidelines (Model C) was provided for stakeholder comment. 
Although Model C is approximately a quarter of the size of the EMM model (which we 
were asked to refer to) the feedback received was that it was overly complex. 
Responding to that feedback, two alternative models (Models A and B) have been 
produced, which are set out in full below. 
• Model A is a streamlined and substantially simplified version of Model C. In 
particular, the decision-making framework has been consolidated into five discrete 
steps, and an enforcement matrix introduced. The suite of enforcement 
mechanisms has also been modified to more readily accommodate incremental 
escalation up an enforcement pyramid. Finally, three example enforcement 
decisions are included. 
• Model B was developed because a minority of NMSF Steering Group members 
requested enforcement guidelines that contain no prescriptive elements in order to 
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maximise inspectoral discretion. Our own view of Model A is that the five step 
approach, while clearly structured, is expressly intended to be used as a guideline, 
and as such, does facilitate inspectoral discretion and flexibility. Nevertheless, to 
accommodate to the concerns expressed above, we developed an entirely non-
prescriptive alternative model (Model B).  
 
To provide a context for understanding how the guidelines were developed it is first 
necessary to describe the relationship between the guidelines and existing policy 
documentation, the enforcement tools available, the enforcement issues addressed 
and how they were addressed. 
 
11.2 Development national enforcement implementation guidelines: 
A context 
 
11.2.1 Existing enforcement guidelines 
 
Inspectors use various enforcement techniques to address risks and secure 
compliance with the law. These range from advice and persuasion, through various 
administrative notices, to prosecution. As has been pointed out, “making decisions 
about appropriate enforcement is fundamental to the role of an inspector” (Health and 
Safety Executive 2005a, 1). 
 
Two key documents relevant to the development of National Enforcement 
Implementation Guidelines for the mining sector are the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive’s (2005a) EMM and the HSWA’s NOHSCEP. Although both these 
approaches provide valuable insights into the development of enforcement guidelines, 
they also suffer from substantial shortcomings.  
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In the case of the EMM, these shortcomings are as follows: 
• At 43 pages long, the EMM is excessively detailed and wordy, and may appear 
intimidating to some inspectors. 
• The decision making process is overly complex given the relatively limited range of 
possible enforcement outcomes. 
• The EMM is unwieldy to apply in the field.   
• The EMM does not make a distinction between prospective or preventative 
enforcement action (before an incident or accident has occurred) and retrospective 
enforcement (after an incident, accident or fatality has occurred), notwithstanding 
the very different enforcement strategies that these different circumstances imply.  
• Strict adherence to the EMM may leave little room for the discretionary provision of 
advice and guidance. 
 
In contrast to the detailed guidance of the EMM, the NOHSCEP is a principles-based 
document that employs a mixture of risk based compliance and response regulation. It 
is in essence a policy document, and it does not provide a practical, step-by-step 
decision-making process for individual inspectors.  
 
The proposed National Implementation Enforcement Guidelines contained in this 
Stage 2 Report seek to build on the strengths of the above approaches while 
compensating for their weaknesses. In particular, the approach extends beyond the 
NOHSCEP policy statements to include a streamlined and practical step-by-step 
decision-making process, but one that avoids the excessive detail and complexity of 
the EMM approach. Where practicable, this seeks to maintain consistency with the 
NOHSCEP approach so as to align mining WHS enforcement with generic WHS 
enforcement and to build upon the latter’s specific strengths.  
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11.2.2 Enforcement approaches 
 
Drawing on the findings of the Stage 1 Report, and consistent with the EMM and 
NOHSCEP, the proposed National Implementation Enforcement Guidelines are a 
complementary combination of two key enforcement approaches, widely referred to as 
(i) risk based and (ii) responsive enforcement: 
• Risk based compliance and enforcement applies inspectoral resources and 
enforcement actions to high risk duty holders and to each duty holder’s areas at 
greatest WHS risk.  Risk based compliance and enforcement seeks to target the 
resources available to each mines inspectorate to areas of greatest need and 
where they are most likely to have greatest impact on improved working 
environments and safety.  
• Responsive compliance and enforcement requires inspectors to take account of the 
duty holder’s particular circumstances, history and attitude in determining their 
enforcement response (in this form, responsiveness does not conflict with 
proportionality and fairness). An essential component of a responsive approach is 
the capacity to escalate up an enforcement pyramid (see ‘enforcement tools’ at 
Section 11.2.3 below).  
 
11.2.3 Enforcement tools 
 
Achieving consistency in enforcement across jurisdictions is largely dependent on 
inspectorates having at their disposal the same, or at least an equivalent, suite of 
enforcement tools. This is particularly the case for a responsive compliance and 
enforcement strategy that allows escalation up an enforcement pyramid (which, it 
should be noted, does not necessarily mean starting at the base of the pyramid). The 
following enforcement pyramid is drawn from the model WHS Bill. 
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Figure 3: Enforcement pyramid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: following successful prosecution, courts may impose a series of progressively 
punitive/restorative sanctions, namely:  
• Adverse publicity order. 
• Restoration order.  
• Community service order. 
• Injunction. 
• Training order. 
• Fine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 1: Advice and persuasion 
Level 2: Verbal direction 
Level 3: Improvement notice 
Level 4: Prohibition notice 
Level 5: Remedial action 
Level 6: Enforceable undertaking 
Level 7: Court injunction 
(compelling or restrained) 
 
Level 8: Prosecution 
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11.2.4 Compliance and enforcement instruments 
 
A graduated and responsive enforcement strategy requires a variety of different 
compliance and enforcement tools, to suit the various levels of an enforcement 
pyramid. Some of these tools will be designed to encourage and reward compliance 
(various forms of education, assistance, advice and persuasion), others will be geared 
to reminding enterprises of their regulatory responsibilities and nudging them to comply 
with them (improvement and prohibition notices, on the spot fines), and still others will 
involve credible sanctions at the top of the pyramid (penalties against individuals, 
criminal sanctions and the threat of closure).  
 
Although the model WHS Bill addresses the issue of enforcement instruments, it is far 
from comprehensive in this regard. It specifically provides power to issue improvement 
and prohibition notices (and the power to take remedial action when the latter are not 
complied with, and to apply for an injunction compelling a person to comply with a 
notice), to accept WHS undertakings (enforceable undertakings), and to prosecute for 
failure to comply with a health and safety duty. There is also a residual power provided 
by s 152 that: “Subject to this Act, the regulator has the power to do all things 
necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its 
functions”. 
 
However, as regards the mining industry there is a need to provide for a broader range 
of compliance and enforcement options, so as to provide a more efficient, effective and 
responsive regulatory toolkit to the mining inspectorates. The additional compliance 
and enforcement options might sensibly include the following: 
• Self-inspection and self-audit: Near the base of the enforcement pyramid may be 
those approaches that actively encourage duty holders (especially SMEs) to 
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regulate themselves. Two instruments with considerable potential (targeted to 
SMEs) are self-inspection and self-audit. Some inspectorates (eg New South 
Wales) already have a self-audit checklist on their website while others already 
have a power to require self audit. The authority of the inspectorate to order such 
actions should be formalised under model Mining Regulations. Although it can be 
argued that they are not strictly compliance/enforcement instruments they should 
be explicitly addressed because companies engaging in self-inspection and self-
audit would need to be guaranteed legal privilege over their results (so as to 
prevent such information being used in any future prosecutions against them).  
• Infringement Notices (‘on-the-spot fines’) have been found to be a very effective 
means of ‘getting the safety message across’. Although the model WHS Bill has a 
heading for infringement notices in Part 13 Div 3, there is no provision in the model 
WHS Bill itself. The Bill advises readers to “see the jurisdictional note in the 
appendix” but there is no such note. However, it may be that further amendments 
will be made to rectify this anomaly and to include infringement notices. 
• In the United Kingdom (Macrory 2006, 68) it has been suggested that it might be 
possible to combine both non-financial mechanisms, such as enforceable 
undertakings, with financial administrative elements of a sanction, in what is termed 
‘Undertakings Plus’. This would be invoked where, notwithstanding that "an 
undertaking offered by the business may be appropriate... the circumstances of the 
breach also require the payment of a financial penalty" (Macrory 2006, 68). For 
example, where non-compliance has demonstrably benefited the business 
financially, it might be stripped of this gain by imposition of a fixed or variable 
monetary penalty, but invited (not coerced) to contemplate engaging in a legally 
binding undertaking as to its future conduct and as to how it will go about achieving 
it, as an alternative to court action. Others argue that since enforceable 
undertakings, by their nature, are an alternative to prosecution, this is problematic. 
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• There would be particular value in an additional mechanism, more targeted to 
systematic WHS management (unlike improvement and prohibition notices) at a 
point in the pyramid short of enforceable undertakings or punitive sanctions. In 
particular, following the lead of many environmental statutes, WHS regulators 
should be empowered to seek a mandatory compliance audit – a systematic, 
documented and objective review of a mine's operations and compliance – to be 
undertaken by an independent third party auditor, but with the audit being paid for 
by the regulated enterprise and the results made available to the regulator. Here 
‘the process may be the punishment’ since the cost of the audit may be 
substantially more than any likely fine. Inspectors would issue an order, with the 
opportunity for appeal by the duty holder (the same approach as with improvement 
and prohibition notices). Such an approach is already provided for under Western 
Australian mining legislation. As with New South Wales’ environmental legislation, 
the power to require such an audit would be limited to circumstances where the 
regulator reasonably suspects that the duty holder has on one or more occasions 
contravened the Act or regulations.  
• Another potentially valuable mechanism not included in the model WHS Bill is a 
Directive, issued by an inspector, as contemplated under Queensland mine safety 
legislation. This would fit in the enforcement pyramid at the level immediately above 
‘Remedial Action’. The virtue of this mechanism is that it enables an inspector to 
initiate action much broader than that which might be required by an improvement 
or a prohibition notice, and one which could be issued in a much broader range of 
situations than either of these two notices. However, it is not as extensive as the 
type of Enforceable Undertaking contemplated by Part 11 of the model WHS Bill (a 
WHS undertaking accepted by the regulator). The latter could not only be much 
more ambitious but could also (based on past experience) cost the duty holder 
some six to ten times the amount of a fine resulting from prosecution.  
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Note: the proposed National Enforcement Implementation Guidelines in Part II below 
combine the above instruments with the existing model WHS Bill instruments. 
 
11.2.5 Enforcement issues 
 
In drafting the National Implementation Enforcement Guidelines a range of 
enforcement issues have been incorporated and/or considered. 
 
11.2.5.1 Identifying enforcement priorities 
 
Although this document is concerned with implementation guidelines once an inspector 
has entered a workplace, it should be noted that the decision of which workplaces to 
inspect, is an equally important one, and there is a separate literature on the question 
of where and where and how an inspectorate should deploy its scarce resources 
(Gunningham 2007, Chapter 4).  
 
For present purposes, the critical issues include identifying where an inspector should 
begin an inspection, where they should focus their attention, what they should look for, 
and who they should seek to contact. Inspectors’ time is inevitably limited, and it would 
be a waste of scarce resources if inspectors were to proceed in a random or 
haphazard fashion. A methodical and targeted approach aimed at the greatest risks is 
preferable, and this principle is incorporated in the draft Guidelines. 
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11.2.5.2 Direct versus management-based risks 
 
A distinction can be made between direct and management-based risks. The former 
includes those risks (or failures to act) that create immediate and discernable risk (eg 
failure to guard dangerous machinery). In short, they have the potential to lead directly 
to work related death, disease or injury (ie there is a direct causal link between the risk 
and a subsequent incident or injury). The latter includes WHS management systems, 
hazard management plans and risk management systems – strategies that do not have 
a direct causal link to a particular risk or event, but, rather, have an indirect, dispersed 
and longer term influence on WHS outcomes.   
 
11.2.5.3 Retrospective versus prospective enforcement 
 
The task confronting inspectors in relation to enforcement will vary depending on 
whether they are inspecting a site on the basis of an event, accident or incident that 
has already occurred, or whether they are seeking to identify risks that may bring about 
a future incident. These two situations may be described as retrospective and 
prospective, respectively. In the case of the former, there is no need to identify the risk 
of the event, as it has already occurred, but rather, the causes and responsibility for it. 
In the case of the latter, the first task (in determining whether to take action and if so 
what action to take) is to calculate the level of risk. 
 
11.2.5.4 Injury versus health, acute versus chronic 
 
The immediacy of incidents leading to acute injuries makes them an obvious target of 
inspectoral enforcement. In contrast, chronic injuries and disease, psychosocial 
hazards and long-term health are sometimes neglected aspects of inspectoral 
enforcement. Redressing this imbalance requires not just a shift in focus on the part of 
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inspectors, but also a shift in how they consider risk and its potential impact on worker 
health. 
 
11.2.5.5 Operator versus duty-holders up the supply chain 
 
Just as inspectors have historically focused their attention on injuries over health and 
major accident precursors, so too have they tended to concentrate on operators rather 
on duty holders further up the supply chain. Yet it is widely acknowledged that the 
design, manufacture, supply and installation of plant and equipment can have profound 
consequences, both positive and negative, for the level of risk in mine sites. 
Enforcement guidelines must treat seriously, the role of upstream suppliers and their 
capacity to mitigate risk (while this is a focus of the model WHS Bill supplier of WHS 
and other consultancy services like HAZID/HAZOP and drafting safety and health 
management plans should also be captured). 
 
11.2.5.6 Owners versus duty-holders down the supply chain 
 
As is well known, there has been a steady rise in the use of contractors (both to 
manage entire sites and to supplement existing owner-operator workforces) and a 
disproportionate amount of work related injury and disease is associated with their 
activities. For these reasons it is important that inspectors focus not just on mine 
owners and their employees but also on contractors and the vulnerability of contingent 
workers. 
 
11.2.5.7 Large versus small operators 
 
There is a very wide gap between the sophistication of major mining companies and 
small and medium sized operators in addressing WHS. As such, it is desirable for 
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inspectors to tailor their enforcement strategy, interaction and actions accordingly. In 
particular, small operators will require far greater advice, guidance, and quite probably, 
prescription. It is also likely that smaller operators will have less frequent interactions 
with the inspectorate, necessitating explicit direction from the inspector and steeper 
action up an enforcement pyramid. In contrast, in their interactions with larger 
companies, inspectors will more profitably focus their attention on WHS management-
based strategies. 
 
11.2.5.8 Advice and guidance versus punitive measures 
 
There is a range of enforcement options that encourage and assist compliance, and 
inspectors should be encouraged to employ them. These include: 
• Incident investigations 
• Targeted workplace inspections 
• Audits 
• Technical services 
• Recognition and rewards 
• Prevention programs 
• Information, guidance, education and advice 
 
Where advice and persuasion fails, enforcement strategy will need to escalate (from 
whichever level of the pyramid is first accessed) to more negative incentives and 
ultimately to punitive sanctions (see enforcement pyramid). 
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11.2.5.9 Responsive sanctioning complements responsive compliance 
 
The principles governing such sanctioning should aim to: 
• Change the behaviour of the duty-holder; 
• Eliminate any financial incentive of non-compliance; 
• Be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused; 
• Reduce the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; 
• Deter future non-compliance; and  
• Be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the particular duty holder. 
 
11.2.5.10 Compliance and beyond compliance  
 
The ultimate objective of the inspectorate is not just to ensure compliance with a 
minimum standard, but also to encourage and reward duty holders where possible to 
substantially exceed such minimum requirements. 
 
11.2.5.11 Role of employee representatives  
 
Employee representatives currently have WHS powers, and these will be enshrined under 
model WHS Bill (including the power to issue provisional improvement notices and to direct 
that dangerous work cease). Consequently, there will continue to be 
opportunities/requirements for the inspectorate and employee representatives to cooperate 
and collaborate in the implementation of an enforcement strategy that maximises WHS 
outcomes – in cases where an employee representative, for example, issues a provisional 
improvement notice, the inspectorate may be compelled to review such actions. In order to 
facilitate a productive working relationship, inspectors and employee representatives need to 
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establish a level of trust, communication and cooperation that allows for the free exchange 
of relevant information and coordinated, complementary follow-up efforts.  
 
11.2.6 Implementation issues 
 
In the course of consultations with stakeholders three key issues arose pertinent to the 
implementation of national enforcement guidelines. First is the need for simplicity so as to 
facilitate inspectors implementing the decision-making guidelines in the field. To achieve 
such simplicity we have greatly reduced the complexity of the EMM model, whilst still 
retaining essential elements of enforcement decision-making. Further, as noted in Part II 
below, or view is that inspectors in the field should utilise a single page decision-making 
check-list (see Section 11.6 below), and use the more detailed policy guidelines as a 
reference document. Additional implementation tools to assist inspectors may be required. 
 
Second, if inspectors are provided with too many enforcement options it may be more 
difficult to achieve consistency within jurisdictions. For this reason, we have included an 
element of flexibility in the enforcement levels at Step 5 below (whilst maintaining 
consistency with the model WHS Bill provisions). We have also noted that jurisdictions will 
adapt them to their own particular needs and circumstances.  
 
Third, and again to enhance consistency in their application, inspectors require 
comprehensive training in the application of the enforcement guidelines. This should be 
coupled with ongoing monitoring to assess the uptake and success of the guidelines. 
Although it is beyond the remit of the consultancy brief, we strongly endorse the need for 
effective training and monitoring. 
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11.3 National enforcement implementation guidelines  
 
11.3.1 Preamble 
 
A broadly similar approach to WHS regulation is taken by the Australian jurisdictions. It 
comprises legislation which codifies common law duties of care, complemented by 
detailed regulations and codes of practice, and incorporates a system of education, 
inspection, advice, enforcement and, where warranted, prosecution. The importance of 
harmonisation of WHS laws (including mine safety laws) is reflected in the 
development of the model WHS Bill and in initiatives under the NMSF. 
 
11.3.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of the National Enforcement Implementation Guidelines is to assist mining 
inspectors to adopt a consistent enforcement effort that is effective (in terms of 
reducing the incidence of work related injury and disease) and efficient in achieving 
compliance while also maintaining community confidence that the laws are being 
administered fairly and consistently. 
 
This policy operates to support the achievement of national priorities of: 
• Reducing high incidence/severity risks. 
• Improving the capacity of business operators and workers to manage WHS 
effectively. 
• Preventing occupational disease more effectively. 
• Eliminating hazards at the design stage. 
• Strengthening the capacity of government to influence WHS outcomes. 
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• To promote transparency and consistency, this policy will be available on the 
website of each mining inspectorate/workplace safety authority.  
 
Additional steps might include providing information about appeals, conducting 
regulator enforcement audits and developing a code of conduct for regulators.69 
 
11.3.3 Scope 
 
The National Enforcement Implementation Guidelines are endorsed by each 
jurisdiction. They are interim in nature, pending the development and jurisdictional 
implementation of the model WHS Bill. They are intended to ensure consistency in 
outcomes and that common approaches are taken by jurisdictions to the laws they 
administer.  
 
11.3.4 Aims 
 
That jurisdictions implement compliance and enforcement strategies in order to: 
• Ensure duty-holders have access to information about WHS laws and how to 
comply. 
• Ensure duty-holders comply with WHS laws or if they fail to comply ensure they are 
held to account. 
• Ensure duty holders eliminate or properly control risks. 
• Take action to deal immediately with serious risks. 
                                                
69 Text in normal type replicates the existing the HWSA’s NOHSCEP. Text in italics has been 
suggested for inclusion by members of the NMSF Steering Group. Whilst the latter would 
arguably enrich the document, it would result in Sections 1-6 of the NMSF Enforcement 
Guidelines deviating from the NOHSCESP. There is disagreement amongst stakeholders as to 
the possible inclusion of the italicised text. 
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• Promote and achieve sustained compliance with the law. 
• Deter non-compliance and prevent workplace injury. 
• Focus on safety (risk and conduct), not outcomes and prosecutions. 
• Motivate duty holders to engage in continuous improvement. 
 
11.3.5. Key principles 
 
Key principles of regulation underpinning compliance and enforcement activities of are 
that jurisdictions should be: 
• Consistent – regulators will endeavour to ensure that similar circumstances at 
workplaces lead to similar enforcement outcomes, thus providing greater certainty 
at the workplace. 
• Constructive – regulators provide support, advice and guidance to help people 
comply with WHS laws. 
• Transparent – regulators demonstrate impartiality, balance and integrity. 
• Accountable – regulators are willing to explain their enforcement decision-making 
and uphold avenues of complaint or appeal. 
• Proportionate – compliance and enforcement responses are proportionate to the 
seriousness of the non-compliance. 
• Targeted – to areas of highest risk or strategic enforcement (eg to protect 
vulnerable workers). 
• Additional principles might include due process, natural justice and flexibility.  
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11.3.6 Compliance and enforcement strategy 
 
The modern workplace health and safety authority/mines inspectorate uses a wide 
selection of compliance promotion and enforcement strategies ranging from 
information, advice, persuasion, co-operation, inspection, verification and compulsion 
through to deterrence (eg prosecution and/or removal of licence or other authorisation 
or permission). 
 
Workplace WHS/mines inspectorates have adopted a strategy to use an effective mix 
of positive motivators and strong deterrents to achieve compliance with the law and 
improved health and safety. This strategy seeks to encourage duty-holders to comply 
while ensuring that there are fair and swift consequences for those who do not.  
 
11.4 A two-pronged approach 
 
11.4.1 Risk based compliance and enforcement 
 
Firstly, the policy aims to apply resources and target compliance and enforcement 
actions to areas of greatest risk to health and safety. Risk-based compliance and 
enforcement seeks to target the resources available to each mining inspectorate to 
areas of greatest need and where they are most likely to have the greatest impact on 
improved working environments. 
 
11.4.2 Responsive compliance and enforcement 
 
Secondly, in order to ensure that regulatory response is effective at leading to 
sustained compliance at the workplace, compliance and enforcement measures also 
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seek to be responsive to the particular circumstances of the duty-holder or workplace 
that is the subject of attention.   
 
Responsive regulation seeks to use the most effective and appropriate enforcement 
measures to achieve compliance. 
 
Responsive sanctioning complements responsive compliance and enforcement. The 
principles governing such sanctioning aim to: 
• Change the behaviour of the duty-holder. 
• Eliminate any financial incentive of non-compliance. 
• Be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused. 
• Reduce the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate. 
• Deter future non-compliance. 
• Be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the particular dutyholder. 
 
11.5 Decision-making framework  
 
11.5.1 Model A 
 
This is a streamlined and modified version of the initial draft enforcement guidelines 
(Model C). In particular, the decision-making framework has been consolidated into five 
discrete steps, and an enforcement matrix introduced. In response to feedback, the 
suite of enforcement mechanisms has been modified from the model WHS Bill to more 
readily accommodate incremental escalation up an enforcement pyramid. Finally, three 
sample enforcement decisions are included. This framework is intended to guide rather 
than to prescribe the decision-making framework and to facilitate rather than mandate 
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a structured approach.  
 
Note: It is anticipated that inspectors would employ the streamlined Enforcement 
Checklist (see 11.7 below) on site, and use the more detailed decision making 
framework outlined below as a policy reference document. 
 
Summary of decision-making framework 
Step 1. Clarify the purpose of the visit. 
Step 2. Determine the nature of the hazard or breach. 
Step 3. Determine the risk arising from the hazard or breach. 
Step 4. Identify the duty-holder(s) and duty-holder factors. 
Step 5. Make an enforcement decision. 
 
Step 1:  Clarify the purpose of the visit 
 
a) Prospective – a hazard or non-compliance issue is yet to be identified. 
 
Where should inspectors direct their regulatory attention? They should draw on, but not 
be limited to, the following sources of information (but dealing first with matters that 
carry a risk of personal injury): 
• An incident or injury has occurred (and has been reported). 
• Inspectorate-wide strategic priorities (eg ventilation or road surfaces). 
• Inspectoral audits (a proactive strategic program based on risk assessment). 
• Risk management and WHS systems and other on-site documentation. 
• The views of management. 
• Relevant information from workers and their representatives. 
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• Previous WHS and compliance history.  
 
If the inspector does not find a hazard or breach, then no further action is taken. If the 
inspector does find a hazard or breach, then they proceed to Step 2.70  
 
b) Continuing – follow-up to past warning or directive of existing breach. 
 
The inspector already knows about the non-compliance issue. If the circumstances of 
the breach are unchanged, and the issue has not been remedied (or a process for 
remedy put in place), the inspector proceeds directly to Step 5 with the assumption of a 
negative duty-holder factor. If the circumstances have changed, the inspector proceeds 
to Step 2. 
 
Step 2:  Determine the nature of the hazard or breach 
 
The inspector determines the nature of the hazard or non-compliance issue, whether it 
presents a direct and/or management-based risk71, and including estimating the extent 
to which it falls short of relevant WHS benchmarks (eg a prescribed standard, relevant 
code of practice, industry norm). 
 
                                                
70 This raises the issue of how an inspector determines if there is a breach (eg they may make a 
comparison of the actual state of premises compared to the standard set in the regulations or 
Act). In the interests of reducing complexity, we chose not to examine this question in detail. 
NMSF steering group members, especially inspectors, may have further suggestions. 
71 It is important to recognise at this point that direct and management-based risks are not 
mutually exclusive, and that some hazards or compliance issues may contain elements of both. 
In such cases, inspectors should address both direct and management-based risks 
concurrently. 
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a) Direct hazard/non-compliance 
 
The hazard or non-compliance issue poses a direct risk to WHS. For example, there 
may be a missing guard-rail, or electrical power is not correctly isolated. The inspector 
estimates the performance gap according to the following categories:  
• Small performance gap – falls just short of WHS benchmarks. 
• Medium performance gap – falls substantially short of WHS benchmarks. 
• Large performance gap – entirely fails to address WHS benchmarks.  
 
The identified performance gap will be utilised in Step 5. The inspector proceeds to 
Step 3. 
 
b) Management-based non-compliance 
 
The non-compliance issue is management-based. For example, there may be a safety 
management system that does not meet regulatory requirements, or risk assessment 
procedures that may be inadequate. The inspector estimates the level of management-
based performance gap according to following categories: 
• Minor – deficiencies in relevant documentation/administrative arrangements that 
have the potential for limited negative impact and can be easily rectified. 
• Major – deficiencies in relevant documentation/administrative arrangements that 
have the potential for broad negative impact and require substantive modification 
and/or updating. 
• Absent – relevant documentation/administrative arrangements do not exist, and 
need to be created from scratch. 
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The identified management-based performance gap will be utilised in Step 5. But first, 
the inspector proceeds directly to Step 4. 
 
Step 3:  Determine the risk arising from the hazard or breach 
 
Inspector conducts a risk assessment of direct risks and calculates the risk factor.72 
 
a) Identify the level of the risk (how likely is it than a WHS event will occur?): 
• Probable – the hazard or breach presents a very high risk to WHS.  
• Possible – the hazard or breach presents a moderate risk to WHS. 
• Remote – the hazard or breach represents only a remote risk to WHS. 
 
b) Identify the impact of the risk (what is the likely consequence?) 
• High impact – the hazard or breach risks a serious WHS outcome, with substantial 
or complete functional impairment, such as a fatality, loss of limb, major internal 
injury and/or substantial, long-term and irreversible health impacts. 
• Medium impact – the hazard or breach risks a significant WHS outcome, with 
significant function impairment, such as broken limb, large lacerations, serious 
ligament/tendon damage, and/or serious but reversible/manageable medium-term 
health impacts. 
• Low impact – the hazard or breach risks a minor WHS outcome, with limited 
functional impairment, such as minor strains, cuts and abrasions and/or minor 
treatable short-term health impacts. 
                                                
72 It may be argued that the quantitative risk factor is of limited practical value, that it may be 
difficult to implement in the field, and can be seen as arbitrary. While there is merit in this 
criticism, a key requirement of the consultancy brief was to build on the EMM model, which has 
as a risk factor as a central component. 
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c) Identify the extent of the risk (how many individuals are likely to be affected?): 
• Single or few (three or less) individuals at risk. 
• Multiple (more than three) individuals at risk. 
 
Complete initial risk assessment where single or few individuals are at risk based on 
the level and potential impact of risk. Where multiple individuals are at risk, multiply the 
risk factor by 2. 
 
Table 8: Risk factor weightings 
 
 High impact risk Medium impact risk Low impact risk 
Probable risk 9 6 3 
Possible risk 6 3 2 
Remote risk 3 2 1 
 
• Risk factor 9 or greater – the inspector should take immediate action (including 
sealing off the area and/or serving a prohibition notice, which in extreme 
circumstances may result in stopping production) to remove the risk. After 
immediate action has been taken, the inspector then continues through the 
remaining steps. 
• Risk factor less than 9 – the inspector proceeds through the remaining enforcement 
steps. Enforcement action is contingent on what happens under these steps. 
 
Step 4:  Identify the duty-holder(s) and assess duty-holder factors 
 
The inspector identifies the responsible duty-holder/s, and then considers relevant 
duty-holder factors.  
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a) Identify responsible duty-holder(s): 
 
• Mine operator – these include PCBUs, officers and/or directors of corporations, on-
site statutory duty-holders and persons who control or manage workplaces. 
• Downstream duty-holders – these include large whole of site contractors, principal 
contractors, labour hire companies and smaller, trade sub-contractors, and 
employees. 
• Upstream duty-holders – these include designers of plant, buildings and structures, 
manufacturers of plant and substances, and importers/suppliers of plant or 
substances, franchisors and holding companies and persons, who install, erect or 
commission plant.  
 
b) Assess relevant duty-holder(s) (and other public interest) factors: 
• Is the duty-holder obstructionist and unwilling to cooperate? 
• Is the duty-holder intentionally or recklessly in non-compliance? 
• Is the general condition of the mine site poor? 
• Does the duty-holder have a history of non-compliance? 
• Has the duty-holder been subject to previous compliance/enforcement action on 
the same or related issue (this factor only applies to follow-up enforcement action 
with regard to a direct hazard)? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the size and sophistication of 
the duty-holder? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the relative contributions of 
operator, upstream and downstream duty-holders? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the extent to which the duty-
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holder falls short of achieving compliance (cross refer to ‘performance gap’ in 
Step 2)?  
• Is the proposed enforcement action likely to be unnecessarily disruptive to mine 
site operations and/or supplier operations?  
 
Step 5:  Make an enforcement decision 
 
The inspector makes an enforcement decision by weighing the evidence from the 
previous stages to determine which type and level of enforcement action is 
appropriate. The following enforcement response boxes are used to guide the 
decision-making process for direct risks and management-based risks respectively 
(recognising that some issues may contain elements of both). Finally, the inspector 
should review their enforcement decision against public interest factors. 
 
a) Enforcement matrix – direct risks 
 
The following enforcement matrix provides a preferred pyramidal enforcement 
response to breaches with direct risks based on three inputs: 
• The performance gap (Step 2). 
• The risk factor (Step 3). 
• Relevant duty-holder factors (Step 4).  
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Table 9: Enforcement matrix – direct risks 
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Enforcement decision73: 
 
Level 1. Advice, persuasion and warnings 
 
Level 2. Self-inspection and self-audit 
 
Level 3. Improvement, infringement and prohibition notices/directives 
 
Level 4. Mandatory compliance audit  
 
Level 5. Enforceable undertakings and undertakings ‘plus’ or directives 
 
Level 6. Prosecution 
 
b) Enforcement matrix – management-based risks 
 
The following box provides a preferred pyramidal enforcement response to breaches 
with management-based risks based on two inputs74: 
• The performance gap (Step 2) 
• Relevant duty-holder factors (Step 4).  
                                                
73 It is anticipated that jurisdictions will adapt the enforcement levels, both in terms of the 
number and the nature of the levels, to their individual needs and circumstances (in particular, 
the available enforcement tools). One jurisdiction, for example, has indicated a strong aversion 
to the use of enforceable undertakings (citing them as unwieldy and resource intensive). 
Nevertheless, they have been included in these enforcement guidelines as they are a key 
component of the model Work Health and Safety Act.  
74 The enforcement matrix for management risks does not include a risk factor as it is difficult to 
conceive as to how to conduct a risk assessment of management risks (this is why in essence a 
distinction is made between ‘direct risk’ and ‘management-based risk’). The UK Health and 
Safety Executive’s (2005a) EMM approach makes a similar distinction between ‘health and 
safety risks’ and ‘compliance and administrative arrangements’. NMSF Steering Group 
members may have suggestions as to ways to address management-based risks, as distinct 
from direct risks, including the possibility of risk assessments (and how they might be 
conducted). 
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Table 10: Enforcement matrix – management-based risks 
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Enforcement decision75: 
 
Level 1. Advice, persuasion and warnings 
 
Level 2. Self-inspection and self-audit 
 
Level 3. Improvement, infringement and prohibtion notices/directives 
 
Level 4. Mandatory compliance audit 
 
                                                
75 Following on from Footnote 3, it is difficult to conceive of how to impose Levels 5 and 6 
(enforceable undertakings or prosecution) for management-based risks (assuming, in particular, 
an absence of a risk assessment process). As such, the proposed enforcement levels cease at 
Level 4 (mandatory compliance audit). A potential limitation of this approach is that it may imply 
that management bases issues are less important than direct risks (which is not the intention). 
NMSF Steering Group members may have suggestions as to ways to deal with this issue. As 
with direct risks, it is anticipated that jurisdictions will adapt the enforcement levels, both in 
terms of the number and the nature of the levels, to their individual needs and circumstances (in 
particular, the available enforcement tools).  
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c) Review enforcement decision76 
 
Before implementing their enforcement decision, the inspector should review their 
decision against broader public interest factors, in particular: 
• Where injury/disease has resulted, is the proposed enforcement action proportional 
to the level of harm incurred? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the public concern and the need 
for deterrence? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action consistent with other strategic considerations 
(eg the need to send a strong message, given the prevalence of the offence across 
the industry)? 
• Is the decision consistent with comparable cases (like cases should be treated 
alike)? 
 
In reviewing their enforcement decision, inspectors may wish to consult with their peers 
and supervisors to enhance consistency. 
 
Note: A decision-making flow chart and a decision-making checklist for Model A are 
provided below.   
 
                                                
76 It has been suggested that this review component of Step 5 should constitute a separate and 
distinct Step 6, and that this would be consistent with, for example, prominent continuous 
improvement approaches. The authors have considerable sympathy for this view. Nevertheless, 
the review component has been left as a component of Step 5 in order to comply with the 
request of others to simplify and reduce the overall number of decision-making steps. 
  
337 
11.5.2 Sample enforcement decisions (under Model A) 
 
1. Work platform injury 
A worker was injured whilst working on a platform (installing roof cables) attached to a 
load haul dump (LHD) via a quick detach system and being driven by a LHD operator. 
As the LHD was reversed, one rear wheel encountered a 300mm depression in the 
road, causing the platform to pivot upwards and jam the worker into the mine roof, 
breaking his arm.  
 
Step 1. Clarify the purpose visit. 
The inspector visits the accident site after the mine has notified that an accident has 
occurred. This is a prospective inspection, as it does not relate to a prior incident – a 
hazard/breach is yet to be identified. Inspector proceeds to Step 2. 
 
Step 2. Determine the nature of the hazard/breach. 
The inspector determines that a breach has occurred as the work platform and LHD 
arrangement did not comply with relevant WHS regulations, and that it is a direct risk. 
Further, the inspector determines that there is a medium performance gap as the 
breach falls substantially short of relevant WHS benchmarks – in particular, it does not 
match the relevant Australian Standard covering “mobile elevating work platforms” 
(people should not be transported on work platforms unless the work platform is 
designed for travelling). The inspector also notes that there may also be an issue 
relating to the absence of a relevant safe work system. 
 
Step 3. Determine the risk arising from the hazard/breach. 
The inspector determines that the breach represents a possible risk (the platform itself 
is stable when stationary, only when moving does the risk arise) with a high potential 
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impact (a person may fall from the platform or be forced against the mine roof). As 
there are at most two workers on the platform at any one time, there are less than 
three workers at risk. Combined, this produces as risk factor of 6. 
 
Step 4. Identify the duty-holders and duty-holder factors. 
The inspector notes the mine is operated by a sub-contractor and identifies them as 
sharing duty-holder responsibilities with the owners. The inspector notes that although 
they informed the inspectorate of the incident, and have indicated a willingness to 
cooperate, there have been a series of non-compliance issues, albeit for unrelated 
matters. Combined with the poor site (road) conditions that led to the incident, the 
inspector concludes that there is overall a negative duty-holder factor. 
 
Step 5. Make an enforcement decision. 
The inspector applies the medium performance gap, the risk factor of 6 and the 
negative duty holder factor to the enforcement matrix for direct risks, which produces a 
Level 4 enforcement decision: mandatory compliance audit. The inspector reviews the 
enforcement decision and concludes that it is proportional to the level of harm incurred. 
The inspector orders a mandatory compliance audit of work platform arrangements and 
systems/procedures (along with advice and guidance), and a prohibition notice on the 
use of the existing, unsafe work platform until appropriate modifications are made. 
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2. Persistent road dust 
The inspector conducts a follow-up visit to a mine site where a verbal warning has 
been previously issued for non-compliance in failing to keep road dust down by 
frequent watering. 
 
Step 1. Clarify the purpose visit. 
The inspector concludes that the non-compliance issue is continuing, and that the 
circumstances have not changed, and proceeds directly to Step 5. 
 
Step 5. Make an enforcement decision. 
The inspector previously concluded that the road dust was a direct risk and had arrived 
at a Level 1 enforcement decision (based on a small performance gap, positive factors, 
and risk factor of 4 (multiple individuals)). This had resulted in the inspector issuing a 
verbal warning. With an automatic negative duty-holder factor (on the basis that it is 
retrospective visit with a previous enforcement measure), this now becomes a Level 2 
enforcement decision. The inspector requires that the mine conduct a self-inspection 
and a self-audit of its road dust suppression practices. 
 
3. Deficient management system 
The inspector conducts a review of a mine sites’ safety management systems at the 
management’s request. 
 
Step 1. Clarify the purpose visit. 
After reviewing WHS safety management system, focusing on production processes, 
the inspector notes many of the associated Safe Work Procedures pre-date a 
significant change in the longwall process, and are now require substantial updating. 
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Step 2. Determine the nature of the hazard/breach. 
The inspector determines that this is a management-based non-compliance issue. On 
its own, it would qualify as a minor performance gap, but the inspector also notes that 
the scheduled self-audit, review and reporting of the overall WHS management system 
are now more than a year overdue. This tips the scales towards a major performance 
gap. 
 
Step 4. Identify the duty-holders and duty-holder factors. 
The inspector identifies the mine owner/operator as the responsible duty-holder. The 
inspector notes that the mine has an excellent compliance history, and has 
demonstrated a strong willingness to cooperate – as evidenced by their invitation for 
inspectoral review. 
 
Step 5. Make an enforcement decision. 
Even though there is a major performance gap, the positive duty-holder factors lead 
the inspector to issue a verbal warning. The inspector also provides advice and 
guidance on what is required by the mine site to bring their production safety 
management system into compliance. 
 
 
11.5.3 Model B 
 
A minority of NMSF Steering Group members requested enforcement guidelines that 
contain no prescriptive elements in order to maximise inspectoral discretion.  
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Summary of decision-making framework 
Step 1. Clarify the purpose of the visit. 
Step 2. Determine the nature of the hazard/breach. 
Step 3. Determine the risk arising from the hazard/breach. 
Step 4. Identify the duty-holders and duty-holder factors. 
Step 5. Make an enforcement decision. 
 
Step 1:  Clarify the purpose of the visit 
 
Inspectors should clarify the purpose of their visit, in particular, whether it is 
prospective (a breach is yet to be identified) or continuing (a follow-up to a past 
warning or directive). In determining where to direct their regulatory attention, 
inspectors should draw on, but not be limited to, the following sources of information: 
• Accident or incident has occurred (and has been reported). 
• Inspectorate-wide strategic priorities (eg ventilation or road surfaces). 
• Inspectoral audits. 
• Risk management and WHS systems and other on-site documentation. 
• The views of management. 
• Relevant information from workers and their representatives. 
• Previous WHS and compliance history.  
 
Note: Inspectors should deal first with matters that carry the risk of personal injury.  
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Step 2:  Determine the nature of the hazard/breach 
 
Assuming that a hazard or breach is found, the inspector determines the nature of the 
hazard or breach, in particular, whether is an example of direct non-compliance (where 
the breach poses a direct risk to WHS) or it is management-based non-compliance (for 
example, an operator may have a safety management system that does not meet 
regulatory requirements or risk assessment procedures that may be inadequate). The 
inspector should also estimate the extent to which the duty-holder falls short of relevant 
WHS benchmarks (for example, a prescribed standard, relevant code of practice, 
industry norm).  
 
Step 3:  Determine the risk arising from the hazard/breach 
 
Employ the following three factors to conduct a risk assessment of direct risks, 
identifying, in particular, the level of the risk (how likely it is that an WHS event will 
occur), the impact of the risk (what is the likely consequence) and the extent of the risk 
(how many individuals are likely to be affected).  
 
Step 4:  Identify the duty-holder and assess duty-holder factors 
 
The inspector identifies the responsible duty-holder: mine operators (including PCBUs, 
officers and/or directors of corporations, on-site statutory duty-holders and persons 
who control or manage workplaces); downstream duty-holders (including large whole 
of site contractors, labour hire companies and smaller, trade sub-contractors); and/or 
upstream duty-holders (including designers of plant, buildings and structures, 
manufacturers of plant and substances, and importers/suppliers of plant or substances 
and persons, who install, erect or commission plant). The inspector also assesses 
relevant duty-holder factors, including:  
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• Is the duty-holder obstructionist and unwilling to cooperate? 
• Is the duty-holder intentionally or recklessly in non-compliance? 
• Is the general condition of the mine site poor? 
• Does the duty-holder have a history of non-compliance? 
• Has the duty-holder been subject to previous compliance/enforcement action on 
the same or related issue (this factor only applies to follow-up action)? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the size and sophistication of 
the duty-holder? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the relative contributions of 
operator, upstream and downstream duty-holders? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the extent to which the duty-
holder falls short of compliance (cross refer to ‘performance gap’ in Step 2)?  
• Is the proposed enforcement action likely to be unnecessarily disruptive to mine 
site operations and/or supplier operations?  
 
Step 5:  Make an enforcement decision 
 
The inspector makes enforcement decision by weighing the evidence from the previous 
steps to determine which enforcement response is appropriate. In this regard, 
inspectors should strive to incorporate risk based and responsive approaches to 
compliance and enforcement. Before implementing their enforcement decision, the 
inspector should review their decision against broader public interest factors: 
• Where injury/disease has resulted, is the proposed enforcement action proportional 
to the level of harm incurred? 
• Is the proposed enforcement action proportional to the public concern and the need 
for deterrence? 
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• Is the proposed enforcement action consistent with other strategic considerations 
(eg the need to send a strong message, given the prevalence of the offence across 
the industry)? 
 
Note: A decision-making flow chart and a decision-making checklist for Model A are 
provided at Sections 11.6 and 11.7 respectively below.   
 
11.5.4 Investigation and prosecution (under both models) 
 
The decision to investigation and potentially prosecute occurs after an inspectoral 
workplace visit, and necessarily requires the engagement of senior management.  
 
11.5.4.1 Investigation 
 
There are two paths leading to a formal enforcement investigation separate from a no-
blame Investigative Causal Analysis Method type investigation (and potential 
subsequent prosecution). First, an inspector reaches an enforcement decision to 
recommend prosecution and refers the matter to senior management/the investigation 
unit for further consideration – with the latter determining if prosecution is warranted 
and feasible (in the case of smaller jurisdictions, with limited resources, this may not be 
feasible).   
 
Second, in the event of a fatality or a major impact incident involving multiple 
individuals (greater than 3), or an event of high potential without causing damage or 
injury, a formal investigation is obligatory (and will similarly determine if prosecution is 
warranted and feasible).  
 
If a decision to formally investigate has been made it would normally be conducted by 
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an individual or team of inspectors separate from the original inspector, for example, a 
specialist investigation unit (again, in the case of smaller jurisdictions, with limited 
resources, this may not be feasible). 
 
The role of a formal investigation is to determine: 
• The circumstances leading to the risk/event. 
• Who or what is responsible for the formation of those circumstances. 
• The nature, level and attribution of any culpability involved. 
• Whether or not to proceed with prosecution (see below). 
• Who and/or what entity(s) should be subject to prosecution. 
 
11.5.4.2 Prosecution 
 
The model WHS Bill specifies the circumstances if not conditions in defence of 
prosecution under the proposed Act, including who may be prosecuted, available 
appeal mechanisms, prosecution timeframes and communication. Jurisdictions will be 
required to act in accordance with these provisions. Further guidance is provided by 
the national DPP guidelines and a set of prosecution principles (see box below). 
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DPP guidelines 
The Australian Director of Public Prosecutions (DPPs) have agreed upon a common 
set of principles to be used in determining the question as to whether or not a 
prosecution should be commenced, or, if commenced, should be permitted to proceed. 
Although in some jurisdictions these criteria are expressed in different language, they 
do not differ in substance, and should be followed by inspectorates in making a 
prosecution determination. In determining whether or not to prosecute, three criteria 
common to all jurisdictions in the DPP guidelines need to be met. They are as follows: 
1. The existence of a prima facie case, that is, whether the evidence is sufficient to 
justify the institution of proceedings. 
2. There needs to be a reasonable prospect of conviction, that is, an evaluation of how 
strong is the case likely to be when presented in court. This takes into account such 
matters as the availability, competence and credibility of witnesses and their likely 
impression on the court or tribunal that will determine the matter, and the admissibility 
of any confession or other evidence, and any lines of defence available to the 
defendant. 
3. The public interest that may include (but is not limited to) the following 
considerations:  
• To the seriousness or, conversely, the triviality of the alleged offence or whether it 
is only of a technical nature. 
• Any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 
• The characteristics of the duty-holder – any special infirmities, prior compliance 
history and background. 
• The age of the alleged offence. 
• The degree of culpability of the alleged offender. 
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• Whether the prosecution would be perceived as counter-productive, that is, by 
bringing the law into disrepute. 
• The availability and efficacy of any alternatives to prosecution. 
• The prevalence of the alleged offence and the need for deterrence, both specific 
and general. 
• Whether the alleged offence is of considerable public concern. 
• Whether the law needs to be ‘tested’ in cases where the possibility of a conviction 
is hard to verify. 
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11.6 Enforcement flow-chart 
 
 
STEP 1 – CLARIFY THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT  
 
 
 
 
Prospective      Continuing 
 
 
 
 
 
STEP 2 – DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE HAZARD/BREACH 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
STEP 3 – DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE RISK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEP 4 – IDENTIFY DUTY-HOLDER AND FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEP 5 – MAKE AN ENFORCEMENT DECISION 
  
 
Management 
based risk 
Risk factor > 9 (inspector must take action) 
Continuing 
Direct risk 
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11.7 Enforcement checklist (Model A) 
 
Inspection case No: __________________ 
 
1. Purpose of inspection             Prospective                Continuing 
 
If continuing, previous case No: _______ (go to step 5 if unchanged circumstances) 
 
2. Nature of the breach           Direct risk      Management-based  
           (go to step 3)           (go to step 4) 
Brief description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance gap                Small         Medium                  Large 
 
Relevant standard/code of practice:     
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Risk assessment 
 
 High impact risk Medium impact risk Low impact risk 
Probable risk 9 6 3 
Possible risk 6 3 2 
Remote risk 3 2 1 
 
 
Risk factor:  _______  (where multiple individuals at risk (3 or greater), multiply risk factor by 2).   
 
4. Identify duty-holder and duty-holder factors       
 
Responsible duty-holder      Operator    Upstream       Downstream 
 
Name of duty-holder: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Cooperation           Positive         Neutral            Negative 
Motivation    Positive         Neutral            Negative 
Site condition            Positive         Neutral            Negative 
Previous breach          Positive         Neutral            Negative 
Average          Positive     Neutral         Negative 
  
5. Enforcement decision: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(refer to relevant enforcement matrix) 
 
Review decision against levels of harm, public interest/outrage, strategic considerations and like 
cases. 
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Chapter 12: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has addressed two broad themes, first, the factors that may impede the 
achievement of continuous improvement in WHS outcomes across the industry, as well 
as at individual mine sites within coal mining companies, and second, the role of the 
external regulatory environment in impacting on the internal WHS operations of coal 
mining companies.  
 
In terms of the first theme, it was found that WHS management systems do not exist in 
a vacuum. Their implementation and uptake are influenced by the culture into which 
they are received. The presence of mistrust, in particular, in various manifestations 
between corporate managers, mine site managers, middle managers, line managers 
and workers, can have a corrosive impact the efficacy of WHS management systems. 
Where managers or workers fail to embrace such systems, or worse, choose to bend 
their will against them, then this can have very real and detrimental impacts on WHS 
practices and performance outcomes. This can occur despite the best of intentions of 
corporate management in seeking better WHS outcomes through the introduction of 
WHS management systems. The finding was evidenced by the dramatic differences in 
WHS practices and performance across mine sites within a single mining company, 
with a uniform approach to WHS management systems. 
 
Turning to the second theme, the thesis found that, just as mine site culture is crucial to 
WHS practices and performance, so too is the behaviour and attitudes of mining 
inspectors. Here, it is the presence of mistrust between inspectors and miners, 
limitations in the capacity of management-based regulation to overcome persistent 
mine site resistance, and overreach in the application of codes of practice that, 
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collectively, have the capacity to the role of external regulation in complementing and 
enhancing internal WHS management systems adopted by coal mining companies.  
 
Beyond these two overarching themes, there are several key constituent findings that 
help to flesh out the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of contemporary WHS 
practices, performance and regulation in the Australian coal mining industry. First, coal 
mining companies operating have developed and implemented sophisticated WHS 
management systems designed to improve WHS outcomes. This has coincided with an 
impressive declining fatality and injury rates, as measured by official safety statistics, 
and more ambitious WHS improvement targets. It has also coincided with the 
introduction of complementary external government regulation that emphasises 
‘management-based’ approaches, in particular, an integrated systematic approach to 
WHS. In recent years, however, the welcome improvement in WHS outcomes following 
the introduction of WHS management-based architectures have not been sustained, 
and have instead plateaued. This points to potential limitations in the prevailing 
approaches of internal WHS management systems and external WHS regulation.  
 
Second, the thesis examines forensically a crucial component of mine safety culture, 
namely, the presence of mistrust, and its capacity to undermine WHS practices and 
outcomes, in particular, the role of WHS management systems. Mistrust is prominent in 
worker-manager and mine site manager-corporate relations, as well with the external 
WHS inspectorate. The thesis identifies the presence of mistrust as a major threat to 
WHS outcomes, particularly in relation to WHS management systems. As such, the 
presence of mistrust undermines the improvement that can be achieved under WHS 
management systems. 
 
A third finding was the striking differences in culture between mine sites of a single 
company, and how this impacts on WHS outcomes. This is pertinent given the strong 
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emphasis that Australian coal mining companies have placed on the implementation of 
corporate-wide WHS management systems. In particular, there is a cluster of 
characteristics associated within heightened levels of mistrust at mine sites (within a 
single company) that have poorer WHS outcomes.  
 
Further to internal levels of mistrust, a fourth finding is that mistrust between mining 
companies and the regulatory inspectorate undermines WHS outcomes. The 
replacement of an advise and persuade approach with a more adversarial deterrence 
orientated approach leads to mistrust. This constricts communication between miners 
and inspectors, with the former withholding information for fear of assisting future 
prosecutions, and the latter concerned that giving advice could undermine future 
prosecutions.  
 
A fifth finding concerns the role of codes of practice in changing landscape of WHS 
regulation. Although they are an important component of management-based regulation, there 
are major problems with their design and application.  The net effect is that codes have 
become a form of regulation by stealth. And the national harmonisation process has 
missed an opportunity to tailor codes to the particular circumstances of the Australian 
mining sector. 
 
Finally, the thesis found that there is a high degree of variability in the inspectoral 
competencies of regulators across Australian jurisdictions. Given this, there is scope to 
provide scope to provide detailed guidance to inspectors in making enforcement 
decisions, which the thesis provides through a framework of risk-based regulation and 
responsive enforcement.  
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In conclusion, the thesis argues that too much faith has been placed in the capacity of 
WHS management systems to deliver continued improvements in WHS outcomes. In 
large part this is because WHS management systems are subservient to the culture 
into which they are received. The autonomy of Australian coal mining sites, together 
with a history of industrial disputes, undermines the effectiveness of WHS 
management systems. Adding mistrust to this mix only compounds the problems. It 
incumbent on Australian coal mining companies, then, to foster trust within mines sits 
to enhance the capacity of WHS management systems. Further, the tools available to, 
and the behaviour and attitudes of, mining inspectors can also impact on the efficacy of 
internal WHS management systems and, consequently, WHS outcomes. Mistrust 
between miners and inspectors, in particular, can impede the efficacy of management-
based regulation in variety of ways. As such regulators also need to adopt institutional 
practices that complement and support internal company WHS management systems.  
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